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Egyptian Diaspora Explains the Meaning of its Political Engagement in Washington, DC

Sameh hasan Elnaggar
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Walden University

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Sameh Hassan Elnaggar

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2019

Abstract

Egyptian Diaspora Explains the Meaning of its Political Engagement in Washington, DC

by

Sameh Hassan Elnaggar

M.A., Mercy College, 2008

B.S., Cairo University, 1991

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

December 2019

Abstract

Available literature showed that the Egyptian diaspora (e.g., emigrants who share a common situations and work for the same cause) has been developing and engaging politically in the United States during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The diasporas' role was of interest to researchers and policymakers; however, the literature concerning diasporas has underexamined the Egyptian diaspora regarding its proliferation and active political engagement. Using the conflict and climate theories of Truman, and Cigler and Loomis in conjunction with the political engagement factors theory of Jang as the theoretical foundation of the study, the purpose was to explore how members of the diaspora explain and perceive their political engagement in Washington, DC. In this qualitative study, the key characteristics of diaspora and political and social factors of home and host countries that enable and inhibit that engagement regarding particular issues were addressed through 16 in-depth, face-to-face interviews with Egyptian-Americans. Maxwell and Miller's doubled-strategy and Yin's case study steps approach were used for analysis. The findings indicated that the engagement of the diaspora except Coptic and some Islamic groups are passive most of the time because of the political home culture; despite that fact, the diaspora became active for a short time because of the Egyptian revolution. Future research should exam those aspects to better understand the mechanism of building an Egyptian lobby to work continuously and effectively on Egyptian interests in the United States. The diaspora and policymakers may use the study results to help improve the role of this diaspora to impose positive social changes in Egypt and the future political engagement of Egyptian younger generations.

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Dedication

First and foremost, I want to give all thanks to Allah for giving me the strength and perseverance to reach this extraordinary milestone in my life. It was another step

To my father, you are the one who advised me to go for and to Washington, DC. I did and will continue. You saw what I could not see. You are never wrong at all. What a man with long sight! Thank You

To my mother, you are the only one who advised and pushed me to do my M.A. and then my Ph.D. You are right, as usual. I did it for you only. Sorry for the lateness, but it is yours now. I will continue to accomplish more exactly, as you planed. Thank You

To my brother and son. I do love you both but I do not thank you for lack of understanding, support, cooperation, appreciation, and for the disturbance. I am sure that we could do better in the past seven years and we should do the best for the future

To his Excellency President Donald Trump, for his exceptional inspiration and views

To many people, some ones in Walden University, FAFSA, etc., I see no reason to thank because 7 years and 160 K+ are enough thanks.

Enemy, thanks for showing me that I am not equal to you. I am free now.

To Sameh Hasan Elnaggar, thanks for believing in Allah, being positive and nonstop working super hard, being extremely patient as well as many other good things and deeds

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

The topic of the study was the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in the United States in the context of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the events that followed, including the 2013 revolution. The focus of the study was on the politically active Egyptian population in the Washington, DC metropolitan area employing the Alliance of Egyptian Americans (AEA) group as a representative case for that population. The 2011 revolution began as demonstrations on January 25, 2011, Egyptian National Police Day, with an announced goal of social and political reforms (Heggy, 2011). The Egyptian diaspora abroad supported the protesters (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp. 357-358). February 11, 2011 marked the end of the 30 years of the Mubarak regime (Heggy, 2011).

The protesters assumed this triumph marked the complete end of that era, and a new goal emerged: a civic regime in Egypt; however, according to Heggy (2011), later in 2011, it became clear that although Mubarak had gone, the regime itself was only weakened, not toppled. People kept demonstrating widely, demanding “social justice, freedom, and welfare” (Heggy, 2011). The 2011 revolutionary triumph was followed by consequences: A military rule was instituted preventing democratic transition (Habatamu, 2017, p. 44). The Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country for one year; however, the second revolution on June 30, 2013, against them followed this event.

Researchers disagree over whether June 30 was a revolution or rather a coup. There is also significant disagreement on whether 2011 was a revolution or a foreign

conspiracy that was based on hidden cooperation between the Western states and domestic Islamic powers. Regardless of that disagreement, there is a lack of national as well as international consensus on whether both events were beneficial or harmful to the country. The study-collected data will provide evidence to support these substantive statements later in Chapters 4 and 5.

The 2011 revolution also caused tremendous changes in the role and influence of the domestic Egyptian political powers and civil society as well as the role and influence of Egyptians living abroad (El-Saeed, 2012). The main assumption of my study was that the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had significant effects on the Egyptian group living abroad—their interests as well as their political engagement. I tested this assumption based on my study participants' answers to the interview questions. The 2011 revolution and several changes in the Egyptian ruling administrations have imposed profound and broad changes in Egyptians' political attitudes and engagement inside Egypt and abroad (Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 8). Severo and Zuolo (2012) cited Médam's summary of the changing status of this diaspora as "still fluid, shifting, [and] floating" (p. 7).

Having said that, I found that comparing the Egyptian case to other diasporas such as the Korean and Jewish diasporas can be beneficial. Jang's (2012, 2014) work contributed to the base of my theoretical foundation. About the Korean case, Jang (2014) wrote, "Scholars as well as the Korean community leaders posit that Koreans are becoming more politically conscious and have been since the 1992 Los Angeles riot" (p. 634). Similarly, the Egyptian diaspora had a historic event that affected its style of political engagement and social changes.

There are many essential differences between the Korean and Egyptian cases; however, a similar situation—lack of interest in political engagement and a remarkable event or historic turning point—happened in both cases. Regarding the relatively small size of both diasporas, the Korean American population in the United States is much bigger than the Egyptian one but is still smaller than Mexican and Cuban diasporas. As I will explain in detail, great changes affecting the typical passive attitude of both populations have occurred. However, one of the differences between the two cases is that the event was local in the Korean case (i.e., the 1992 Los Angeles riots against Korean businesses) and involved non-Koreans, while in the Egyptian case; the event (i.e., the 2011 Cairo massive demonstrations against the national regime) occurred on Egyptian land and involved only Egyptians. In the next chapter, I will discuss a number of factors that might explain differences in political behavior between the Korean and Egyptian diasporas.

This study was necessary because of its potential social and political implications. The study findings could enable the diaspora members to maximize benefits to their country's economic welfare and political interests in Washington, DC by lobbying the U.S. government in a consistent, organized, and professional manner. As suggested by Filipovic, Devjak, and Ferfila (2012), one of the primary interests of the policy makers of countries became the cooperation between them and their local diasporas dealing with diaspora and development-related issues such as promoting of networks and strategic alliances (pp. 7-8). The results of the study can be used to call for improving better cooperation between the Egyptian diaspora and the diasporas of other countries, the home

and host lands, and the Egyptian diaspora members themselves. Active diaspora should support the social progress inside the homeland regarding several concerns, such as human rights in Egypt. In this study, I will also offer suggestions for future research so that ethnic minorities could contribute to building a stronger democracy in increasingly diversifying societies.

In this chapter, I introduce the current situation of the Egyptian diaspora and its political appearance and engagement. The chapter includes the background of the diaspora studies related to the scope of this study to better understand the Egyptian diaspora problem. The nature of the study, its significance, limitations, and definition of terms are also provided in the chapter.

Background of the Study

Jang's (2014) Korean diaspora study provided the substructure for my study of the Egyptian diaspora case. As I mentioned before, both cases have several similarities that I will detail. Jang studied the Korean diaspora showing its characteristics as well as its typical passive engagement and the new positive changes in that engagement. Jang's exploratory study on Korean political engagement in Washington, DC is the modified brief of the author's 2012 dissertation. According to Jang (2014), building upon framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), the study applied qualitative grounded theory approach to examine how members of the Korean diaspora Washington, D.C., provided meaning to their political engagement on their own words. The theory of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad addressed the aforementioned general, known factors of place, type of group, and organizational type.

For that purpose, Jang (2012, 2014) addressed several known factors that could be related to diasporas in general, then generated new factors that are related to the Korean diaspora in particular. Those factors all influence that desired engagement in different ways or levels. Jang built the theory or model inductively (i.e., it was empirically based on the reciprocal relationships among the data collected from interviewing study participants).

In this study, I used a combination of the theory of Jang (2012, 2014) on the political engagement of the Korean diaspora in particular and Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's (2008) theory for the general political engagement factors. This combination constituted the major components of my own theoretical framework for building my study and its findings inductively about the Egyptian diaspora, assuming a valid comparison between the Korean and Egyptian cases. Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad suggested other factors that have been found to encourage and discourage political engagement of ethnic Koreans in Washington, DC, including underestimation of the self's political engagement, lack of strong ownership toward the host lands, and negative perception toward politics (Jang, 2014). Jang (2012, 2014) addressed these new factors inductively based on the personal perceptions of the participants while giving much attention to several elements such as religion. I will explain these factors and others in detail in Chapter 2.

Another justification for drawing comparisons between the Korean-American diaspora and the Egyptian diaspora is a special quality of the framework for Jang's examination of political engagement of ethnic Koreans: It focused on a significant

weakness, which was the negative relationship between the church institution and politics. This central finding of Jang's study might be in contrast with my assumption in this study about the Egyptian diaspora or might support it. As I will detail in Chapter 2, the emphasis on places of worship is essential for 21st-century diaspora political mobilization in the United States and, therefore, was one of the focuses of my research hypotheses.

Jang's (2014) research is also related to the scope of my study at several other points. Jang explored new factors and characteristics that were not mentioned in the literature, and in my study, I tested their appropriateness to the Egyptian case. According to Sheffer's (2006) data, the Korean and Egyptian groups are incipient diasporas and not old or historical in the United States. In different words, the Korean and Egyptian groups are different from other, older groups, such as the Jewish or Cubans, and the Korean and Egyptian groups might have similar time and push factors for immigration. Considering both diasporas as incipient should not mean that they are similar in total. They are still different for a variety of reasons including the difference between their home countries in many aspects, such as size population size and economy.

The general tone of Jang's (2014) study is negative regarding the past and current image of Koreans' political engagement. The factors Jang listed, tested, or modified implied a deficiency in engagement level and activities. My personal experience and readings in the available literature and resources gave me the same impression about the Egyptian diaspora; however, I tested the correctness of this essential impression and will provide more details on the results in Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Jang gave some

recommendations for a better future but did not provide promising indicators that the Korean diaspora future would be different. Hence, it would be more rational and practical to employ that model (i.e., negative failure factors, or at least, unstable engagement) than to use a model of positive factors or successful diaspora such as the Armenian or Jewish.

On the other hand, both the Egyptian and Korean cases have a specific turning point--the racial discrimination and Los Angeles riot in 1992 in the Korean case, and the revolutions against Mubarak's rule in January 2011 as well as the Muslim Brotherhood group in June and July 2013 in the Egyptian case. I found that these events are indeed critical in the formation of the Egyptian American diaspora as well as its polarization and weakness and, therefore, was significant. The respective turning points imposed notable changes on the political and social engagement of both diasporas; however, the changes from the first Egyptian revolutionary event were different from those of the latter as I explained in the Chapter 2.

Jang (2014) found that this external factor, the 1992 riot in Los Angeles, changed the typical Korean passive attitude (p. 634). Ban and Adams (1997) urged Korean communities and leaders to stop being isolated socially and financially from the other racial minorities. The authors recommended those communities to "make effort to live in harmony with their neighbors of other color...participate actively in various events occurring in their neighboring minority communities ...and to announce...actively, their...positive aspects of their lives as American citizens" (pp. 75–76).

I expected Jang's (2012, 2014) findings to support my idea that external factors (i.e., the revolution event) can change the traditional, passive characteristics of diaspora

and make for more engagement. However, regarding the nature of the turning points, I had to account for the differences in these cases. Korean Americans were attacked in the United States, whereas Egypt is far away from the United States. Therefore, I intended to focus exclusively on the abstract idea of the effect of the external factors in general (i.e., the sudden event or turning point) and its impact on a diaspora's negative or positive change. In addition, Jang's grounded theory design showed that not all factors apply equally to all diaspora groups and members. For example, the influence of a language barrier on Latinos, Koreans, and Mexicans was different. Jang clarified the different relationship between the religion factor and political engagement of ethnic Koreans in DC. With a practical study, Jang sought ways of improving the typical, limited engagement.

However, generalization of Jang's (2012, 2014) findings is still possible. Jang's findings contribute to the development of theory building for studies on the political engagement of ethnically diverse groups because the author offered propositions that other researchers can test and apply to the theory-building process in the political science discipline. In particular, Jang's (2014) findings suggest areas for future research on whether non-church-affiliated Koreans also do not contribute politically (p. 649). In the Egyptian case, many non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians are also not politically active. Of course, in the Egyptian case, the reason is not always or only the politically passive stand of the religious institution or the separation between politics and religion. Before my study provided evidence to support this statement, it would not be accurate to conclude anything about whether Washington, DC-area mosques, and Muslim

religious organizations facilitate Egyptian Americans' mobilization or not. Egyptian Americans generally might not be active because of other several factors related to the diaspora in general.

Jang (2012, 2014) did not detail the differences in the religious impact on Korean political involvement based on the differences among the three types of Korean church, the Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists, and sectarian conflicts. Jang just used a general term, the Korean Church. In a similar way, I addressed the impact of religion without regard to the type of the church and mosque, their different stances, and any level of sectarian conflict among them that might include the distrust and dislike seen between many Egyptian Christians and Muslims in this study. However, the particular question of the likelihood of political contribution by non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians needed to be addressed by the interview questions as an essential part of my scope.

Although Jang (2014) found that the relationship between religious affiliation and political engagement was negative or lost in the Korean case because the church was strong enough to prevent mixing politics with faith, I did not assume the same could be applied to the Egyptian case, particularly for the mosques. According to Jang (2014), the high level of involvement in religious institutions has a strong positive influence on political involvement for Muslims and Arabs. In contrast, the Korean diaspora does not show this level of relationship (Jang, 2014).

In calling for social change in the diaspora population, Jang (2014) recommended increasing the impact of the religion factor toward more political involvement to make that social change. Because the majority of Koreans are affiliated with their churches,

church and community leaders should be open to collaborating to find ways of enabling their Christian community and especially encouraging the younger generation to engage politically without harming their beliefs (Jang, 2014, p. 649). I challenged Jang's call in application to the Egyptian diaspora due to the differences in the respective roles of Korean and Egyptian religious institutions. The problematic nature of the role of mosques comes from their refusing the separation between the state and religion. According to Pratt (2005), this separation does not exist in the Islamic Arabic culture, and in fact, Islamic cultural concepts include the invention of political Islam (p. 74).

My claim was contrary to the social change that Jang (2014) looks for. The social and political role (i.e., other than worship) of the mosques is stronger than the Korean church role because some mosques are involved in politics intensively (Jang, 2014). Many governments do not welcome this role and consider it harmful; therefore, the desired social change for the diaspora reality and mosques might need to be directed toward decreasing that extra role. In other words, the role that mosques can fill to help the home country as well host communities is to act as the Korean church does. They might need to be limited to the basic traditional role, which is the pure worship, as many governments such as the Egyptian government wish.

This raises the question of why mosque involvement could be detrimental in some cases and times. I investigated the outreach activities and political role of some mosques as well as the American government and local societal attitudes toward those activities in the literature review in Chapter 2 and data collection report in Chapter 4. Contemporary religious movements and groups are a form of politicized religion, and this means that

they pragmatically manipulate the religion as a political medium and combine it with an efficacious tactic of violence, seeking to educate and change the face and values of *jahiliyyah* (i.e., “conscious ignorance”) of societies to obtain political power (Friedland, 2011, pp. 66-67, 75). The minimum outcome that the radical Islamists fight for can be seen as achieving the governance and religionization of the society and nation-states (Friedland, 2011, p. 66). According to Benard (2008), “Mosque-state separation and religious freedom appear to have stalled in Muslim-majority countries, leading scholars, theologians, and policymakers to conclude that a theocratic model of governance [such as Iran after 1979] is inevitable for the Islamic world” (p. 65). Maybe some Muslim and non-Muslim countries have realized these facts, but others still try to ignore or resist them.

Hypothetically, the desirable features in the Korean American case regarding activating the involvement of religious or worship institutes in the political realm to lobby for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. In the results and conclusions chapter, I dealt with whether such a hypothesis can be ultimately proved or disproved. The religion factor will be addressed by the interview instrument questions.

Mehrez and Hamdy (2010, p. 250) composed one of the few studies on the Egyptian diaspora; it concerned one type, the skilled diaspora, focusing on the professional members residing in different regions. The scope of the study was limited to the diaspora-homeland relationships only. That particular sector, the well-educated and skilled members of the diaspora, is capable of supporting the country in many areas: investment, human resources, technology transfer, medical facilities, and charity (Mehrez

& Hamdy, 2010). The authors examined whether and how the skilled diaspora contributes to the development of Egypt and what are the potential sorts of the desired contributions.

Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) gave several indications about the diaspora characteristics and its social engagement abroad; however, the authors also inquired about to what degree and in which areas the skilled diasporas could engage in efforts in their host communities to benefit their parent country, Egypt. Similarly, the scope of my study was limited to certain types of the diaspora members based on their location, education level, political interest, and other affiliations. This implies that I was focused on the members who have attributes that can make them a leader or political activist, such as native-level equivalent influence in English, high education, high income, and so on. Having said that, the results of this study might also support the assumption of Ceschi, Coslovi, Mora, and Stocchiero (2005), who stated that the Egyptian diaspora could be able to canalize new migrants for working purposes; however, formalization of its social role can be also an effective action insinuating excellent political relevance (p. 53). Chapter 4 showed whether the Egyptian diaspora members support the new immigrants or not as an aspect of the engagement and loyalty to the homeland.

Based on the previously summarized research literature related to the scope of the study topic, there is a gap in this existing literature needed to be covered. Jang (2014) commented on this gap, stating, “[the] body of literature on the political engagement of ethnically diverse publics is growing, however, research on this population remain less compared to native-born, as many immigrants are not yet U.S. citizens” (p. 630). One of

the underresearched ethnic groups is the Egyptian. The major need was to know how the Egyptian diaspora behaves regarding its proliferation and fall, in particular its political performance. What makes this group or some of its members develop and engage or disengage in the U.S. political sphere and why that engagement concurs at intervals needed to be explored. As Sheffer (2006) said, “such studies are necessary to facilitate assessment of the potential for diaspora’s further development” (p. 250).

One of the major factors behind that style of engagement is the salient external factor, the 2011 and 2013 revolutions in Egypt. There is a need to explore what was known as typical about the Egyptian diaspora before that turning point has, for several reasons, been changed during and after the revolutions. What has been changed in Egyptians’ political life abroad and whether that change has continued or waned after the revolution also needed to be explored. Some of the literature, such as Severo and Zuolo (2012), has addressed the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its impact on the country as well as the region; however, the current literature has not mentioned the impact on Egyptians abroad and their political development. Severo and Zuolo asserted that the revolution has changed the diaspora positively (pp. 3-4). They also thoroughly explored the revolution’s impact on the Egyptian e-diaspora (i.e., websites of the Egyptian emigrant community) all over the world, but did not focus on an actual (i.e., not online) diaspora in a specific geographic area such as the United States—their scope was wide and global.

As the diaspora is subject to the influence of several factors and parties on one hand; on the other hand, it can be an effective factor influencing the political bodies, environment, and foreign politics of the homeland and host land. According to Sheffer

(2006), new world disorder can in part be attributed to diasporas themselves and their good or bad agendas and conflicts so that dispersed groups deserve additional investigation. The historically active Jewish diasporas, the incipient Iraqi diasporas before 2003, and Russians after 1990 are all examples of that role and importance for the world at different times (Sheffer, 2006, p. 248).

This significant status of diasporas is not limited to the Egyptian diaspora. Diasporaism is an extreme case in general because of the globalization implementations and critical complex social and political circumstances of diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, p. 249). This extreme status should impose the present and future need to study issues such as the nature of the diaspora identities and loyalty patterns. These last two issues connect to another issue: the confrontation and challenges that diasporas can cause to both types of governments, the host and home. Sheffer (2006) urged future researchers to answer the question of “whether or not we currently have strategies adequate to reduce the tensions and conflicts associated with such groups” (p. 249).

Problem Statement

The problem was that the Egyptian diaspora is not continually active with unpredictable political and social behavior because of unknown factors that need to be addressed with research. As Severo and Zuolo (2012) have said, “Few studies have been carried out on Egyptians abroad, and the majority concerns the link between remittances and development. In particular, very few of the studies are recent and focus on [diaspora] political or lobbying role” (p. 7). There is a scarcity of empirical, updated information on the Egyptian diaspora’s characteristics and the connection between those inherent,

influential characteristics and the external engagement factors (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp. 353). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to close the gap of a clear understanding of a comprehensive model for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as well as political engagement factors in Washington, DC in particular.

In general, researchers have noted the importance of diasporas' influence on the formulation of foreign policy in the diaspora's home and host countries (Ambrosio, 2002). Diasporas are an influential player in many host states, especially in democratic states such as the United States, and they will play a growing role; however, not all diasporas and lobbies are equal concerning this influential role (Ambrosio, 2002). Existing research has delineated multiple factors that increase or decrease the diasporas' role and ability to exercise their power. However, I noticed that the existing literature's stance toward some incipient (i.e., groups at initial stage) and new ethnic diaspora groups is different, and toward the Egyptian diaspora is very different, if not insufficient. Some studies offered a panoramic image, and others focused on some key diasporas only, such as the Jewish and Cubans.

Available research that considers the Egyptian diaspora is limited to two major types. Most of the research, such as Dickinson (2008) on the Egyptian diaspora, focused on the Coptic sector as a unique group in the United States. The other type focused on the relationship between the diaspora and home countries, which consists mostly of financial contribution (Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 7). Most studies on political engagement were conducted on White or Anglo ethnic (i.e., native-born), ignoring or not focusing enough

on other groups such as the incipient Korean diasporas (Jang, 2012) and Pakistani diasporas or the relatively new and growing groups such as Egyptian.

For known and unknown reasons, the Egyptian diaspora used to be a passive group but became very active in Egypt and abroad during and right after the recent Egyptian revolution based on its action and reaction to the removal of Mubarak (Severo, & Zuolo, 2012, p. 9). Despite the growing number of some diasporas and their tremendous immigration waves, the Egyptian diaspora is not very active; therefore, it is being ignored by governments and researchers. I will explain different factors behind this situation.

The relatively small size—approximately less than quarter a million in the United States as of 2013 (Migration Policy Institute [MPI], 2015)—and weak influence of the Egyptian diaspora might be another reason for being ignored by the researchers. However, the population of Egyptian immigrants has grown recently because of several reasons, including the 9/11/2001 event and its offspring. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to understand how those newcomers experience the acculturation process in their new host land (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 3). The increase in diaspora populations in U.S. society has influenced the engagement of some diasporas positively compared to some other large-population diasporas (Jang, 2014). Therefore, there is a growing academic interest in the diasporas and interest groups (Filipovic et al., 2012, p. 49).

However, an initial review of the literature revealed the growing number of new citizens, good opportunities for political practicing in the U.S. welcoming sphere, and

other positive factors. Despite this observation, little is known about the political engagement influence of specific groups, such as the new or small ethnic groups on the formulation of American foreign policy (Jang 2014; Ramakrishna & Espenshade, 2001; Sheffer, 2006). This finding shows that my research problem itself focuses on some meaningful gaps in the research-based literature that my work helped to fill. Such literature has led to more interest in and recognition of the need to study the factors of political engagement of some particular incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups, especially in Washington, DC (Jang, 2012, 2014), including the Egyptian diaspora. Therefore, there was a need to explore and understand whether that Egyptian diaspora could have potential engagement, influence, and success.

Purpose of the Study

The qualitative case study approach is designed to obtain an in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). The general rationale for this research paradigm is the need to understand how some factors regarding that phenomenon happen and work in one way or another. Based on that chosen general methodological frame and the study problem, in this study, I responded to the need for clearer understanding of whether and how, based on its characteristics and related external factors, the Egyptian diaspora engages in and contributes to the political process. That political process, in particular, concerns some contemporary Egyptian political issues and the U.S. foreign policy toward those issues, which was addressed by the research questions.

Hypothetically, the Egyptian diaspora reacts to the Egyptian national events and not acts or has initiatives. Therefore, the engagement of the diaspora is temporary and takes a model of waves that need to be understood. Understanding this pattern should explain whether that diaspora could have potential engagement, influence, and success; therefore, the study aims to understand that general model of the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora; its political engagement factors and style in Washington, DC, in particular; and the interactive relation between the characteristics and factors. Hence, the research and interview questions were developed to explore the political engagement interests and issues of the Egyptian diaspora addressing topics, such as Egyptian immigration to America, good governance and democracy, mixing religion and politics and terrorism, and the Egypt–U.S. relationship.

In this study, I explored those issues that were of interest for the diaspora members (i.e., the study participants) and could indicate their political engagement within their time context. That time context and boundary was the 2011 revolution against Mubarak's regime and 2013 events against the short rule of the Muslim Brotherhood-imposed changes regarding these issues and how the Egyptian diaspora interacts with them. Therefore, I interviewed different types of people, such as those who have founded organizations and those who attend mosques or churches infrequently, regularly, or very frequently. The interview questions addressed this religious affiliation as an independent variable and how it might affect the dependent variable, which were the issues of political engagement.

In sum, the purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, describe, and share information regarding the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and its different members and subgroups in Washington, DC before and after the revolutions. Another goal was to determine the key joined internal and external factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular issues or forms. The 2011 revolution was the major factor that I explored in this study regarding its impact on diaspora engagement behavior. The pivotal focus on this factor was inspired by Jang's (2014) study but aligning closer with Jang's focus on the existential threat Korean Americans felt following the Los Angeles riots was not the only basis of this focus. There was also a need to explore and test my hypothesis about the shift in the Egyptian diaspora attitude. To do that, I employed a known factor—the revolution—that was of crucial importance in relation to the development of and change in the diaspora's engagement. Other factors were also explored and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.

Research Questions

Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host country) of political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative perception of politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?

Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such as the Egyptian revolution and the following presidential elections?

Theoretical Foundation

My theoretical foundation was based on a combination of those theories concerning three connected wings: the diaspora proliferation, characteristics, and factors of their engagement as I mentioned in the purpose section. The essential theoretical framework of my study was Jang's (2012, 2014) theory on the Korean diaspora. Jang's model was the basis for generating my pattern of meanings and themes of the Egyptian diaspora case. Nevertheless, I explored additional proliferation and engagement factors derived from different cases other than Jang's model, such as the Ethiopian case.

Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) highlighted the place, group type, and organization type as three factors that could affect the civic and political engagement of ethnic groups (Jang, 2012, p. 42). Jang's (2014) new model examined some of these factors. Building upon the theoretical framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, Jang also developed new factors pertinent to the Korean diaspora's political engagement, such as the lack of organization and religious institutions (p. 637). According to Jang's theory, the Korean diaspora has not had a sense of how they might be active in meaningful ways, and they have lacked opportunities to engage in political conversations. Jang's model includes factors that were mainly relevant to why the diaspora was not very engaging or influential. Not all elements are found to have direct or similar influence on the level of political involvement for diasporas (Jang, 2014, p. 633).

Jang's (2014) theory is the modified application of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's model of the general political engagement factors (p. 629). Jang extended and refined that original theory of diaspora political engagement in order to generate a theory on the Korean diaspora inductively at the end of a qualitative study. That theory examined factors that might encourage or inhibit ethnic Koreans' political engagement as well as ways in which they make meaning of political engagement.

It should be noted that the debate in the literature on the diaspora definitions and identification relates to diaspora proliferation and development. I found that the theories of identification and proliferation included and were related to the factors and employed strategies of the political engagement of diasporas. In particular, Cigler and Loomis (2007) briefly showed some theories of the proliferation of ethnic interest groups, including the seminal theory of Truman. Those studies on diaspora proliferation and ethnic political engagement have identified diaspora characteristics and factors to explain the existence of opportunities for some ethnic and dispersed groups to be politically influential in the U.S. environment (Cigler & Loomis, 2007).

As I will detail in Chapter 2, when leaders and members act, the diaspora emerges somewhere and vice versa, leaders emerge, and members act when diaspora comes to the real world. In different words, "Diasporas have to be invented and mobilized in order to come into existence" (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 315). The diaspora leadership and members should be active supporting a specific national cause consistently based on its feeling of attachment to the home if they want to be considered as an active influential group in the host land political scene (McCormick, 2012; Oswiecinski, 2013).

The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different in their political engagement and the outcomes of the engagement factors. The potential similarities and differences were one of my justifications for choosing the theoretical framework of Jang (2012, 2014). I chose the Korean model as a key base for comparison with the targeted Egyptian case; however, I did not ignore other classical diaspora cases, such as the Jewish in New York and Washington, DC or Ethiopian and Cuban groups. These groups and the Egyptian diaspora share some political, historical, cultural, and possibly physiological roots. My use of any component of a diaspora case depended on the similarity and connectivity with the Egyptian case and appropriateness to the chapter content. For example, no other study mentioned the underestimation of self's political engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and negative perception of politics as a factor of civic and political influence of diasporas. These factors and others in the Jang model have much to do with the Egyptian case and do not exist or relate to other diaspora cases, as I will show in the literature review.

Concerning the theories of proliferation of diaspora and other interest groups, Jang's (2014) theory of Korean diaspora engagement did not address them. Cigler and Loomis (2007) proposed that the surrounding national, tolerant climate should lead to and interpret the expected proliferation of groups and organizations within the U.S. sociopolitical environment. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, this theory can be insufficient to explain some cases of diaspora proliferation and political engagement, such as the Korean and Egyptian cases. Therefore, Cigler and Loomis introduced Truman's theory of groups' proliferation through the conflict of the groups' interests.

The function of theory is to explore and address research questions (Creswell, 2009, p. 49). The research questions should relate to and build upon existing theory or theories, and I will explain that alignment in detail in Chapter 2. For example, one of my questions concerned the political engagement style of the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC and why it takes a zigzag course. According to the conflict theory of Truman (as cited in Cigler & Loomis, 2007), “group formation ‘tends to occur in waves’ and is greater in some periods than in others” (p. 8). As the research questions and study approach show, my central interest in the current study was how the participants made sense of the phenomenon of diaspora political engagement and how their points of view informed the study, rather than determining what actually happened and what they really thought was true. Jang (2014) adopted this methodological base to generate a theory inductively, and I will apply the same method to my Egyptian case.

My approach aligns with the theory of Truman for proliferation and of Jang for engagement because all of these models consider the interest groups’ conflict approach. The social disturbance that Koreans faced in 1992 was an external factor; it was a calling for organizational unity and mobilization (Jang, 2014). Group conflict, however, was not the major element of Jang’s theory. The relation between the existing theories and my study approach and questions was one of my rationales for choosing these theories of proliferation and engagement.

There is a body of work called social identity theory that might be useful in explaining diaspora behavior, and it is more recent than Truman’s interest group approach. Sheffer’s (2014) new model of convergence and divergence in diaspora-host

government relationships and the diaspora-home country relationships also revealed the migration causes and proliferation factors that would be essential for understanding those questions. Therefore, I used the second prong of my theoretical foundation, the political engagement factors theories of Jang and of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, to explain the proliferation of diasporas. This conclusion might lead to some validity concerning my study approach. The uniqueness of the diaspora characteristics could explain why it can be studied as an extreme case. I describe the case as extreme because it includes weak proliferation, unhelpful characteristics, and unique inconsistent political engagement behavior, which all lead to notable failure or at least unstable mobilization and success. The extreme case is one of the rationales for selecting a single case rather than a multiple-case design (Yin, 2014).

Regarding the Egyptian diaspora, extant studies, such as Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) and Mowafi and Farag (n.d.), were limited to the diasporas' connections to the homeland (in particular, economic and financial contributions to the home development). The scope of research by Dickinson (2008) and Zohry and Debnath (2010) was the Egyptian diaspora-host land relationship. There was no single, peer-reviewed study addressing both sides at the same time or addressing the proliferation and political engagement jointly. Oliver and Montgomery (as cited in Nkongolo-Bakenda & Chrysostome, 2013) asserted that, to play an effective role, the diaspora should consider "the conditions in the home country and those in the host country [or the external factors], as well as the profile of the diasporas involved [or the group characteristics]" (p. 34). That said, exploring why and when individuals establish or leave a diaspora should

be connected to the understanding of the individuals' inclinations and the characteristics of that diaspora and the external factors that affect the diaspora characteristics and political engagement.

Nature of the Study

The central phenomenon of this study was not the ethnic Egyptian population itself as an intrinsic case. I selected the Egyptian diaspora as an instrumental case to best understand the aspects and unique phenomenon of Egyptian diaspora political activities and engagement in specific Egyptian issues and forms, such as human rights matters in Egypt, Egyptian governance, and Egypt–U.S. relationships. The issue of Egyptian governance affects other current issues in Egypt and between Egypt and the United States. Determining which issue should be the focus was important because the research questions reflected and connected those issues. If the focus included other forms of the political participation activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political system, then it would also be good to indicate what they could be. For example, political participation can be focused on shaping U.S. policymakers' views about Egypt's internal politics or economy or something specific like Egypt's position regarding the dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile River. This latter example might be something that highly educated Egyptian Americans might be attentive to. Other issues and related questions could have been how the interviewees viewed the President El-Sisi government or the 2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups, which are controversial.

The overarching focus of this study was how Egyptian Americans attempt to influence the U.S. government. In previous sections of this chapter, I mentioned the

issues of Egyptian Americans' political participation and engagement as well as others, such as facilitating emigration to America. Facilitating emigration is important issue because it can include and affect many other forms of political participation. My study would achieve the goal of investigating the political engagement by addressing the Egyptian diaspora characteristics as well as several external factors, such as the current revolution, that could all relate to and affect the weak political role and engagement of this diaspora.

I conducted a qualitative single case study using in-depth interviewing as the main method to collect data. The qualitative method guided my research approach in several ways. According to Jang (2014), The interest of the researcher in the daily, social interactions as expressed and attributed by the study participants themselves is one reason for choosing the qualitative method. There was compatibility between the qualitative tradition and my research activities, personal goals, and designed research questions. This compatibility justified my personal motives and values for doing a qualitative study, which aligned well with my abilities and subjective interest in the tradition of qualitative fieldwork (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 26).

The qualitative design of this study was a case study. In general, the case study is an approach involving an in-depth exploration of a specific bounded system or case(s), such as a program, organization, event, and individual or individuals (Creswell, 2013). Case studies can be an intrinsic single, instrumental single (within site), or collective (multisite) (Creswell, 2013). I adopted the approach of single case study, including a small number of embedded subunits (not cases) because of the analytical and practical

considerations of the study. Therefore, the purpose of choosing a particular Egyptian organization and some individuals was so they could function as analysis units for this single case study. I used only those units to help the case illustrate, explore, and present an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon or concern of my study. Qualitative tradition and case study design require collecting data from several sources considering validity issues, and the analysis units should help further this goal and develop the in-depth understanding of the case and topic (Creswell, 2013).

Operational Definitions

Some of the key concepts and terms in this study will likely be found in the literature or everyday conversation and will often have a wide array of meanings therefore, I provided concise definitions of them. Some terms such as *revolution* and *coup d'état* are controversial; therefore, I did not waste time defining them. The concept of revolution has long been a focus of study in political science because controversy over its definition and implementation exists on the media, academic, and especially the political levels. Terms such as *uprising* or *overthrow* might be used instead; however, I used the term *revolution* because the relevant literature uses it.

Diaspora: Jang (2012) asserted that dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance criteria could be applied for defining the diaspora term and distinguishing a diasporic group from nondiasporic groups that could seem similar to diasporas (p. 7). Bruneau (2010) adopted the physical approach of defining the term, considering the diaspora materiality in terms of space, place, and territory. On the other hand, Bruneau said, "In everyday language, the term is now applied to all forms of

migration and dispersion of a people, even where no migration is involved” (p. 35). This means that the diaspora term might refer to any population beyond the home national borders (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 147). On the other hand and similar to Bruneau, Waterbury (2010) mentioned that a diaspora is composed of “a population beyond the border” (p. 147). Kenny (2013) has mentioned that the term diaspora is a synonym for the nature of migration or all displacement types.

These wide definitions could resolve the specific debate on whether the Egyptian diaspora is a diaspora or not as it will be detailed in chapter 2. I considered and defined diaspora based on its behavior and identity, not physical shape and geographical boundaries. In practical terms, a group can be a diaspora if it mobilizes for such a cause (Bauböck, & Faist, 2010, p. 315), such as resisting the host country’s immigration policies or supporting the economy or fighting for democratic values in the diaspora homeland. In Chapter 2, I will continue this essential illustration, assuming that the Egyptian diaspora is a diaspora. I will explore whether the Egyptian diaspora’s political engagement exists or not and determine whether the diaspora itself exists or not. The assumption here is that the Egyptian diaspora exists because it acts and engages actively. The definition of *political engagement* will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Ethnicity: This term refers to the quality that gives the close personal identity that members of some ethnic groups need and feel toward a policy issue, and that should produce “the strong identity politics” of that group’s members (McCormick, 2012, p. 339). This identity, as well as the ethnicity power and quality, can be facilitated when “the strong emotional bonds of large numbers of Americans to their cultural or ancestral

homes,” have been characterized as the “secret weapon” of [some] ethnic groups” (Mathias as cited in McCormick, 2012, p. 339).

Ethno-national: Sheffer (2006) imposed this term to identify the diaspora limiting the diaspora term to specific categories. According to Sheffer, the term ethno-national defines diasporas as a group of people for whom their common collective identity is based on their feeling of being attached to the same ethnic nation and believing in shared values, cultural mores, shared history, and biological traits. The second condition that an ethnic group needs to meet to be regarded as a diaspora is the actual moving. According to Sheffer (2014), the group should also emigrate from an actual state or imagined country (i.e. Palestinians, Kurds, and Romani state-less cases) to live as a minority in the host country or countries permanently.

Incipient diaspora: This term refers to “groups of migrants who are in the initial stages of forming organized diasporas” (Sheffer, 2006, p. 75). This term does not mean modern or new diaspora. This category refers to diasporas Incipient diasporas such as Koreans in the Arab-Persian Gulf area or Russians in Baltic Sea area are newly developing organizations and composed of new migrants. They have established adequate, active organizations in the host land and yet are not known as historical diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, 2014).

Political engagement factors: I used this term to refer to the external factors that surround the diaspora in host and home countries affecting the diaspora existence, influence, and success. This term is detailed in the following chapter.

Characteristics of a diaspora: I employed this general term to refer to the internal factors of a diaspora that could affect its organizational development and political performance. They are another set of variables that could affect the diaspora by determining its reaction to the external factors differently from other diasporas reactions.

Assumptions

In-depth interviews with the Egyptian diaspora members were able to produce insight into the participants' subjective perceptions, but not objective facts of the diaspora political engagement situation itself. The model of the Egyptian diaspora assumes that this diaspora behaves according to a pattern of waves that the study findings should confirm or disconfirm. What is desirable in the Korean-American case regarding activating the religious or worship institutes involvement in the political realm to lobby for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. What can be a positive or desirable factor for such a diaspora, is not necessary to be the same way for another diaspora. The assimilation into American societies for many Egyptians contradicts the diaspora proliferation itself, diaspora-home state relationship, and the potentiality of the political engagement in the Egyptian concerns in general. Every diaspora needs a waking up event making the diaspora act and engage. That event cannot be the same in each diaspora case.

The more the size of the group is significant, the less the group is united and organized. A big size does not lead an influence and success for diasporas in all cases. The good example here is the Jewish diaspora. If this assumption of the size and organizational unity characteristic could be applied to the small-size Jewish or Cuban

diaspora, it might be not applicable to the smaller-size Egyptian diaspora. There are factors other than the size factor that can affect that diaspora existence as well as success.

The Egyptian diaspora is an incipient group. This assumption was necessary in the study context because clarifying it should help clear up several related issues such as diaspora formation and potential development and success of such a diaspora. The incipient type of diaspora has not been researched yet (Sheffer, 2006, p. 250).

Exploring the Egyptian diaspora proliferation and role should help positive social change in its reality, and the political atmosphere of the home and host countries. The main assumption of my study was that the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had significant effects on the Egyptian groups living abroad—its interests and political engagement. Therefore, external factors (i.e., the revolution event) can change the traditional passive characteristics of diaspora and make for more engagement.

Scope and Delimitation

The scope of the study was on the approach of the identified active diaspora members in Washington, DC only. I collected the data from the target diaspora members, in their private setting or via online way. Hence, the data were obtained with collective views from all the study suitable participants. The collection data process and the study findings scope have been limited by the revolution times and Egyptian populations in Washington, DC in particular. Therefore, I was able identify major emerging themes when analyzing the Egyptian diaspora political engagement issues. The sudden positive and sharp negative shifts of the political powers in the local Egyptian sphere from 2011 to 2013 were deviant enough to catch the attention of the researchers in different fields.

While this fluctuating mood of the national Egyptian powers and parties also reflected on the Egyptian diasporas in abroad, it did not catch any attention of the researchers yet. That was the major aspect of the research problem to be in the study scope.

Other Egyptian diaspora members, such as the diaspora of New Jersey and New York City were not included in this study. Living and involving in the diaspora activities in Washington, DC during the revolution time gave me a unique opportunity to approach the group. Many Egyptian organizations and activists participated politically taking advantage of being close to the political atmosphere of the political capital city of America such as the Congress, think tanks, and the Department of State. That fact gave the members easy access and fast communications with the U.S. official decision makers. All of these elements do not exist in other U.S. cities.

However, not everyone in the Washington, DC diaspora will be considered. I do not intend to interview someone who is politically inattentive and uninterested in the political activities of his or her diaspora in Washington, DC I am focusing on questioning members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian diaspora organization(s) during and after the revolution, and because of that event. The immigration status and political orientation were not included in the criteria for excluding some population members. I chose and used specific units of the population (individuals and one group) within the single case for the interviews and observations based on the values only those samples can bring to the study. My study's scope would be limited to some types of the diaspora members based on their education level, political interest, and other affiliations. That implies that I am going to be focusing on people that have

attributes that make them such a leader, such as native-level equivalent influence in English, high education, high income, a reasonable level of communications and interests, and so on. Based on these boundaries, my major unit of analysis is the AEA group and its members.

Limitations

The small size of the Egyptian diaspora means exploring less than a quarter of a million Egyptians in the United States (MPI, 2015, p. 1). A small part of that number may exist in Washington, DC and that should impose challenges regarding the availability of the data, resources, and studies on this small diaspora. Although the sample size in a case study approach should be small, I still need to find a sufficient number of participants who can provide precious information for my study. Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) found that “most respondents did not belong to any diaspora network...this noticeable lack of enthusiasm toward diaspora networking and advising indicates a missed opportunity for the country” (p. 48). However, my research data would tell whether this negative image existed before the Egyptian revolution, and whether it incurred some tremendous change because of that event or not. But as I mentioned earlier, based on my first-hand experience in the Egyptian diaspora field in Washington, DC the diaspora members became passive or had different goals or motivations that keep them again from being organized and active. Therefore, I expect the same unhelpful attitude among my study participants. The survey and interviews that I have designed to collect my data should prove or disprove my expectation practically. To address this limitation and others, I therefore decided to apply several methods of sampling, to be discussed in Chapter 3.

One of my other rationales for applying the qualitative tradition is my set of personal goals, abilities, and motives. Personal goals can be a sufficient base for conducting a qualitative study if the questions are appropriate for that approach (Maxwell, 2013, p. 26). Because personal goals and abilities cannot be excluded from the research design, they can also have consequences for the findings credibility. I would therefore take into account how my goals shape and affect my topic and research, design of the questions, choice of particular participants, and data collection and analysis methods (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 24, 26-27). I need to be aware of how to deal with any possible barriers and negative effects of my goals and personal motives. These personal and practical goals are my patriotic and personal desire to conduct this particular type of research for the purpose of illustrating and improving the Egyptian diaspora situation and its relations with Egypt and the United States.

This study topic affects and involves several aspects such as organizational unity, nationalism, religious perspectives, identity, integration and assimilation, host and home states relationships with the diaspora, and loyalty. All of these aspects could be controversial and personal if not emotional for the participants. This expected style of participants' emotional and subjective reaction should affect the efforts of seeking the absolute and actual reality. The nature of the emotional behavior of participants as well as the study topic, Egyptian diaspora, imposed difficulty in collecting data from that type of participants and addressing all of the case dimensions and realities objectively. That is also because many known and unknown control variables and factors involved in the case and because of my potential personal bias. Hence, using a qualitative case study approach

and its relative flexibility gave me that desired deep understanding for diasporas within a bounded system by specific time and space.

Significance of the Study

Based on the justifications I have shown, I will try to drive the attention of the research toward (a) the proliferation, development, and political role of the incipient diasporas; (b) the Washington DC area as a critical environment for that type of diaspora and any diaspora; (c) and the choice of Egypt and the justification for choosing the incipient Egyptian diaspora in particular.

Egyptian case choice is significant for several justifications. As Jones (2012) asserted, “The fate of reforms and changes in Egypt will be particularly important in setting the tone for the rest of the region. Egypt has a disproportionate influence on the politics and culture of the Arab world” (pp. 459-460). This proposition might support my general belief that this study could help launch and support future research regarding the Egyptian diaspora and other similar relatively new diaspora such as the Arab and African. Also, I have mentioned several times in this proposal that the Egyptian diasporas have been addressed as a part of the Arab diaspora, ignoring the clear or subtle differences between the big and small groups. Hence, according to Coles and Timothy (2004), there is a need for Western researchers to read the diaspora matter from a different and wider frame of mind and to avoid the current tendency of generalization.

My interest in this basic and applied study and its potential findings and lessons is personal, academic, and practical. As an intellectual goal and based on the study problem, this study is significant because it addresses a topic that has not yet been explored in

detail (Maxwell, 2013, p. 28) has not been accessible. Hence, this study would offer an original contribution to this area of research and fill in that recent gap in the literature. Hopefully, this will lead to future research on this topic.

There is still a need to explore the Egyptian diaspora's political position and engagement through explaining the intertwined relationship between religion and political participation in that diaspora as well the relationship of the diaspora with the most powerful political player, Washington, DC. In short, the rationale of the study problem is the heightening of awareness for the Egyptian diaspora political experience that is being forgotten or ignored by researchers and politicians, unintentionally or purposely, despite plenty of studies on the Egyptian revolution and its influence on the citizens and the region.

Exploring these controversial relationships should be critical to understanding the Egyptian diaspora on a general theoretical basis. The grounded theory is not my study design or at least is not the primary one, and the deductive process approach (specifically, testing variables relation) is not my primary way of leading to an entirely new generalized model or theory. Although earlier in the study I referred that Jang (2014) had used a grounded study qualitative approach, my primary design was the single case study. Despite this clarification of my design orientation, the findings of the study could also contribute to advance knowledge in the discipline. Hence, using the inductive-deductive logic process would be applied to enable my use of complex reasoning skills (Creswell, 2013, p. 45).

There is always a need for the development of theory building for studies on the potential for further progress and political engagement of diasporas by offering propositions that can be applied to the theory-building process and as a comparison foundation (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 250–251). In short, this exploratory study has the potential to offer valuable insights that push forward theoretical development in political engagement of ethnic Egyptians, which could lead to social changes in the reality and future of this group. Justification of the study significance could also come from practical goals (Maxwell, 2013, p. 29). This type of goal could include changing the current political situation and ongoing conflicts or polarization of Egyptian diaspora and improving the governmental policies toward this group. Also, this applied study will offer suggestions for future research so that other diasporas and ethnic minorities could contribute to building stronger democracies in increasingly diversifying societies (Jang, 2014, p. 21).

Hopefully, I was able, based on the study's results, to have the attention to the Egyptian government's ambivalent outlook on its diaspora in the United States, and spotlight the need for making some positive change in the recent U.S. policy toward Egypt and the diaspora. The occasional divergence in interests and the relationship of the United States to Egypt and the Egyptian diaspora are issues that needed to be addressed by both governments in the interest of a better relationship between the two countries. The literature review provided illuminating details on this matter. According to Muslemany (2013), at present, the Egyptian government puts effort into contacting its

diasporas all over the globe, but unfortunately, those efforts are insufficient, and the government needs to put forth more consistent, less selective efforts.

After the end of 2011 revolution and its consequences, the diaspora polarized and, therefore, became weaker than before. The Egyptian polarization seems much more intense inside Egypt but maybe it is not so intense among Egyptians in the United States. Illustrating the need for a strong, active Egyptian diaspora that includes community organization hypothetically can result in raised consciousness and a positive culture. This desired change could produce a sense of teamwork and unified partnerships and leadership among the diaspora.

This research aims to support professional practices and allow for transparent and practical applications for the current political incorporation of the Egyptian diaspora. It is essential to create an organizational awareness and positive culture that encourages the members to work together in a professional manner, accepting of the other members' participation and insights. If these goals are not achieved, the present division within the Egyptian community, the traditional aversion from politics (a typical weakness), and the dominant negative organizational culture and experience will not allow for the legitimate positive influence of the diaspora and positive policy of the governments. Furthermore, this level of awareness and performance will not be possible without helping the diaspora realize the core of its problem: lack of effective organization.

There were good reasons for conducting this study. Its scope was broad enough that it has potential implications for positive social change. Such change might include improvement of human or social conditions of this diaspora and others by promoting the

worth and development of individuals, communities, organizations, culture, and societies. For example, the diaspora's economic contribution to Egypt's development should intertwine with the political engagement in the host country for the home benefit as well as the diaspora influence.

The advancement of diaspora and the national strategies concerning this development are essential. The implementation of the desired development can show how and why the home and host state agencies, policymakers, and citizens should cooperate. According to (Filipovic et al., 2012), they should think beyond national borders, security, and immigration concerns; and make efforts to build or support the existing nonterritorial nonprofit or official organizations and activities.

The weak or unclear relation between the Egyptian governments and diasporas can be attributed to "the prevalence of a culture of mistrust between the Egyptians and their government in general" (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, pp. 6–7). According to Sheffer (2006), the homelands usually are responsible for lack of cooperation and friction in the relationships with their diaspora; however, the actual situation should be reexamined (pp. 255–256). However, the problem exists not only in the relation between the home country and diaspora. To enable a diaspora to play the expected roles, it would be useful for the diaspora to realize what could disable the proliferation of its organizations, and then its political role. Hence, it was important to address the other external factors (challenges) that prevent diasporas and their organizations from playing their critical roles.

Summary and Transition Statement

Egyptian diaspora issues were being addressed and proposed for this study precisely because little research has been conducted and focused on them. My dissertation topic and purpose was clearly connected to this study problem. These issues shaped my research questions, data collection method, and analysis process, as was described in the next chapters of my dissertation. As the research questions showed, my real interest was in how the participants think about the phenomenon of the Egyptian diaspora political engagement, and how their personal, social, cultural, and historical points of view and information can inform the study. The other desired result of the study was the potential social change implications on different levels and for all parties.

This study used a new theoretical foundation that was composed of more than one previously developed model. Jang's (2012, 2014) theoretical framework was the essential framework of my study, and it was based on the factors of place, type of group, and organizational type. Beyond these frameworks, this study suggested identifying other factors that might encourage and inhibit proliferation and the political engagement of ethnic Egyptians.

Building upon this new framework, this study employed qualitative methods using a single case study approach of the purpose of exploring how members of the Egyptian community in the Washington, DC describe and practice political engagement on their own terms. For the purposes of this early work, my goal was not to conduct a comprehensive initial search, but rather to explore the landscape in a preliminary fashion

to learn about the main themes, modes, and factors of political engagement that the Egyptian diasporas have met and employed over time in their host country.

The next chapter will include the literature review as it relates to critical variables and concepts of the study and the research questions. I elaborated on the background and Jang's (2012, 2014) theory of political engagement factors. The purpose of the chapter is showing the apparent gap in the literature on the proliferation and political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in particular.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

After careful review of the available literature on diaspora, it appears that there is a continuing interest and need for studying the diaspora and many related issues, such as the factors of political engagement in incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups (Jang, 2014; Severo & Zuolo, 2012). Therefore, the problem under study was that while the potential general importance of diasporas is known and while previous research has identified a number of possible factors influencing engagement, how those factors and others affect some specific incipient diasporas, such as the Egyptian, or how they affect its political role are not known. No current researchers have looked at the importance and uniqueness of those growing groups and their political role in Washington, DC in particular. A few studies have been conducted on this particular type of diaspora, including Egyptian, Arab, and others (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2; Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 7). Very few of the studies, however, are recent, and they did not focus on the political or lobbying role of the Egyptian diaspora. Most also focused on the financial contribution of the diaspora to its homeland instead (Severo & Zuolo, p. 7). Therefore, this study aimed to remedy the lack of a clear understanding of a comprehensive model for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora and political engagement factors in Washington, DC in particular.

The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore, explain, and describe the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and its different ethnic Egyptian members in Washington, DC at the time of the 2011 Egyptian revolution as

well as the key factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement. Therefore, my focus in this study was on describing these factors and the characteristics of the diaspora that have not been addressed in the literature. Ultimately, I aimed to contribute to knowledge and theory as well as drive attention to a social concern (see Patton, 2002, p. 213).

This chapter includes an explanation of the theoretical foundation as connected to an exhaustive literature review. It also includes information regarding the key concepts and phenomena of the study. The purpose of synthesizing the current literature studies was to produce a description of what is known, what is controversial, and what remains to be studied. Achieving this purpose assisted me in filling the apparent gap in the literature on the proliferation and political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in particular.

Literature Search Strategy

In this section, I describe the strategy I used to search for the literature. It includes a list of the databases, journals, and search engines I used to gather the literature. A list of the keywords I used in my searches is also included.

Literature Source

I searched for relevant literature for review using several sources gathered via Google Scholar, American University in Cairo, and Walden University's library website. I conducted a majority of my research using the Thoreau Multi-Database Search and the ProQuest Central with full text database. I also collected ethnic data and associated information from the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale and Foreign Policy magazine

websites. These sources provided information about diasporas in general and the Egyptian diaspora in particular, including diasporic Egyptian's cooperation with the homeland, the Coptic diaspora, and characteristics and political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora.

Literature Key Search Terms Used

The principal search terms I used were *diaspora*, *Korean diaspora*, *groups' conflict*, *revolution*, *political engagement*, *lobbying*, *ethnic groups*, *ethnic identity*, *political relationship*, *assimilation*, and *Muslim Brotherhood*. To narrow the search process and to focus the results, I subsequently searched for *Egyptian Diaspora*, *e-diaspora*, *ethnic conflict*, *mother country and homeland*, *power struggle*, *power decentralization/centralization*, *incipient diaspora and group*, *diaspora size*, *traumatic memory*, *ethnic clashes*, and *convergence and divergence*. Some of these terms such as the term *Egyptian Diaspora* came up with a few relevant results.

The Iterative Search Process

When conducting my searches, I logged into Walden's University Library website, clicked search and obtained articles through Thoreau Multi-Database Search, Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest Central with full text. I tried to limit my searches to materials published in the past 5 years, but I subsequently expanded the range. I reviewed materials published in English and Arabic. In the initial search of Thoreau, I entered *Egypt* and *diaspora* on the second bar. The search results displayed over a thousand articles with "Peer Reviewed" checked, but many of these were not specific to the *Egyptian Diaspora*. Using the terms *Egypt* and *diaspora* produced results

about Somali and Jewish diasporas in Egypt and not the Egyptian diaspora elsewhere. Therefore, I narrowed the search process. When I entered *Egypt* and *diaspora/Egyptian diaspora* on the first bar, *political engagement* on the second bar, and *political engagement* and *America* on the third bar, the search resulted in about 500 articles from which I selected and reviewed the newest scholarly papers and journal articles. I applied the same search format to the multiple databases listed above; however, the results were not the same each time or try. In addition, I used Google Scholar through my account in the Walden University Library and came up with much more accurate results.

Theoretical Foundation

A Brief Map of the Theoretical Framework

The purpose of the theoretical framework for this study was to provide an explanatory, narrative text that can illuminate the major items and concepts to be studied in the following literature review section, which include the key factors and constructs and the presumed relationships among them. In general, the topic includes two major prongs: diaspora engagement and diaspora proliferation. The existing political models and theories are not suitable or inclusive enough in exploring and examining the political engagement of diasporas (Jang, 2014). This insufficiency is especially visible in the Egyptian diaspora literature; hence, I adopted a new theoretical framework developed by Jang (2012, 2014) in this study that explored several known factors and new factors influencing how members of the Korean community in the Washington, DC area make meaning of political engagement on their own terms. Regarding the theories of proliferation, Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014) mentioned several theories, such as

Truman's theory, that might explain the expected proliferation of ethnic interest groups and organizations within the U.S. sociopolitical environment.

In order to explore the components of theoretical framework of the study, I explain the origin or source of the theory and describe major theoretical propositions and major hypotheses, including a delineation of any assumptions appropriate to the application of the theory. Next, I provide a literature- and research-based analysis of how the theory has been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. Finally, I describe how and why the theory of Jang relates to the present study, and how my research questions relate to, challenge, and/or build upon existing theory.

Origin or source of the theory: Major theoretical propositions and major hypotheses, including its delineation. To inductively generate a new theory on the political engagement of the Korean diaspora in Washington, DC, Jang (2012, 2014) extended and refined a framework that had been developed by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008). The latter one, the theory of the political engagement factors, looked at the place, type of group, and organizational type to understand political engagement of ethnic groups in United States. On the other hand, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's theory found its roots in Ramakrishnan and Espenshade's (2001) comprehensive study entitled, "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States" that examined factors of engagement of many diasporas, without focusing on a specific place.

In line with Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's (2008) framework of the three factors, Jang (2014) also suggested that factors, such as underestimation of self's political engagement, language barrier, religious faith, type of group and organizational type, and

gender, enable and disable political involvement of the Korean diaspora (p. 637). Jang applied a mix of original factors and factors from Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's model to examine the Korean diaspora. These factors can hinder and encourage political engagement of Korean as well as other diasporas.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, according to the researcher, Jang's (2012, 2014) study has limitations in terms of applying the factors that exclusively focus on one area: the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Because of those limitations and other similar ones that apply to the Egyptian case and have appeared in its available literature, I needed to support the framework of Jang with other theories. The differences between the Egyptian and Korean cases also suggested that caution be used when drawing parallels between them.

Several scholars, such as Ambrosio (2002), Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014), Kenny (2008), and Zuolo and Severo (2012), have identified a number of political engagement factors and strategies. Those factors and strategies are related to the diaspora's identity and loyalty, environment, organization, group size, convergence and divergence in interests between diasporas and host and home governments, and nationalism that were all of interest in the current study. Besides the factors model of the Korean case, these factors listed above and others explain the influence, success, and failure of several other ethnic groups and diasporas, including the political performance of the Egyptian diaspora in the United States. Those theories and models were the theoretical foundation for my study of the Egyptian diaspora case.

Assumption of the connection between proliferation and engagement

concepts. Besides the factors of political engagement theories, I address diaspora and ethnic group proliferation in this chapter. Through my review of the existing literature, I found that the debates and theories on the proliferation or existence of diasporas and political engagement factors were not separated because the concepts and mechanism of engagement and proliferation are also not separated from each other in the real world, as I will show in the remainder of this chapter. Therefore, I claim that, theoretically, when a diaspora emerges somewhere, it acts and engages actively and the proliferating and existing diaspora will have a chance to play its role. Practically, it is a diaspora if it acts like one. As Cigler and Loomis (2007) stated, there has to be a motivating issue all the time encouraging people to gather or join the diaspora. In this study, I inferred that proliferation and engagement are two sides of one coin.

Diaspora proliferation and development theories are connected to a broad debate in the current literature on diaspora's definitions and identification. My collective theoretical foundation considered the diaspora identity and identification and was based on a mix of theories concerning two connected wings that are the proliferation side (Cigler and Loomis's (2007) theories) and factors of the engagement side (Jang (2014) and Smith [2014] and their other colleagues). The engagement factors also included two parts: the internal factors (i.e., characteristics) and external factors. These elements are connected to each other to compose the image of the diaspora performance. Hence, I chose a mix of those theories for the theoretical foundation and to describe the ways researchers in the discipline approached the problem as well as the strengths and

weakness in their approaches.

The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different regarding their political engagement and the influence of the factors on their formation and engagement. However, I chose the Korean model for comparing with the targeted Egyptian case. I also considered some other classical diaspora cases that have similar roots in the Middle East and Africa and are close to Egypt, such as the Jewish, Ethiopian, and Lebanese.

In addition, the literature review revealed that many factors of political engagement are alike in both diasporas. For instance, both types of citizens, as well as diasporas members, have inherited negative perceptions about politics and politicians. Also, I have found that the religion factor is a great ascendant influence on both sides. As Jang (2012, 2014) did, my study will explore engagement factors inductively, and that will be my study's original contribution: discovering how the Egyptian diaspora evolves, operates, prospers, or fails, something to which the literature has not paid particular attention. Likewise, Jang complained that the existing literature has not paid enough attention to addressing the Korean case.

Jang (2012) provided a comprehensive list of research and interview questions that I have used, with several modifications, as a suitable model for my proposed research and interview questions. Finally, adopting the theoretical framework as well as the Korean diaspora case of Jang (2012, 2014) should give a new model for comparison. It is obvious that the Korean diaspora is different from another conventional model of cases such as Arab Egyptian diasporas that are similar in many issues and features. I consider the difference as a point of strength, not weakness. The similarities between Egyptian and

Arab or some African cases perhaps will not reveal many new details about the target case. However, there are not enough studies on Egyptian diaspora to be compared to the similar diasporas.

Theories on Interest Groups and Ethnic Interest Groups (Diaspora) Proliferation

According to Sheffer (2006, p. 250), the need for definitional boundaries of the phenomenon and its components generates difficulty and ambiguity that should be resolved first. This step should help clear several related issues, such as diaspora formation and potential development of diasporas, e.g., the understudied incipient type of diaspora. In short, studying diaspora formation and proliferation should be combined with resolving the ambiguity of the diaspora definitions; that issue will be addressed in the literature review.

Concerning the theories of the proliferation of diaspora, Jang's theory of Korean diaspora engagement focused on the social, civic, and political engagement, but there was a lack of in-depth or exclusive examination concerning the ways and factors in which Koreans have been formed into and acted as a diaspora. Jang mentioned that Koreans in the Washington, DC area, a new host for the newcomers, have not experienced the same strong ethnic or racial tension as Koreans in the 1992 Los Angeles and New York riots (Jang, 2012, p. 629). Jang (2012) said, "After the 1992 riot, there were significant changes in Korean communities. Most important, the uprising brought the community together. Political associations sprung up noticeably after the 1992 incident" (p. 47). What can explain the positive reactions and positions of Koreans groups? What made Korean Americans realize that they needed to be politically empowered to defend

themselves by joining a group? (Jang, 2014, p. 633) In short, what was their reason for that change: external force or personal or organizational benefit? The answer can be an application of Truman's conflict theory or other pluralist theories. However, as I will explain shortly, a conflict can explain the behavior of Los Angeles Korean Americans, but it cannot be applicable to the quiet Washington, DC Korean Americans.

Truman's theory of group proliferation: Group interest conflicts. This theory concerns all interest groups and is not particularly focused on ethnic interest communities (Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). The conflict or disturbance theory could explain two different dimensions that are related to the present study: first, the push factor of immigrating, and second, the pull factor of joining a diaspora after the immigrating process has completed. According to this theory, interest groups and their communities arise spontaneously as a reaction to an action, force, or need (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 7). When like-minded people gather to address a common problem, the interest groups emerge and are mobilized as a natural response (Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). Those "groups organize politically when the existing order is disturbed, and certain interests are, in turn, helped or hurt" (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). But the proliferation, development, and mobilization of the responsive groups do not happen immediately or suddenly. Instead, the political interest groups come to the real world in successive waves as a response to the disturbance in the existing socioeconomic or political order and interests.

According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), the imbalance of interests could lead to conflict. Changes in socioeconomic development of complex communities and

improvement of technology and communication could impose a subsequent disequilibrium among the social powers and create new problems, needs, and interests for them; thus, groups proliferate and develop reacting to an event or events (p. 7). Similarly, Rowe (2001) argued, “conflict of interests between diasporas and their domestic compatriots is part of a significant search for survival strategies, identity, and meaning” (p. 84).

The interest conflict in the Ethiopian diaspora case as well as the Egyptian case has some violence, to a different degree and nature, all the time. Of course, the conflicts have different causes because different parties are involved claiming different agendas. The Addis Ababa government used to claim that some Ethiopian diaspora groups in America were actually terroristic in that they carried on the national conflicts by supporting the “violent” local Ethiopian groups and influencing the international community (DeWind & Sigura, 2014, p. 178). Probably, the Egyptian governments also have the same attitude against the Islamic groups abroad. According to DeWind and Sigura (2014), ethno-national-religious diasporic entities and organizations such as fundamentalist Muslim groups of North Africa can use violence to promote their interests in either host lands or homelands (p. 47).

As a reaction to the disturbance and conflict, citizens create, develop, or join interest groups, and thus the interest communities, or any interest groups, exist (Lowery & Gray, 2014, p. 135) to expand and invest in existing opportunities in response to the rise of other counterparts or interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 7, 8). Rowe (2001) noted that their behaviors could also be attributed to “the spread of a domestic struggle

for legitimacy and power to a transnational setting” (p. 84). The size and age of those groups and their organizations depend on the number, frequency, and density of disturbing events (Lowery & Gray, 2014, p. 135).

The disturbance of the existing orders of life can take multiple shapes, such as organizational, social, economic, military, or political and sometimes violent disruption (i.e., the action). In turn, these actions can lead to new needs or interests that could be protected sooner or later (the reaction) by new or emerging social factors such as business, labor, or ethnic interest groups. Cigler and Loomis (2007, pp. 7, 8) observed that the emerging groups’ needs and responses are not always good and can be bad in some events, such as terrorism.

This selected theory of conflict or disturbance might relate to the present study, and the research questions might relate to and build upon that existing theory. For example, the emergence of new interests and the conflict of many new and old Egyptian political and religious groups and organizations came to reality because of the 2011 revolution. According to Lowery and Gray (2014), “The interest community is generated merely through the accumulation of these mobilization events” (p. 135). This remarkable event was a response to accumulated social and political disturbance in the ordinary system of the country and legislative challenges facing the groups’ and powers’ existence before and after that event.

Patterson and Singer (2007) observed, “Although Truman’s theory may explain the origin of groups and their emergence, it does not explain how groups evolve over time, prosper, or fail altogether” (p. 39). What happened in the Egyptian situation was

that the old powers, interest groups, and counterparts that commonly were titled as a counterrevolution power or *deep state* have partly and gradually retrieved the normal system of life again. Many new revolutionary powers became disappointed and thus passive and disorganized again. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it later became clearer that the regime itself was only weakened, not toppled (Heggy, 2001). The army and Muslim Brotherhood appeared again explicitly and heavily in the political scene, leaving only slight room for political engagement of the other revolutionary powers and reformists, and much economic hardship for people.

This observation, based on the theory of interest conflict, might explain this cyclic attitude of not only the Egyptian diaspora's unstable engagement but also the domestic political groups and their activities. According to Truman's theory, group formation "tends to occur in waves" and is greater in some periods than in others" (as quoted in Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). This assumption might also be correct for the other diasporas, such as the Arab and Korean. This relation between the existing theories and my study and research questions is one of my rationales for the choice of these theories of diaspora proliferation and engagement.

Arab Americans have traditionally not been very active in foreign policies or do not have enough numbers of unified political organizations (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 307; Oswiecinski, 2014, p. 66; Uslander, 2007, p. 307). Nevertheless, they reacted collectively and individually on different levels to the 9/11 attacks, and its legal, societal, and political consequences were, presumably, targeting Arab and Muslim communities. Those groups responded positively to the irreconcilable atmosphere of inequity and

imbalance of interests or positions. Their reaction was not just to change the biased foreign policy of the United States, but also to resist some new national policies (i.e., the Patriot Act), public discriminations, and some public violence toward Arabs and Muslims. They also reacted to maintain the balance with other groups who took advantage of the American government, and the new laws.

According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), “the potential for diasporas united by an identity other than shared origin and the importance of the threat of violence in maintaining group cohesiveness have added significance for Muslim diasporas after 9/11” (p. 352). Although this sudden extreme disturbance was appalling, it created a unique opportunity for a new wave of mobilization and countermobilization in the Arab and Muslim civil society in New York and Washington, DC (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 8, 307). Referring back to Jang’s case, the disturbance theory of Truman might answer many questions I have asked and explain why the riot against Koreans in Los Angeles in 1992 led to political awareness and mobilization for coalition building among the diaspora members. However, that theory could not explain why this diaspora in a later time, as well as the Egyptian one after the revolution, has become retrograde.

Conflict theory could explain why and how some ethnic and interest groups emerge. It could also explain their engagement and role. Conflicts seem to have a negative meaning or tone; however, this is not always true for all parties or times. I found that the revolution was a temporary positive factor that forced different Egyptian diasporas all over the world to react to the indigenous movements and changes in the country. This event or internal conflict produced organized mobilization and the

emergence of the virtual e-diaspora as well as actual diaspora. According to Ambrosio (2002, pp. 169, 184), the homeland's conflict can be over the national identity, and this type of conflict becomes a threat to the diaspora survival that turns into an ingredient in diaspora identity. As a potential result, this menace will be a motivation to the diasporic communities to mobilize. The homeland conflicts and violence enable the diaspora to justify its political act and fight for its homeland and its interests and to maintain and nourish its ethnic identity.

Ironically, Ambrosio (2002, pp. 184, 188) argued that resolving the homeland's conflicts and having stability and peace could threaten the diaspora's identity and change the public and official attitude toward that group. As a result, the motivation for mobilization would disappear, and that ethnic community would need to be reshaped to keep the diaspora's life and its accepted role in the host and home states. Moreover, the diaspora groups and leaders might try to keep the conflict going or even create other conflicts to keep both the home and host governments in need of the diaspora role.

In short, a diaspora needs the homeland's conflicts to survive, and its identity and role emerge and continue as a result. The same technique that American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the American Jewish Committee use to maintain their organizational bureaucratic interests and financial support in U.S. foreign policies (Ambrosio, 2002, pp. 188–189). Islamic radical groups recently realized how to manipulate this strategy too. The conclusion is that conflict theories could explain the proliferation and the engagement of the diaspora in some cases and times. It would not

explain why the diaspora or other interest groups fail to keep their active status and existence and how they could develop.

Other theories of ethnic interest groups. Other theories might be able to explain the proliferation as well as the failure and success of diasporas. *Climate theory* is another approach to the proliferation and political engagement of diasporas. According to Cigler and Loomis (2007, p. 6), a national, tolerant climate should shape the expected proliferation of interest groups and organizations. American history and sociopolitical environment have provided this favorable climate. This relatively open atmosphere is rooted in several constitutional democratic principles, such as separation of parties and powers, decentralization, and equity and justice. Moreover, we must consider the vastness and the great variety of the country's regions, different traditions and opportunities, open immigration policies that allowed for cultural diversity and heterogeneity of populace, and U.S. cultural values that appreciate the individual initiative—all of these factors created a favorable climate for transnational groups in the United States. These contextual or external features are opportunities that encourage individuals to join groups and use different kinds of access points to the political decision-makers at all levels, at least theoretically.

Similarly, this positive climate, jointly with various factors such as decentralization and division of the federal political system and vagueness of the strategic priorities of foreign policy, has caused a vacuum and hesitation within the political process and system of Washington, DC. For example, the reactive policy of Obama's administration toward the new rule of Egypt after the fall of the Islamic Brotherhoods

was hesitant, confused, and confusing (Bamyeh, 2014, p. 91). That administrative policy allowed several Islamic groups in DC to try to fill up the gap and manipulate that hesitation and vacancy in an attempt to influence the current American administration regarding Egyptian and other concerns (Sorko-Ram, 2015).

This assumption is not new and has several precedents in recent history. This vacuity and uncertainty about the U.S. strategic policies provided an opportunity for some interest groups, including some ethnic interest groups such as the Jewish diaspora after and during the Cold War. This diaspora always works to fill up the decentralized political power structure and power vacuum in the decision-making process. I refer to this status as political *system gaps*. The interest groups or political organizations such as diaspora take advantage of this status to influence political decisions and to comment on foreign policies based on the benefits of the favorable environment for the development of such decisions and comments (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 6-7; Huntington as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 135). The Jewish lobby did not just fill up the gap; it also achieved obvious influence on U.S. foreign policy (Bamyeh, as cited in DeWind and Segura, 2014, p. 15; McCormick, 2012, p. 320).

The external factor of the absence of defined national interests and meaningful national policies of the United States after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union permitted some ethnic groups to wield influence more than other groups in shaping that indeterminate U.S. policy. I have found this to be a striking fact: the vagueness of the strategic priorities of the foreign policy became a common notion that

could be cited in many resources of the political and ethnicity literature and scholars such as Fukuyama (2014) and Ambrosio (2002).

Besides the vacuity, weakness of the general structure, knowledge, and sphere of the U.S. foreign policies might also allow the interest groups to be influential. According to Perez (2014, p. 147), a vacuum also implies insufficient stake or little stimulus to change a particular American foreign policy that should allow an organization to work in Washington, DC. This situation allows the well-organized communities and groups to shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014, p. 256). For example, according to Pérez (2014), the well-organized Cuban diaspora worked sufficiently well under an efficient lobbyist leadership and operated in a political vacuum in Washington, DC in the 1980s and 1990s because the organization did not encounter strong organized political opposition. The result was an open sphere and opened doors for that smart organization and leadership.

This theory and its implementations could be interpreted by Baubock and Fiast's (2010) model of *diaspora as resource*. According to that model of comparison, the state policies toward diasporas will shape the diasporas' ability to be organized and mobilized as a valuable resource for the state. Favorable climate and policies of the state should consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a symbol of weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states (Baubock, & Fiast, 2010, pp. 146-147).

In conclusion, the positive climate for ethnic interest groups refers not just to positive public attitude and cultural tolerance. As an extended meaning of the theory, it

could also refer to decentralization, separation of powers, and weakness and vagueness of the host state foreign policies and strategic priorities. The theory implications also include the difficulty of defining the public interest, and other circumstances of the host environment that might allow diasporas to work.

How the existing theories have been applied similarly to the current study? I would provide a brief literature and research-based analysis of how the existing theories I mentioned have been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. For example, the incipient Ethiopian diaspora is an ideal example of the conflict of interests as a factor of the proliferation as well as political mobilization. This case is different from the Egyptian diaspora case concerning the interests, levels, and times of the conflict, but the Ethiopian diaspora is relatively much different from the Korean case. According to Sheffer (2006), most, but not all, incipient diasporas or subgroups emigrate mainly due to economic reasons, including deprivation as well as career opportunities, so they would not be forced. Thus, they have grown voluntarily (pp. 113-114). However, the fleeing persecution, oppression, and marginalization, even genocidal attack is another set of motivations for emigration. It would seem that migrants such as Rohingya refugees from Myanmar today fleeing persecution are more likely to continue to self-identify with their lost home in their origin country and therefore act like a diaspora in the new, host country.

However, what makes the Ethiopian diaspora case attractive concerning the comparison with the Egyptian diaspora case is that both groups share the same African origin and region. Also, both countries have historic relationships that range from

friendly to very strained. Of course, the Nile is the most critical issue regarding this changeable relation, but this matter is out of the study scope because the studied conflict is not between states but between groups and their state or governments. The possible comparison might expose and point to the similarity between the peoples as well as between the characteristics of both diasporas. Both cases include political adversaries who work actively to defeat the incumbent regime by building lobbies, and relationships with the host government of the United States. Besides, there are other reasons and factors for choosing this group for the comparison purpose and that all should be illustrated in the next two paragraphs and two sections.

Ethiopian groups as an application of the conflict theory. It seems that Lyons (2014) adopted the conflict approach to explaining that interest groups' proliferation. This approach might explain how and why Ethiopian diaspora emerged and settled. This approach denotes the disturbance of regular social order and imbalance between different interests in the local sphere. Lyons (2014) believed that Ethiopian ethnic groups were a conflict-generated diaspora, and this is the reason behind its origination in the political atmosphere of Washington, DC (p. 164).

According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), events of disturbance such as a war can “place extreme burdens on society, and protracted conflict lead to a growth of groups, whether based on support of [the war] or opposition to the conflict” (p. 8). In the Ethiopian case the disturbance of the normal life system occurred because of the internal, natural ethnic conflict, communist military coup, and the prolonged one-party rule. Because of the ethnic nature of the Ethiopian society, the local confrontation also took

ethnic trait, and that caused the conflict to be multisided, lengthy, cultural, and armed. I would investigate whether the Egyptian case had any disturbance causing the diaspora members to escape.

The conflict became an identity crisis in a period of uncertainty and confusion in which the society parties' sense of identity became insecure, typically due to a change in their expected aims or role in that society. Therefore, that multi ethnic domestic conflict led to waves of Ethiopian migrants moving to Italy, European Union, and the United States. According to Lyons (2014), some of those immigrants framed their country conflicts in "categorical, hardline terms, thereby strengthening confrontational leaders and organizations and undermining others seeking compromise" (p. 164). In the Egyptian case, some groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and some Coptic organizations do not escape from local conflict only but also escalate that conflict remotely while they settle in host states. Interviewing some members of those groups should approve or disapprove this assumption.

The validity of applying the conflict theory and Ethiopian groups model to the Egyptian Diaspora case. Sheffer (2014) listed three main reasons for national conflicts that could motivate the individual diasporans to involve themselves while they are abroad. Those reasons are the expulsion, struggles for separation and independence, and discrimination and deprivation (p. 43). Those reasons of homelands' conflicts could also discourage the United States to be involving itself in the same conflicts. Sheffer (2014) categorized diasporas and groups based on the prevalent causes of conflict. Sheffer

(2014) put Ethiopian diasporic groups in the category of the “cultural, political, social, and economic discrimination and deprivation of their kin in their homeland” (pp. 43-44).

Some Egyptian groups such as some Copts and Islamists including the Muslim Brotherhood could claim discrimination and denial. All of those groups would seek strategies to fight for what they claim and assume. According to Sheffer (2014), the most important factor in those conflicts is the United States interest in involving itself. It is important because the diasporas always need to keep convergence in the core goals and interests with the United States because that consequently can lead to the United States involvement in some international cases based on the severity degree of those cases of conflict and other U.S. determinations (pp. 42-44).

The different groups of the Ethiopian diaspora employed several transnational strategies and activities to heat up the existing internal disturbance; therefore, the conflict over interests resources and legitimacy became a transnational conflict. Several Ethiopian conflicting groups involved in the conflicts by sustaining and using hard feelings and traumatic memories. They also provided different supplying resources such as remittances from the kin and back-and-forth visitations of internal opposition leaders to their dispirited followers and pre-existing networks in America. They used the Internet means and oriented radio for their mobilization efforts and transnational communication with the preexisting networks in the host country. As I mentioned before, improvement of technology and communication means could impose a subsequent disequilibrium among the social powers and create new problems for all interest groups. Moreover, those groups engage in the ongoing conflict and transnational politics through employing

strategies of lobbying a number of the U.S. congressmen, raising funds, and using the social media applications (Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165).

It is possible to infer that some groups of the Egyptian diaspora have the same situation at the current time, given evidence of the past Ethiopian case. The Ethiopian specimen is similar to some contemporary Egyptian groups in the United States after the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions. As these two events were a decisive factor for the organizational unity of the diaspora, they became a factor for the fraction and ongoing conflict among the Egyptian political parties in the homeland and distant lands.

Similarly to Ethiopian groups, the Egyptian opposition groups' agenda and strategies can be challenging to the Egyptian regime when those groups try to convince the United States to block any U.S. official aid and supportive public opinion. Hence, I have noticed the proliferation of a new group that is the Egyptian Islamists group based on their portrayed conflict and active strategies. The diaspora's type and proliferation shape should be different based on the differences of the motives, conflicts, and time. The cause of Ethiopian, Irish, Tamil, and Egyptian groups in the 1960s and 1970s were different historical racial, religious, and political events that produced their respective homelands' different conflicts.

What happened is that some counterparts disturbed the existing order, and certain interests of some powers were, in turn, helped or hurt. This internal situation in the homeland gave those groups a ground to flow from domestic homeland disturbances or injustice, as they perceive, and then organize themselves financially and politically using transnational political relations and strategies (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8; Dickinson,

2008, p. 38; Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165). This observation could be applicable also to small diasporas such as Egyptians in the United States, and the newest diasporas such as Syrian, and Egyptian Islamic groups in Turkey and Qatar after and during the severe political events of 2013, 2014, and 2015. It may be partly a class issue. The Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC disproportionately consists of well-educated professionals who are fluent in English. They may have the time, resources, and self-confidence to participate in diaspora formation and lobbying of the U.S. government. The Syrian diaspora today consists of desperate, poor or poverty-stricken refugees fleeing, often in fear for their lives. They want to stay and survive, not engage in diaspora formation. However, diaspora formation and lobbying may be an issue for their children in a later time.

The members of these groups brought their conflicts to their new environments and continued the same path. However, the catalyst conflicts, of course, occur at different times, degrees, and nature in each case, therefore, the emergence nature and time, goals, and characteristics of each diaspora were different too. Other factors can affect those diasporas' appearance and political role in the host lands, and that would be the subject of the other sections of this chapter. I would say in conclusion that the major comparison point between Ethiopian and Egyptian cases is the behavior of both diasporas against their incumbent governments and their lobbying strategies that they apply to conduct their homelands conflicts.

Literature Review

An Exhaustive Review of Current Literature

In this section, I provided my rationale for selection of the study concepts based on the relation between the available literature, the phenomenon, and my study scope. Having said that, I continued to explore other points related to the diaspora proliferation theories and diaspora development theories that I have just presented in the theoretical foundation section. I analyzed the connection between the climate and conflict theories and other concepts to assess their validity for exploring the proliferation and mobilization of the Egyptian diaspora. When considering the proliferation, development, and engagement of diasporas, a review of Jang (2012, 2014) and other researchers' studies of factors and characteristics that might encourage or discourage political engagement in diasporas is warranted.

In short, I turned to the literature to justify my selection of the phenomena and concepts under investigation to produce a description of what is known about them, what is controversial, and what remains to be studied. As part of this process, I reviewed and synthesized studies related to the concepts of identification, characteristics, and political engagement in the Egyptian diaspora *problem*. Therefore, I started by exploring how the literature consider the Egyptian diaspora

Is the Egyptian Diaspora a diaspora? In the first chapter of the study, I mentioned Sheffer's (2006) limited term *ethno-national* when defining the term diaspora. A different approach to the definition takes into account the communications and culture that diaspora produces while abroad (Kenny, 2013, p. 12). Dufoix (as cited in Müller-

Funk, 2016), argued that no diasporas as such exist physically, but diaspora means the ways of managing its the relationships with the homeland. Diasporas develop by themselves when the members share common situations, and believe and work for the same cause (p. 354). Given that some scholars have broadly defined diaspora as not limited to a distinct social or physical entity, all Egyptian migrants might simply be considered members of a diaspora. Moreover, Kenny (2013) argued that diaspora is just an “idea that helps explain the word migration [or] the migrant experience abroad” (pp. 1, 11). In other words, *diaspora* connotes a broad emigrational and cultural frame explaining all migrant experience (Kenny, 2013, p. 6).

Given the limit Sheffer’s (2006) ethnonational definition of diaspora, I adopted a wider definition of diaspora to include ethnic Egyptian groups and to avoid the sophisticated theoretical debate on ethnicity. Like Zohry and Debnath’s (2010) definition of diaspora, Sheffer (p. 9) asserted that the broad definition frames a group as a diaspora when it has been established outside of its homeland because of voluntary or forced migrations. Hence, Sheffer excluded several types of diaspora from his limited ethnonational definition. According to his limited application of the term, pan-diasporas such as the Muslim and Arab American diasporas are not ethnonational diasporas, but according to the broad definition, they are. These groups are also considered diasporas because the majority of Muslims and Arabs speak the same language and share the same dominant religion of the majority, Islam (pp. 10-11).

It was relatively difficult to locate materials on the political influence of Arab and Muslim diasporas during and after the Cold War. If this is the case, then it will also be

harder to assess the appearance and influence of the Egyptian diaspora because the scope of early studies was on Arab immigrants in general, and not on the diasporas of different subgroups such as Egyptians. Moreover, I noticed that researchers such as, Sheffer (2006, 2014) and Bamyeh (2014) often study Arab diasporic groups in comparison with the Jewish Diaspora and conflict with Israel, and rarely study these groups outside of this approach. That is one of my justifications for studying the Egyptian diaspora separately from these typical approaches and limits.

Does Egyptian identity, for all Egyptians, really reflect and belong to Arab nationalism? What can describe the Egyptian national identity prior to the Arab nationalism wave? Nasser's Arabism propaganda in the 1960s deepened this problematic phenomenon and question. Witteborn (2007) asserted that Egypt was Arabized and Islamized by social and political powers. That means that the country had come to the reality from thousands of years ago as not Arab or Muslim before those two fixed interrelated identities, the Arab and Muslim.

The modern Egyptian national identity was reproduced by regnant powers under new circumstances and for specific reasons. Concerning a particular agenda and interest, Pratt (2005) said, "The reproduction of [Egyptian] national culture and identity acts as a means of reproducing the dominant configuration of relations of power in society, or hegemony" (p. 90). The imposed national identity did not just change and reproduce the Egyptian people's culture and identity, but it also impacted the practice of democracy (Pratt, 2005, pp. 1, 74). In this study, I considered the Egyptian case as one entity, but I

also mentioned the uniqueness and influence of both Copts and the Muslim Brotherhood whenever doing so could serve my study purpose.

The concept of political engagement and participation. The term *political engagement* is varied and unclear (Jang, 2014). It could be defined as that which grants citizens in a well-functioning democracy an opportunity to influence the political choices of government officials to communicate specific information to those officials about citizens' concerns and to put pressure on them to respond positively. This political participation involves a wide range of informal activities and is not limited to the typical formal participation that exists (Boarini & Diaz, 2015).

Political engagement might take several forms and range from passive or inactive to proactive and traditional activities. These forms could include a minimal level such as watching the news or reading newspapers, meeting a group of friends to discuss political issues, paying taxes, boycotting products and recommending others to do the same, and serving on a jury. A higher level of engagement could include visible activities such as electoral voting, participating in politicians' campaigns, participating and organizing demonstrations, or signing petitions for a cause via social media or other traditional ways. According to Jang (2012), generally, people engage by communicating with the decision makers directly or indirectly by influencing the electoral outcomes of those politicians and other officials (p. 639). In the Korean ideal, Jang asserted that second generation of diasporic populations might tend to adopt the traditional activities that are at the higher level of engagement such as direct involvement in political campaigns and voting (pp. 637-638).

Of course, the choice of engagement activities and levels depends on several factors that are part of the study topic. However, Jang (2014) asserted that the low engagement and influence emerges because people underestimate their own political commitments because they believe that being active should mean being proactive and visible. They have a misunderstanding and no confidence in their ability to make any change; hence, they avert from doing any activity, however minimal.

Finally, ethnic groups are, in general, different regarding their political engagement based on the engagement factors combined with the groups' characteristics (Jang, 2012, p. 41). Political engagement is an outcome of a long process of interaction between many related elements. I designed my approach to studying the external and inter factors of political engagement in the Egyptian diaspora based on the premise that engagement is the result of such a process. Jang's statement assures my notion that no separation should be made between all types of factors at the theory and practice level in order to address what is political engagement and how it could look like for the diaspora

The concept of the diaspora identity and how it affects the diaspora formation and proliferation. Goodman (as cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009) argued that diasporic individuals forge their new identity in host lands through both passive and active processes and interaction with the environing population and environment (p. 352). As Aswad (2001) noted that identities vary and change and people can have multiple identities at the same time and situation (p. 2). That is because ethnic, national, religious, and other forms of identification depend on situational factors such as political context and geographic location (Witteborn, 2007).

Also, changing identity is a common behavior and is not limited to the diaspora members. As I have explained previously, the authorities of the country of origin, i.e. the regime of the Egyptian military coup of 1952, also tended to change and reproduce the people's identity as Pratt (2005) explained. That happened because of other circumstances such as the regime need of having its stable legitimacy instead of the revolutionary legitimacy.

Changing, hiding, or showing a distinct identity of diaspora members is a general notion; however, Watanabe (2002) referred to the situational political mobilization to indicate one of two dimensions of addressing the Asian Americans' identity. Sheffer (2006, p. 18) pointed to the same approach as one of the several approaches addressing the ethno-diaspora identities concept. Some diasporas such as Asian-Americans or Coptic-Americans could choose one of the several identities, or they could gather several identities. For example, the identity can be global versus the local or limited national or religious identity. According to Dickinson (2008), the Copt community in Michigan chose to show their religious identity and hiding their Arab identity because of the hassles that occurred after the situation of 9/11.

This orientation was not limited to the Copts or Michigan. "Today, as Muslim Arabs receive so much attention many Christians Arabs in the Detroit, [Michigan] area [were] distancing themselves by wearing large crosses" (Aswad, 2001, p. 2) and that orientation was not limited to that city. In the United States as a whole, "much of the 2/3 of the American Arab community that is Christian [tended to] distance itself from the 1/3 that is Moslem" based on the effect of the same situation of 9/11 (Wilson Center, 2001).

But although some “Arabs in abroad dropped the label of “Arab” after September 11 to avoid discrimination, others started to self-identify as “Arab American”” (Witteborn, 2007, p. 556)

On the other hand, this event and its public consequences and legal problems also made many Arab Americans start feeling their original identity for the first time (Hajjar, 2001). Therefore, because of this public hassle and suspicion, Arab and Muslim Americans found that event as a strong reason to shift to the protection of civil liberties and identity and to be more active and organized (Uslaner, 2007). This positive, pragmatic notion can also be applied to other diaspora cases. With peace in the Middle East based on the Oslo Agreement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis in 1993, the homeland “would no longer remain Jewish-America’s “secular religion,” and the [Jewish] diaspora would have to reshape its identity” (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 184) Each diaspora and subgroups have a different reason or motive to come to the United States.

The paradoxical situations of those diasporas denote that their unique Islamic and Arabic identities become explicitly salient in the host environment more or easier than in the home country. According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), group identity is “constructed” through experience in the host country and these experiences can lead to more explicitly Islamic identities (p. 351). High unemployment and exclusion from certain social circles in the host societies are another example of those negative experiences of Muslim diasporas. Those experiences increase not only the feeling of the Muslim identity but also extend the radical identity, Islamism identity (Mossallanejad as cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009, p. 352).

Watanabe (2002) referred to the flexibility of choosing one identity, which is option one or assuming multiple identities instead, which is option two, for the Asian-Americans groups. The flexibility of the situational model allows more than one mobilization reaction and other political behaviors (Hing, as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139). The second option that is the multiple identities is also based on the political and social situations and changes. In different words, politics can be the base of assuming multiple identities (Wang as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139).

As a result, the identity was not solid all the time because of some political situations. According to Jang (2012), several studies found “identity changes and evolves over time as immigrants assimilate into the host culture” (p. 9). That also means that the identity formation is a natural process and outcome as it could also be an arbitrary choice of individuals in a specific time and for a reason. Is it perhaps rather that they have a range of more or less intense identities, among which some become more salient depending on the external circumstances. Egyptians are very unlikely to assume a Muslim, Buddhist, or Jewish identity, for example, even if they would get material and security benefits. Some might, i.e. those who marry outside the ethnic group and convert their religion, but that situation is not often occurring. In the section of loyalty characteristic, I showed how that identity and assimilation could be a factor in deciding on loyalty type of diaspora.

In sum, identity has a role in defining the diaspora political choices on the one hand (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139), and choosing or forming any identity is a product of interactions between several social, political factors such as the

context, immigration policies, foreign policy, political status of the home country, and time, on the other hand. This cyclic process and relation also indicate that having a particular identity can be not only the group choice only but also the outsiders' perception and treatment towards the group (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, pp. 138, 139).

Egyptians have long conducted an intense national debate about what Egypt is, what it stands for, and its place in the world (Cook, 2011). Hatina (2007) stated, "The struggle over Egypt's cultural identity was reflected in a large corpus of ideological writing, quintessentially represented in the works of neo-liberals and their Islamist writing" (p. 8). Neo-liberal Egyptian theorists use Islamist concepts regarding several issues such as, the challenge of modernization and Western culture, and the true Islam (pp. 8-9) While Egyptians are African in nature origin, the Arab, and Western mindsets commonly identify them as Muslim-Arab or Middle Eastern. This public perception and reception consider the contemporary political, religious, and linguistic dimensions that Arabs share with Egyptians, and does not reflect many aspects of the physical differences and social, history, and geography facts. Islamic culture and values were the most influential factor in shaping the Middle East and North Africa image and making the assimilation of Egyptians into the Arab Muslim culture (Bishai, 2010, pp. 18-19).

The problem is that many Egyptians and Egyptian diasporas mostly changed that path and believed in the Arabic identification and nationalism for mostly political agendas and crisis events (e.g. wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). This change caused a new formation of the Egyptian nation as well as diasporas and, thereby determined their policy choices and actions especially after 1956 during Abdel Nasser's rule. "In other

words, [Egyptians'] cultures and identities are socially constructed, yet, for political reasons [and particular interests], they are represented as natural and unchanging" (Pratt, 2005, p. 91). Several national identities should lead to different or situational political behaviors and activities within both the host and home countries. While I could address these situational behaviors of Egyptians in the Gulf area, I explored their behaviors in the American environment, which still has not been handled in the available literature.

A long time of observation could show and approve the situational model of identity for the different Egyptian diasporas. Many of the their members of the 1960s and 1970s immigration waves had chosen a radical Islamic identity when they lived for long terms in Saudi Arabia and Persian/Arabian Gulf states. After the 1967 defeat, Nasserist nationalists and pan-Arabism declined, which opened the national sphere to the Islamic discourse and powers to come back and became salient in the 1970s and 1980s (Hatina, 2007, pp. 8-10, 100). Thus, "the Islamist movement in Egypt is active in attempting to shape cultural practices" (Pratt, 2005, p. 78).

There was a need to explore what other political situations or factors could make ethnic groups have a specific identity and form their diaspora based on that. Teitelbaum (as cited in Watanabe, 2002) argued that migration policies and process are the most important element that affects the U.S. foreign policy through regulating the ethnic composition (p. 132). Ambrosio (2002) had the opposite view of this triple relation. Ambrosio believed that the foundations of Asian-American groups connect to the foreign events more than the U.S. local immigration regulations (p. 133). Does that mean anything regarding the Egyptian case due to their identifications and mobilization as a

diaspora? I would merge both views that Ambrosio showed to explain the ethnic groups formation and connect it to the identity choice.

I adopted a simple idea of Glazer and Moynihan that implied that there could be a loop of interactions between the formation of ethnic groups, and the formation of foreign policies. Hence, the ethnic group foundations, including the identity, are located and affected by the context that implies several internal and external actors, counterparts, opposing or coinciding interests, and foreign policy. In turn, ethnic groups participate in shaping the foreign policy; however, they are not the only factor in this process. The foreign policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces and concerns also shape the size, identification, and diversity of the groups such as Asian Americans (Watanabe, 2002, pp. 132-133). In different words, all of these factors are functioning as a cause and result of each other in a cyclic style, not a linear way.

Egyptians are not different from some other Arab ethnic groups regarding to their identity aspects. According to Connor and Smith (as cited in Sheffer, 2006) the identity of groups ethno-national groups such as Gypsies are based on primordial, instrumental, and mythical/psychological elements (p. 11). The controversial identity, loyalty, and relationship between Arab and Egyptians are one of the elements making the Egyptian identity that is still undetermined. According to Witteborn (2007), some Egyptian diaspora members emphasize an Egyptian instead of an Arab identity in their daily, social communications. They believe that Egypt was Arabized and Islamized by the state authority (p. 566). Confusion about the identity choices and the situational characteristics are an important determinate of the division among the Arab diaspora and Egyptian

diaspora members and their deficient political engagement in America. However, let us also continue considering all Egyptians abroad as *diaspora* and one diaspora only, and exploring its internal characteristics as a diaspora as well as the external engagement factors in the coming sections.

Approaching the Diasporas' Characteristics and External Factors

Oswiecinski (2013) detailed the characteristics and factors of political influence and engagement of some powerful and traditional diasporas in history, which are the Jewish, Cuban, and Armenian Americans (p. 70). Oswiecinski built a list of factors on the perception of the influence and power using a comparative approach. Similarly, DeWind and Segura (2014) used a distinctive interactive approach to explore and analyze the different degrees of diasporas-governments relations to examine the influence of several diasporas such as Jewish and Iraqi (p. 15).

According to Oswiecinski (2013), "To discuss the role of ethnic lobbies in foreign policy making one should rather look at examples of groups that are the most active and are perceived as having the most influence" (p. 53). My study also used the same approach that is the compared powers; however, my comparison will not be inclusively using successful models such as Jews and their powerful organization, AIPAC, only. Instead, I would compare the Egyptian ethnic group to influential diasporas such as Cuban and Jewish besides less powerful diaspora, which is the Arab, Ethiopian, and Korean ethnic groups to explore the characteristics and factors of the Egyptian diaspora influence.

I chose new, incipient, or less powerful diasporas because their influence level assumingly, would not be far or very different from the Arab or Egyptian diasporas. Jang's model of included factors were mainly addressing why the Korean-Americans were not very engaging or influential. Having said that, it would be more rationale to use that model of adverse factors or failing enterprise of Korean-American lack of engagement. This approach is more reasonable than using a model of very positive factors or model of success to explain Egyptian-American weak political diaspora lobbying engagement. Jang (2014) offered a new model of the political engagement factors and diaspora characteristics that I would take in my primary account.

Of course, in any comparison, I take into my consideration that the ethnic groups have different features and would be different regarding their political engagement level and type depending on several factors. Those factors are such as what kind of priorities and problems ethnic groups face and faced given their unique circumstances (Jang, 2012, p. 41). Jang's (2012) theoretical foundation considered "studies have not separated behaviors from knowledge and attitude, along with resources, recruitment, and psychological orientation, when examining groups under investigation" (p. 40). Hence, exploring the political engagement factors would not be separated from the nature and characteristics of the diaspora. That is because these two categories of factors were not studied separately in the literature and because they could not be separated from each other as well as the strategies the diasporas employed to be influential in the real world.

The effectiveness of an ethnic group is primarily due to some relevant group and organizational characteristics such as the size, particular electoral distribution, and

motivation and commitment to a specific policy and country (McCormick, 2012, p. 338). McCormick built an approach to the success of all interest groups including ethnic lobbies on Smith's general factors: the pluralist nature of the American political system that implies several divisions among the official political branches and powers of Washington, DC and the characteristics of ethnic groups themselves (p. 321). Both scholars considered the external factors such as the nature of the U.S. political system, as well as the internal organizational and characteristics as essential independent, intervening, or confounding variables to determine the diaspora potential influence and success. Among the external factors are the democratic principles such as Madison's version of democracy that exist in the host country sphere.

Diaspora Characteristics

Political apathy has dominated the behavior of most Egyptian expats, and indeed most other Arab expatriates, with the exception of some Palestinians. Concerning the typical style of that diaspora's engagement, Ashour (2010) believed that "Most Egyptian expats have been more concerned about building economic fortunes and retaining the ability to go back home without fear of government reprisals" (para. 2) This section, covering the characteristics, explored and tested if that statement of Ashour (2010) has reflected the reality of the Egyptian diaspora.

The Korean case and Jang's study are significant for my study basically, because of its theoretical framework and new factors of diaspora political engagement model. Jang's study shows several characteristics of the Korean diaspora and other diasporas, and external factors of their political engagement. No other study mentioned the

underestimation of self's political engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and negative perception on politics as all factors of civic and political influence of diasporas, and that was the uniqueness of Jang's new model.

These internal characteristics and external factors and other variables of Jang model do not exist or relate to many other diaspora cases but they still have many things to do with the Egyptian case as well as the Korean. In general, the diaspora characteristics exist and form the diaspora profile and engagement at different levels because of different reasons and factors. According to Watanabe (2002), the foreign policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces and concerns also shape the characteristics size, identification, and diversity of the groups such as Asian Americans (pp. 132-133). Severo and Zuolo (2012) summarized the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as the following:

[It is] known phenomena: the fact that the Egyptian diaspora is limited; the weak link with the country of origin; the variety of the diaspora's dynamics and how they differ according to the host country; and, last but not least, the strength of the Coptic diaspora. Given these facts, we can describe the Egyptian diaspora as one of those diasporas that Alain Médam defines as "still fluid, shifting, floating. Even if these data cannot be considered as representative of all Egyptians abroad, they reveal an interest of part of Egyptian migrants for their homeland, a common feature of diasporas. (p. 7)

I cannot consider all of these features of Egyptian diaspora as an absolute fact. The link with the country of origin is not weak at all. According to Talani (2005), the

patterns of Egyptian migration indicates that Egyptians have a reputation of attachment to the land and kin, and when they travel, they always return no matter how long they stayed out that homeland. However, recently, the number of migrants raised and one-third of the Egyptian migrants all over the world are permanent. Usually, Egyptians who go to work in the Arab countries and come back while their peers in the West prefer to stay in the diasporic countries (pp. 18-19). They are also eager to obtain the citizenship as a clear indicator that they decided to stay and maybe assimilate into those Western countries.

This generalized statement could be challenged by a hypothesis that I intend to test to determine whether it is true through my questions research. Egyptians emigrants' self-identity is not that weak; hence, that unique characteristic might explain why their connection with the homeland and kin is still salient, however, that is not the only reason. Egyptians emigrants are not just this diasporic sector of the Arab diaspora that has not been assimilated into the American environment. That is if I generally speak by considering the Egyptian diaspora as a part of the Arab Americans (or Arab-Americans), therefore I could agree with Suleiman (2001) who asserted that Arab Americans still have a serious difficulty of being accepted, assimilated and integrated into that environment, especially into the political realm (pp. 9-10).

Nevertheless, generalization is not the right way to address the Egyptian group's status. The strength and salience of the different activities of the Coptic sector of the Egyptian diaspora is a fact according to many researchers such as Severo and Zuolo (2012), Dickinson (2008), and Rowe (2001). However, the dispersed Islamists after the January 2011 Revolution should also be considered in the same active group category. I

would address and test this statement by exploring the following characteristics. The Egyptian diaspora also has other attributes that need to be explored in terms of highlighting their effect on the political engagement of that ethnic group.

First characteristic: Negative perceptions of politics and politicians. Jang (2014) found that negative perceptions of politics and politicians were attributed to direct and indirect negative political experience of the Korean diaspora members in the home and host countries. This stand made them refrain from politically engage and decide not to establish or join active diaspora. The first generation has this stand that is more intensive than the stand of the latter generations. That is because they had direct experience in Korea and America and negative impression about the Korean politicians and organizational leaders in the United States (pp. 637, 642). That can also be true in the Egyptian case. The negative impression of Egyptians is not on Egyptian organizational leaders in the United States only.

There are many reasons for assuming the existence of negative perceptions characteristic in both the Korean and Egyptian cases. Egyptians have typical negative perceptions of their politicians, political system, and all powers in Egypt. For example, Islamists were already framed negatively before they reached power, and when their political roles changed, framing became more negative (El-Haddad, 2013, pp. 41-44). It is not just negative perceptions but also mistrust between citizens and the government that affect the citizens as well diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 7). In line with those statements, Jang (2014) found that distrust toward Korean associations and their leadership is a common negative perception among Koreans in Washington, D.C.

For example, it is a common thought that those leaders and politicians only work for themselves, family businesses, and personal prestige (p. 642).

Moreover, since 1952 and Nasser's regime, Egyptians have reasonable causes to fear the state and its long unchecked arms, and the fall of democracy and the Egyptian liberal era. That era had extended from the Constitution of 1923 under King Fouad the First and impaired partly by the British and then diametrically by the coup d'état of 1952. According to Pratt (2005), "The importance of dominating the cultural sphere in order to exercise political power may be signaled by the vast amount of resources dedicated to promoting the leadership cult of [a number of Pan-Arabism leaders such as]" (p. 77) Nasser. Having said that, in Egypt, the typical Egyptian culture, and identity, based on liberal values that were common before the Free-Officers coup had vanished (Hatina, 2007). The new authoritarian rule has reshaped this national culture and thus identity.

The regime's rationale for going this way was the regime's rhetorical pan-Arabism, the claim of security, protecting the "our newborn revolution" from the forces of reaction and feudality powers, and fighting "what is called Israel." The result on the national level was a new fixed identity but also new resistances against that imposed orientation of the state and the society. The resistance came from Islamists as well as the civil society but of course, for different socio-political goals and confronting agendas (Hatina, 2007, p. 31, 100; Pratt, 2005, pp. 74, 77). When Egyptians moved to other states regardless any positive climate of those new host lands, they kept and transferred the conflicts between all of these factors and the reproduced culture. In addition, there were always other reasons for the adverse perception of politics and politicians such as the

high rate of corruption that has been composed due to the illegal marriage between the wealth and authority. Due to these reasons and others, many Egyptians believe that there is a difference between the welfare of the country and the interests of the ruling regime. (Ashour, 2010)

Second characteristic: Organizational unity. This internal factor is an umbrella of several factors facilitating political influence for diasporas and their lobbies. The diaspora's strength is rooted in the organizational unity. The unity means the collective and dominant national dream, a single clear agenda backed up by salient goals and organizational purpose, positive human communication, and mutual understanding of the differences of the nation's parties. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone of organizational unity (Smith, 2000, pp. 110-111). Jang (2014) mentioned that the diaspora members realized their need for being united only when they faced a disturbing, robust, and external factor (e.g., the domestic racial riot against the diaspora and its interest).

As an independent variable, when divisions occur and grow within the diaspora, it will lose its one-voice characteristic, and it will be harder to gain or keep support outside one's own group for the diaspora cause (Uslaner, 2007, p. 302). Losing this support should lead to a lack of the diaspora motion and influence that is the dependent variable of this relationship. As per Smith (2000) and McCormick (2012), interest groups including diasporas permanently should adopt and press for achieving a primary purpose for its institutional structure under a single leader, for example, a historical founder as in the Cuban diaspora. (p. 110, pp. 319-320, 338) or collective institutional leadership that members have to appreciate. The institutional backbone is the harmony of the

organization among the leaders and between its leadership and the diaspora community (Smith, p. 116).

Before the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian diasporas had “face [d] real challenges in terms of overcoming their differences in order to form strong organizations” (Ashour, 2010). Supporting the country’s economy by the diaspora and national agenda had kept the organizational harmony for a very short time during the last few years that followed the Revolution. The state, organizations, and individuals might need an external enemy (i.e., Israel before Camp David Treaty in 1979, Ethiopia Dam project, or Shi’ite rhetoric of Iran) or internal challenges (i.e., Muslim Brotherhoods and ISIS and terrorism in north of Sinai) to keep the national entities’ friendship, solo national identity, unity, and maybe all parties’ life. The new revolution was the key to the national unity because people, organizations, and civil society were all fighting one enemy or challenge that was Mubarak’s tenure.

Although this collective mindset of national popular struggle was the key to the resurgence for citizens as well as Egyptian diasporas and political groups, Egyptians tend typically to disagree on one leadership or agenda and a collaboration culture or tradition does not exist in many situations. According to Ashour (2010), the reason could be the diaspora is divided along political, ideological, religious, and social class lines (para. 4). On the other hand, according to Abdel Aziz and Marcos (2013), Egyptian organizational culture is known as having a high level of power distance and hierarchy (p. 1). Hence, the unity might not be available if was not imposed by the polity from top to down.

For example, the revolt or coup d'état of 1952 that was the symbol of the struggle for national independence had succeeded in imposing and maintaining the national unity and consequently, the Islamic slogan and activities had disappeared for some years till the 1970s. Ironically, one of the factors that existed behind the return of the Islamic powers and discourse was the Egyptian state itself (Hatia, 2007, pp. 3, 100). That template was not different or separated from the situation of the Egyptian diaspora and was expanded to all Arab diaspora especially, Arab and African students' unions abroad during the collective revolutionary waves in the 1960s.

For Egyptian Americans diaspora and its advocacy organizations, there is severe polarization, social class lines, and political, ideological, religious divisions amongst them and between them and the Egyptian state, and an apparent lack of organizational experience and lobbying history (Ashour, 2010, para. 4, 9). In a later section of this paper, I explored the connection between this characteristic, the organizational unity, and an external factor that is the relationships between a state and diaspora. In sum, these characteristics and others set back the political influence on the home and host countries' politics. The identity profile of Egyptian diaspora including Copts is a complicated, critical matter because of common issues such as faith as well as past and emergence political circumstances. The current research on diaspora did not approach the influence of the current Egyptian identity debate and struggle on the likelihood prominence of united diaspora leadership and organized political mobilization. In the following section, I continue exploring more characteristics as well as factors that all are independent

variables that intertwine determining the potential political engagement and Influence of diaspora with more focus on the Egyptian ethnic group.

Factors of Diaspora's Political Engagement, Influence, Strategies, and Nature

Egyptians in the diaspora face many different obstacles to playing such a political role (Ashour, 2010). Of course, those obstacles change due to the change in time frame and the internal and external circumstances. As I mentioned, several writers found that ethnic interest groups, communities, and diasporas are not solid or static entities, but they are changeable and dynamic objects whereas they react to different types of factors and changes as well as they influence other parties along history and the current time. In other words, no diaspora is always paramount or passive (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 71) because a diaspora is not an isolated group or organization.

Diaspora consists of human beings who influence as well as being influenced by others and surrounding historical and new events and factors every day. For example, "In 1987, the pro-Israel groups began to lose some of their clout because the rising success on the Palestinians side and the conflict in the region which led to fractionalization within the Jewish organizational unity" (Uslaner, 2007, p. 308). Similarly, the strong, active Cuban diaspora lost its unity, the one-voice trait; because of the change in its solo, leadership coupled with the United States government policy shifting towards new collaboration the Castro brothers' Cuban dictatorship regime (Uslaner, 2007, p. 303).

In sum, diaspora is a subject of changes based on its amebic nature and changeable characteristics that expose the diaspora to different factors. The following sections will demonstrate factors and more characteristics of different diasporas to be

applied and compared to the Egyptian case. The analysis of the available literature would conclude that the emergence of the ethnic groups and the existence of their influence per se are also linked to each other and those factors and others. In a similar vein, Jang (2014), Smith (2005), Sheffer (2006), McCormick (2012), and Ambrosio (2002) summarized several factors or characteristics that ethnic groups should have to be seen as a successful and influential actor in the foreign politics realm.

The organizational type and strength. This major factor was widely explored by several studies. Jang (2012, 2014) and Ambrosio (2002) found that this factor could include several elements; however, not all studies classified or identified it in the same way. The organizational factor includes the role of the religious institution, unity among leadership and members, using advanced technology, and relatively easy access to the Congress members. The last element should reduce the cost and obstacles of lobbying the decision-makers.

When Jang (2014, pp. 633-634, 640) referred to this factor, she did not mean the diaspora as a substantial entity and its organizational issues. She focused on one dimension that is the religious institution as a primary organization in the Korean diaspora's life. Korean churches play a fundamental role within Korean social enclaves at all levels of social and civic assets (Jang, 2012, pp. 29-31). However, its notable role and attitudes constituted a negative influence on the Korean community regarding the participation in political activities (Jang, 2014, p. 634). The church leaders firmly believe that this contrasting stand of abstaining from politics should keep the church and diaspora strong and united regardless of the political engagement.

Jang (2014, p. 632) paid more attention to the religious organizational element that influences political engagement of ethnically diverse publics; however, she found this relation between mobilization and religious organization factor was clear and confident in other diasporas such as Arabs, except for the Korean diaspora members. On the other hand, the religious institution is not the only dimension or element of the organizational type factor. Jang found that diaspora was not organized politically before the 1992 riot that imposed profound shifts in the community by bringing it together. As a result, the diaspora realized the need of being politically empowered and organized to be able to defend its benefits and assets when confronting other minority groups (Ban and Adams as cited in Jang, 2014, p. 634).

This factor also implies long, successful organizational experience that has furnished a roadmap for the newcomers to the political process. Arab diasporas do not have this level of experience unlike Jews, and that organizational feature affected their potential access to the decision-makers' layers. According to Smith (2000), some professional organizations of diasporas such as Jews, Albanians, and Cubans are able to push for enacting particular legislations and policies, monitor the decision-making process, and building cooperation with other diasporas, maintain ethnic unity, and all of these elements lead to strong organizational type and experience. Being close and closer to the decision makers is fundamental to achieving greater change and influence on the foreign politics (pp. 94, 123).

Electoral mobilization implication. This factor includes several elements of membership unity, concentrations in states rich in congressional districts and electoral

college votes; political and financial contribution of ethnic groups; and access to contacting the district constituency that might lead to voters participation impact, voting bloc pressure, and financial ethnic support (Ambrosio, 2002, p.p. 11-12; McCormick, 2012, pp. 319-324). According to the annual report of the Arab American Institution (AAI), (2016), although Arab Americans live in all 50 states, two-thirds reside in 10 states only such as New York, Washington, DC, and New Jersey. As I mentioned previously, Egyptian immigrant communities are growing up. They composed one of the three largest Arab communities: Egyptian (12% which was 9% in 1990), Syrian (12%), and Lebanese according to Census 2000. Then, the Egyptian group became the largest Arab group as Egyptians (34%) who concentrate in California and New Jersey respectively according to U.S. Census 2010 (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2). One limitation that statics have is that “there was no statistical difference between the size of the Egyptian populations in New Jersey and New York” according to Census 2000 (Census, 2003, p. 8). The meaning is that they are both the same proportion of the population in those cities.

Available literature and resources did not explain the reason behind this type of concentration of Arabs and Egyptians. However, the Egyptian diaspora concentration in New Jersey might be explained by saying that since New Jersey has the largest population of Coptic Christians in the United States, therefore the reason for Egyptian and Egyptian-Christian concentration in this state might be religious, personal, or cultural. In other words, the political power of the diasporas concentration pattern is not the reason for moving and mobilizing, but it is just a consequent result. The concentrated

voting power could explain the contrast between the small size and significant influence in many cases such as Jews, Greeks, and Albanians (Smith, 2005, p. 95) with taking into account that the Greeks and Jews must be significantly larger U.S. diasporas than the Albanians. This idea should explain the finding of Oswiecinski (2013) that is about why the small size is not always effective in a negative way. This issue will be a subject of more explanation through other factors that are connected functionally to electoral mobilization.

The effective size and expected influence. This factor has particular significance because it connects and affects the diaspora' proliferation, engagement, and potential influence. According to Jang (2014), given the exponential growth in the size of the population of ethnic minorities increased the academic interest on them; therefore, more research was needed to understand their political engagement (p. 649). The effective size factor includes population concentration, effective generation, and leadership style. Ashour (2010) addressed this point and found "the potential advantage of the expats lies in their numbers, and thus have made permitting Egyptians abroad to vote in Egyptian elections via consulates." However, this claim cannot be generalized or believed all the time.

As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, "It would seem that the size of the group should affect its lobbying effectiveness. This is only partly true, though" (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 64). Theoretically, Irish and some other European diasporas should have stronger lobbies than the Jewish lobby based on the vast difference in size, but this is not the fact on the ground. The enormous size of some diasporas such as the

Egyptian, Mexicans, and Chinese caused by their countries large population also did not necessarily lead to greater political effectiveness all the time or in all cases.

According to Mowafi and Farag (n.d), “Creating a sense of community is not dependent on size of country” (p. 6). To explain this contrast, we should differentiate between two sorts of population sizes, the general and core size. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), and Oswiecinski (2013) asserted that the most substantial Jewish populations concentrate in key electoral districts such as New York, California, and Washington, DC. The most important is not the general population size (pp. 54, 63, 65; pp. 41, 43). The Jewish-Americans small portion (3 percent) of the general American population guaranteed a place for Jewish agenda on the table of foreign policy deliberation in Washington, DC (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 43; Smith, 2006, p. 99).

Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that this concentration of population is an important factor of ethnic groups’ political power and influence in general, and voting turnout in particular, besides other organizational benefits (p. 878). However, this finding of Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, and Oswiecinski (2013) were not the common belief in the literature on some groups such as Latinos. Due to some characteristics and contextual social factors such language barriers and insufficiency of financial resources and immigration status, higher ethno concentration might be not a useful factor for electoral mobilization, voting participation, and political manipulation (Cho; de la Graza; Espenshade & Fu; DeSipio, as cited in Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 878).

Those two contrasting ideas cannot be generalized to all ethnic groups or across all generations. Ethnic concentration can be sufficiently positive for diasporas to organize

themselves as effective organizations and voting bloc. Concerning the small size of the diaspora in the United States, the MPI report (2015) indicated that the “Egyptian diaspora organizations are relatively abundant” (p. 2). I inferred that the entire small size of the population did not affect the proliferation and engagement of the Egyptian diaspora's organizations all the time negatively.

However, I should assert that being effective does not always mean being successful and achievable. Also, the *success* is a relative perception, i.e., the Palestinian diaspora is relatively unsuccessful if we considered it in proportion to AIPAC. There are always other factors as well as characteristics intertwining with the consideration of the size enabling or disabling the social assimilation, in general, political integration in particular, and organizations’ proliferation. De La Raza (as cited in Oswiecimski, 2013) expected that Mexican-Americans and African Americans might have a future chance of being a potential influential ethnic community mainly because of their large and growing population size (p. 63). It is easy to generalize by saying that as big it is it should be strong. However, Oswiecimski (2013) challenges this hypothesis by saying that despite the large size of some ethnic groups including Mexicans, these groups do not formulate an influential lobbying power in America (p. 64).

The Egyptian diaspora essentially does not have significant absolute size (less than quarter of a million in 2013 in America) or concentrated population (one type of the effective size) in any politically important electoral district (MPI, 2015, p. 6). While Egyptians comprise about 12% of the 1.7 million Arab people as 2010 U.S. Census record indicated (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), they compose only 9% of the total Arab

population, that is less than 4000 in Washington, DC according to the same year of U.S. Census record (Suleiman, 2001). That is, could this tiny group come to be concentrated and thus mobilized and active? This claim about Egyptian and Arab Americans might support my idea; there is a difference between the size of the ethnic group population and concentrated population size that interest organizations can mobilize for lobbying. And because of this debate, yet, there is no direct connection between the group size and effectiveness. According to Smith (2000), regarding the Irish Americans, “one should not confuse their numbers with their strength” (p. 117).

The effective size is not only resulting from the concentration of the ethnic population in the key electoral districts. The other type of the effective size is the core size of the group, which I will speak about in the section of the diaspora’s proliferation, and effective size. According to Oswiecinski (2013), some diasporas such as Cubans had an effective center that should represent and push the whole diaspora to be effective regardless of its actual size. This substantial size refers to wealthier, better-educated, and politically active members (the exile generation in the Cuban case) who care about the interests of their country of origin (pp. 65-57, 70). Those two specific components-the concentrated population in the key electoral districts and effective core-of the population is the launcher of the diaspora lobby and its influence. Egyptian diaspora might need to gather those two elements to be an influential group, however, the entire population is tremendously small, and that might make this hypothesis such dreaming.

Finally, neither the mother country population nor diaspora total population size could always lead to automatic political effectiveness of its diasporas. According to Mowafi and Farag (n.d),

“Israel is less than 1/10th the size of Egypt and India is more than 10 times the size of Egypt; yet both have managed to foster a strong self-identity and linkages to their diasporas that have benefited both the home country as well as their respective communities worldwide” (p. 16)

The small size of a country could make it feel the need for its diasporas support more than other bigger countries could do. However, the strong, big Indian diaspora in the Silicon Valley, CA could challenge this assumption meaning that a significant national population can also lead to the vast and influential diaspora in some cases. Regardless of this hypothesis, the population of Egyptian immigrants to the United States is growing (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), and Egypt population exceeded the 80 million in 2013. But this growing rate of immigrants and the enormous number of the national population is out of proportion to the minuscule size of the diaspora population and this diaspora is not influential compared to the large Indian one. The total estimated Egyptian diasporas size was about 2.7 million only in 2005 in the whole world including Saudi Arabia and America (Talani, 2005, pp. 18-19). In different words, they compose about only 1.5 % of 175 million that is the total of migrants all over the world.

This percent has changed due to the large refugee movements in the last two years. While Egyptian diaspora size in the United States is small, much smaller countries such as Albania and Czech Republic have much bigger diasporas size which does not

consist with their tiny countries population and area. That Albanian diaspora became much stronger and bigger (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 106-107). Although there are many Egyptians, especially the well-educated young generations and middle class eager to escape to the United States, their existing number is modest. For the Egyptian situation in particular, there are specific factors could be behind that contrast between the country size and its diaspora size. American foreign policy and national immigration policies (e.g. visa and Green Card), and global forces and concerns should affect the formation of diaspora by shaping its absolute size. The interview questions would try to find out an explanation of that contrast.

The Connection Between the External Factors, Internal Characteristics, and Strategies

The last section included several references to the diaspora characteristics and their relations to other factors and strategies of political engagement and influence. In the current section, I make a closer focus on this relation in more details. The factors listed in both sections are separated or different. I simply try to see the external factors through their links to characteristics and how the literature has linked them.

Uslaner (2007) and McCormick (2012) listed some essential conditions and strategies for ethnic interest groups to employ if those groups seek to be influential and successful. The two authors asserted the need for organizational unity that supports a specific national cause of the home state they present, a supportive public opinion of the host country, campaign contributions, and diaspora members' concentration in key political states and cities. The pro-Israel lobby was able to integrate and manipulate these

particular elements. However, the lobby was not able to maintain these strategies and features all the time (McCormick, 2012, pp. 321-325; Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308).

Also, it could infer from these strategies that they are not different from factors and characteristics. What can be characteristics of one diaspora can be applicable strategies or external factors of one another. The classification and differentiation depend on authors' views and his study purpose. All factors connect to different parties and political contexts that diasporas work through and with them. This second type of factors is the external factors that do not directly or solely determine the engagement or compose the diaspora characteristics (internal factors), but they mingle with them to determine the collective image, engagement, and strategies of any diaspora (Jang, 2012, p. 40).

The effect of the external type of factors connects and depends on the internal factors or characteristics of each diaspora, and all should jointly enable or disable diasporas to bring pressure to bear on the political process and influence. This point is essential to this study, and I am testing and explaining it in detail in the following section shortly and through the entire study. The external factors are such as, how the public and government perceive the group, the changes in the governmental attitude and political process, the ongoing national and international historical conditions and changes such as the post-Cold War and 9/11, and the political system mechanism, nature, and gaps (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 12; Smith, 2000, pp. 94-129). To differentiate the external factors from the internal characteristics, we could consider the element of the local political system as an external factor (independent variable). The way that the diaspora could use to show its professional understanding and take advantage of the political system element

(intermediate variable) should consider the internal organizational characteristics (dependent variable).

By exploring the factors and their elements, the objective of this research has been reached. Although not all of those items were found to have direct or any influence on the level of political engagement for ethnic minorities (Jang, 2014, p. 633) some factors are more important than others depending on the groups' characteristics. For example, the religion as an element of the organization type factor was not always positive. It is positive in the Arab Muslims and Black Americans cases and negative in the Korean case (see Jang, 2012, pp. 3-4).

According to Oswiecimski (2013), the size of the ethnic population might translate into the size of a motivated lobbying ethnic community but it is not the only factor. Many encouraging and discouraging circumstances and characters can always control the implementation of the diaspora size (p. 65). A large size of diaspora does not necessarily provide more resources or has more perceived political influence and presence (Jang, 2014, p. 633). Ashour's (2010) findings indicated that "The Egyptian diaspora, estimated at between 3 and 8 million worldwide, has until now not been a factor in Egyptian domestic politics, in contrast to the active roles played by Armenian, Irish, and Cuban expatriates" (para. 2)

Historical and historic factors. Smith (2000) mentioned that some historic well-established diasporas such as Jewish and African Americans continued with their influence on different domestic and international American policies (pp. 64, 68). In other words, some tremendous shifting events in the world did not impose significant change

on the unique position of some diasporas. More recently after historical events such as World War II and the period of the new Arab military regimes, Arab Nationalism's (Nasserism and Al-Baath) rise, sectarian strife in some countries such as Lebanon, and the disastrous outcome of the 1967 war for Arab states, Arab-Muslims also has been immigrating to America and established their new groups.

Besides these internal factors of migration, Arabs faced other factors in America such as the positive change in the immigration quota system that ended favoring European immigrants in 1965, and the consequences of the 1967 war and the biased support for Israel (McCormick, 2012, p. 323). Therefore, they launched their first organization or lobby, the National Association of Arab Americans in 1972 (McCormick, p. 323). They have significant disadvantages compared to the historic Zionist lobby, and the community still lacks a coherent lobbying arm in Washington, DC and thus has not served as effective counterweights (Wilson Center, 2001).

Every Arab group including Muslim and Christian had its historical motivation or incentives to flee to a different era forcibly or voluntarily. It might be correct to say that any ethnic group needs a wake-up call to immigrate and then to be active in the foreign settler societies. That wake-up call could be national or local events. The 1992 Los Angeles riot against Korean business offered this call and rang the bell for making significant changes in the passive Korean communities. Most importantly, the riot brought the community together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being active and empowered (Jang, 2014, p. 634).

Similarly, Egyptian ethnic groups were partly contradictory and passive until the revolution in 2011. This historic event was national and not a U.S. local event in contrast with the Los Angeles riot. Although the revolution was the direct motivation for displaying the unity characteristic of Egyptian diaspora, the domestic following events in Egypt had an obvious negative effect on that temporary organizational unity. This tendency contrasts with the advantage of the immense unity of Jewish diaspora that rarely desire to bring any dissonance to the public sphere or the congress (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 46; Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 56). Although the Coptic lobby in the United States and Canada is very active and more organized in the Internet sphere compared to the Muslim groups, the Coptic groups have no one voice, which conforms with the general characteristic of the Muslim Arab and Egyptian peers (Rowe, 2001, pp. 89, 90).

The relationships between the host state and its diasporas. DeWind and Segura (2014) focused on this factor in their new edited book *Diaspora Lobbies and the US Government Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy*. The major case study of their book is the convergence of interests between the U.S. government and Israel and the Jewish ethnic group that seek to influence the U.S. foreign policies especially towards the Middle East all the time (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 7). It is not just that a good relationship between both states reflects positively on the diaspora political positions, but also the stability of that relationship does.

The relation between diasporas and host land is not limited to them but extends to involve the homelands too. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the host land-diaspora relation should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland (p. 5). However, this

association is not always positive in its nature and it can affect the diaspora's homeland. It can be negative because of the negative role or bad agenda of the diaspora per se. For example, the Egyptian media, press, and official discourse claim that the role of the Muslim Brotherhoods and, sometimes the Coptic groups and their relations with their host lands should have negative consequences on the Egyptian state and its relations with the diasporas' host lands such as Canada, Britain, and America. According to Sheffer (2006), this role, and nature of some diasporas can be negative on the political level causing conflicts and terrorism not just in the homeland but also in host lands (p. 31).

Other Factors Related to Diasporas' Proliferation or Mobilization and Devaluation

To have a deeper exemplary understanding of the diasporas' proliferation and devaluation, I need to explore the effect of the connection between immigration motive factor and effective size factor on diasporas' proliferation or mobilization in particular. The decision of migrants and community members on immigrating contributes to joining a new or incipient diaspora. Therefore, their decision affects the establishment or materialization as well as the disintegration of that diaspora itself. These events are all affected by more factors such as the original culture and immigrants' experiences, prevailed attitude of host and home countries, globalization, migration orders, and backgrounds or motivations for emigrating. According to Sheffer (2006), The migration pushing-factors and patterns with the pulling-causes for taking part in a diaspora can together establish a specific diaspora in a particular region and time; however, the cause for migration decision and reasons for being members of a diaspora are different (p. 115).

According to Ceschi et al., (2005), the immigration pattern, namely, the kin network is a cumulative process. This process implies a structured pre-existing diaspora that attracts a particular population of, for example, an Egyptian countryside region to come to specific Italian cities. For example, the majority of Egyptian diaspora members of Milan city came from individual villages of Banha city seeking work and only work. The newcomers would receive generous help in all areas, and the total group became in touch with the homeland through a representative organization in Egypt (p. 3). According to Jang (2012), in this type of immigrants group, the laborers typically preserve their emotional and social connections with their kin and homeland (p. 6). As a result, the concentration of the new and old migrants in a specific place in the host land as well as being committed and attached to the ancestral homeland give the feelings and shape of the diaspora.

However, concerning the diaspora emergence, establishment and, development, Sheffer (2006), argued that the traditional hypothesis of making a connection between the migrating reasons and the diaspora nature and creation is not conclusive because there should be other related factors affecting the diaspora presence (pp. 115, 128).

Alternatively, Sheffer proposed four factors or interpretations explaining the individuals' decision of establishing and joining or abandoning a diaspora. Those factors are based on the related immigrants' status and various circumstances, and they concern the naturally expected delay of the settlement decision based on home and host land's conditions. No settlement decision would be made before a certain time of living and assessing the conditions prevailing in the host land (pp. 128-131).

Having said that, the delay in making the final determination of settling in the host country is a result of many issues such as the attachments to the homelands and kin, fear of the immigration authority's regulations, and common visa obstacles. Sheffer (2006) used only the example of Egyptian guest workers in Iraq (p. 130) as an example of the fear of the immigration authorities. However, I assume that Sheffer's example is ideally applicable to Egyptian illegal migrants in America too. The restrictiveness on the new immigration mantle decreased the growth of the Egyptian population after 9/11 in the host land (MPI, 2015, p. 3). In addition, many diasporas - such as Egyptian -do not decide clearly, for different reasons and times, to stay when they come to America, thus, they do not have interest in joining or staying in a diaspora and being active (Sheffer, 2006, p. 129; Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 16).

However, the data of MPI (2015) study has reported that the "population's relatively high naturalization rate suggests that many Egyptian immigrants applied for citizenship shortly after they became eligible" (p. 4). Moreover, many doctoral students (67 %) decided to change their immigration visa to stay longer in the States (MPI, 2015, p. 5). On the other hand, Egyptians who have migrated to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and Libya after the 1973 War and oil prosperity moved to those host lands "on a temporary basis, since [they were] unlikely to gain citizenship in these countries" (MPI, 2015, p. 3). The differences between host countries (i.e., Iraq in the 1970s and the United States) regarding their social and political circumstances and legal conditions and restrictions affect the migrants' decision of settling and the time of making that final decision that all affect the chance for diasporas emergence and development or devaluation. In sum, the

host lands and homelands' policies, time, and place, and different personal and legal factors and concerns effect the settling decision of immigrants.

I would describe how and why the selected climate theory relates to the present study. The previous finding should remind us the climate theory approach to the interest groups' proliferation. As it was mentioned, the religious and political freedom in the United States encouraged different particular ethnic groups such as Copts as well as radical Islamists to flee and settle in the States. Moreover, the educational and practical opportunities are unique in the United States and should attract scholars such as Ph.D. students to change their basic plan of coming and staying for a short time.

However, these different phases of the American tolerance climate, the religious freedom, the secure political practice, and educational and financial opportunities might not clarify the decision of coming and settling by other sectors of the diaspora. What about people who decided to stay based on new random changes or chances that they found a mate and married? They did not plan for that decision in advance, as they may not have any particular reason to come to the host country (Ceschi et al., 2005, p. 25). This may be more common among lower socio-economic classes such as Egyptian immigrants who fled from poverty in their home to live and maybe settle in the United States or the Arabian Gulf.

Generally speaking, the lower socio-economic classes or guest workers in a diaspora would maintain their self-identity and dual national identity differently from other peers (Sheffer, 2006, p. pp. 129-130) such as Ph.D. holders and scientists who can speak different languages and could find a job anywhere in the world. It seems that they

prefer to keep strong relationships with their kin in the homeland, and they might prefer and able to return back home when they accomplish a satisfactory economic or social level or for different personal reasons (Ceschi et al., 2005, pp. 38-39) without considering any academic or political or religious fear or concern.

There could be a significant difference in political, organizational behavior between Egyptian graduate students in the United States and poorer and less educated migrants working in a menial job in Italy. The climate and conflict approaches would not interpret other cases of the migrants who decided to settle in the United States for pure personal reasons, e.g. making money, with a legal or illegal status. Once again, the motivation approaches of the Pluralists and Olson as well as Sheffer's new model of the establishment and demise of diasporas could remain proper to explain the migration cause and the existence or establishment of one sector of the Egyptian diaspora, the *economic immigrants*.

According to Sheffer (2006), the ambiguity or hesitation of the settling decision in the host country reflects on another ambiguity of establishing and developing the diaspora itself. Moreover, it is very common that many of those migrants deciding to stay permanently would not return home if they could (p. 129). The status of the Egyptian case supports this assumption of Sheffer but not all the time. After Mubarak's fall, many Egyptians (long-distance nationalists), who left the country because of utter political suppression, decided to go back and contribute in the political compass regardless of their past final decision of settling in the host lands forever.

I would ask if this decision of come-backs could support the diaspora strength and influence in the host countries! The interview questions of this study would illustrate the answer from the participants' point of views. As I mentioned previously, the Egyptian Diaspora has never been a stable or solid entity because of many external circumstances and organizational factors. It changes over time based on the mentioned factors. According to Halpin and Nownes (2012), it is hard to imagine a group will remain as we found it at its outset; therefore, it is essential to the researchers "...to know what it used to be and what it is now" (p. 57).

The diaspora's proliferation and effective size and leadership (core adequate size). The previous different point of views regarding the diaspora's proliferation should explain and match to the idea of 'the core adequate size' that Oswiecimski (2013) mentioned in his study. According to Oswiecimski, not all Cuban diaspora members are considered as active political and organizational members. The exiles were the dominant hub of the Cuban community; therefore, they are the, not the entire group, effective organizational size (p. 56). When compared to the exile generation, the second and third generation does not fully involve in the diaspora political concerns that focus on the homeland because the personal political motivation does not exist (p. 57). Besides the economic and educational motivations, the assimilation into the U.S. societies in New York and Florida is higher amongst the latter generations in all diasporas and Cubans are not different. In other words, their motivation became mainly economic and personal; hence, their assimilation into the American society and culture enjoying the democracy and welfare is higher than the exiles generation's political motivation.

As a result, the politically oriented generation-the first generation- that fled after Castro's movement- appeared to exercise control over the entire lobby for a long time. The difference between the levels of the political concerns of the generations is that the leading edge generation (the exile) possesses a hatred for Castro's regime and that feeling is not strong among the following economic immigrants to be mobilized politically (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 57). That might explain the contrast between the small size and considerable political and organizational effectiveness. Many second and third generation Cubans are politically concerned about Cuba, but generally much less than the original exiles. Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora members, in general, had insufficient selective benefits or personal motivation to be politically active most of the time, thus, no stable, effective size can become apparent through their group.

The adequate size is not enough by itself, and it relates and includes many elements that the leadership style is one of the most important of them. Bauböck and Faist (2010) put a very clear conditional statement stating, "Diasporas have to be invented and mobilized in order to come into existence" (p. 315). The two authors connected this conditional existence of ethnic identity groups to specific positive conditions that provide motivations for, particularly, the elite of the diaspora members. This elite and their followers should be active working to support a specific national project or cause consistently concerning a specific homeland and interests (McCormick, 2012, pp. 320, 326, 338; Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 56). In short, it will be a diaspora if it acts, and it will act if it has an active style of leadership or in other words, an adequate or core leading size.

The effective size and leadership in the Egyptian case. The same factor of leadership effect has appeared in the Egyptian diaspora but for different short times. Before and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Professor Mohamed Elbaradei, the former Vice President, was the most important motivation icon. According to Ashour (2010), “it is clear that for now [2010] diaspora Egyptians are responding in a way they never have before to Elbaradei’s [socialism democracy] message to them.” In the Korean case, the church seems to be the active leadership; however, it is active in a contrary nature and direction. That religious leadership traditionally keeps the diaspora away from political engagement (Jang, 2014, pp. 640-641) and maybe this policy was one of the reasons of draining the possible active size of this diaspora. The situation is the same in the Egyptian Church in Egypt; however, the restriction of the Egyptian Church on the political engagement did not prevent the Coptic People from being politically very active in America compared to other passive Egyptians (Dickinson, 2008, pp. 40-41).

In the same vein of Dickinson’s observation, Rowe (2001) praised the very active lobby of Copts that assumed an important role in the politics realm of the West (pp. 86-90). What about non-militant Muslim Egyptians? Most U.S. Muslim clergy members are not militant Islamists. What role do they play in assisting Egyptian Americans to organize and mobilize, if any role at all? Is the typical Egyptian-American imam politically passive, apolitical, or uninterested? Do home countries and the attitude of the American government and environment welcome the outreach political activates of the mosques and their imams? In general, “from being a foreign body in America, [the majority of imams of the mosques tend] to be totally integrated into America” (Haddad, 2001, pp. 9-

10). Haddad conducted this finding came based on a survey during the U.S. office election of 2000 before Sept.11, 2001. In the current time, 2017, the question is how can imams and mosques' eagerness of integrating with the American sphere relate and help their diasporas political role regarding the home countries?

Egyptian Coptic people are typically afraid of being active explicitly, politically within the local Egyptian climate (Dickinson, 2008, p. 44). The reason can be that the Church leadership, military regime of July '1952, the partial repression of the Muslim majority or radical groups, the general common attitude of the Egyptian society towards any minority, or all of these counterparts were against the political participation of Copts. Depending on those factors, Copts in general, are inactive or not successful politically in the home state in contrast to their overpassing economic and business status in Egypt as well as their active attitude and political and religious role in the U.S. sphere. The climate is supportive and cooperative on all levels in the host countries compared to the home. The Muslim Egyptian case is in an opposite direction. This climate might be not applied to the Muslim majority who is active in Egypt but relatively inactive in the United States. Once again, the climate theory of proliferation that Cigler and Loomis (2007) mentioned might be a valid interpretation of this paradoxical situation.

Compared the small size of Copt inside and outside Egypt, the big population size of the Muslim Egyptians might not be the final word in determining that group political effectiveness. Here, I can derive another general result from the explanation of the connection between the proliferation factors and size characteristic. According to Borkowska (2006), "It does not always follow that the larger the group, the better its

organization and therefore visibility” (p. 24). These hypotheses should lead us to explore the debate about the connection between the other characteristics and effectiveness of diaspora.

The Hypotheses of the Functional, Reciprocal Connection Between the Impact of Diaspora’s Characteristics and the Influence of Political External Factors

One of the theoretical hypotheses of Jang theory is that the difference of the factors influence comes from the difference of the influence of groups’ characteristics. According to Jang (2014), religious institutions are an important element of the organization type factor, however, not all elements such as this element could have a direct influence on the political engagement and power of diasporas (p. 633).

The available literature shows that diasporas’ characteristics cannot be sharply separated from the external factors of the diaspora’s proliferation, organizational development, political engagement and influence, and success or fall. Both the characteristics and factors and their sub-elements are integrated with strategies employed by diasporas to impose the desired change in politics and to deal with other diasporas and host and homelands. On one hand, diasporas’ characteristics are the result of the factors and strategies, and the latter are clearly affected by the characteristic on the other hand. As a technical result of this relation, it would be difficult or not reasonable to distinguish which ones are independent and which are dependent variables. However, until I found a different reasonable hypothesis or observation, I would assume that the diaspora characteristics are the independent ones that enable or limit the outcomes of the factors.

By investigating the available research, I found that the internal and external factors are connected to the strategies and basic preconditions for the effective influence of diasporas. Not all factors and their elements or ideals could have the same effect on all diasporas. That different effect also varies from time to time, for example, the Cold War and the post-Cold War. The characteristics and their influences of each diaspora are different. In short, the differences between diasporas make differences of the influence of the external factors causing the change in diaspora political engagement level and thus the diaspora strategies of influencing the countries politics should also vary.

Jang (2012) asserted that understanding the influence of Korean churches and their communicative role in shaping the social lives of Korean Americans is very important (p. 52). Jang (2014) found that the conservative characteristic of the Korean diaspora and honored civic and social role of the churches (mediating variable) enabled a close, negative influence of religious institutions and faith (independent variable) on the insufficient political engagement of Korean Americans diasporas (dependent variable). On the other hand, Jang's findings referred to a close, positive relationship between religious institutions and rhetoric (independent variable) and explicit political engagement of other diasporas (dependent variable) such as Arab, and Latinos in America. This statement should not lead the reader to assume that this study is going to focus on Egyptian-American religious institutions as a factor in their political engagement. Of course, religious institutions factor is not the only one.

While the conservative political characteristic of the Korean diaspora and the negative political perception made the majority keep their faith separate from politics for

fear of politics influencing their faith and confusing priorities, mosques have been found to directly and purposefully influence political engagement and perceptions of Arab Muslims (Jang, 2014, p. 639). That is because those groups have salient religious characteristic that intertwines with identity and political orientations. Besides, some of those institutions and groups have an extreme or harmful agenda against the host or home country. For another example, Sheffer (2006) considered the diasporas characteristic of identity and identification as one of the elements that shape the factor of loyalty level of the diaspora (p. 227).

On one hand, as the characteristics of a diaspora could enable or disable some external factors of engagement, the factor can generate new characteristics on the contrary. As I mentioned previously, an ethnic group might need a wake-up call to be active in the settling foreign societies. This wake-up call could be national events or local events. The factor of the Los Angeles 1992 racial riot brought the Korean community together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being active and empowered (Jang, 2014, p. 634).

A diaspora needs to have organizations or lobbies holding a clear agenda and reasonable goals in order to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 41); however, this characteristic of having organization and unity is not always available in all diasporas such as the Egyptian one. In other words, to convince decision-makers to support diaspora political agenda is to have this agenda clear before the official agency and decision-makers (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 70; Smith, 2000, pp. 109, 128). Having this influential agenda (factor-intervening variable) should be affected by the unity and

organizational level (characteristic- independent or control variable) among the group members and leaders, which should lead to some level of political or social influence (dependent variable).

As there are negative characteristics that are connected typically to some diasporas, there are several unique characteristics connected to some classical diasporas exclusively. Arab and Latino diasporas are criticized that they are not organized sufficiently and have no announced clear organizational purpose and goals (Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307, 310-313). This characteristic could be attributed and related to their typical divergence and the multiple, unclear, or controversial identities that some of the Arabs have. This image made it impossible for them to be seen as one voice to the public. The characteristics and factors jointly made the political groups emergence difficult and insufficient. The connection between the characteristics and factors are strong to the degree that both of them can be seen as the same. I discerned in the literature that what some writers saw as characteristics or strategies, others could see as factors.

A number of diasporas and their lobbies are characterized as naturally influential and successful. According to Uslaner (2007), “Jews benefit from a high rate of participation in politics, and Arab Americans are not as great a political force” (p. 307). As a result, the characteristic of being generous and caring provides a high image of the diaspora and makes its lobby heard by the decision-makers who receive the diaspora’s combination of demands and generous donation (McCormick, 2012, pp. 322, 324). The pro-Israeli lobby and its active and old organizations realized how to keep the United States on their side most of the time.

Apart from their influential factors, those diasporas have their several positive features that led to positive effect of the external factors on the diaspora political role. According to Smith (2000), the Jewish lobby and other lobbies such as Armenian share positive features in different degrees and times. Functionally, the Israeli lobby represents a state that has a strong military power in its region. This powerful ethnic lobby introduces that strong state as the most stalwart keeper for the U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, and that should convince U.S. politicians and government branches to keep doors open for that lobby agenda and demands (pp. 124, 128). This type of positive relationships is triangular.

Compared to Arab states, Israel has this favorite position, which reflects positively on the Israeli lobby position in the U.S. politics. In other words, the Israeli lobby introduces itself and the state of Israel as a compatible alliance to the United States with no chance for deep or long public division between both states (Smith, 2000, p. 127). Arab diasporas do not have those features because of historical, political and religious values or obstacles (Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308). It might be a common double-standards case, but the Arab diaspora might still have the chance to change. The change that Smith (2000) meant is the change in the diaspora characteristics per se. Smith recommended that no efforts should be made for changing the political system of the United States because it would be an unrealistic attempt. Instead, groups just need to improve themselves and their organizational strategies and show understanding of the existing political system, no matter whether the system could be broken or even tyrannous (p. 129).

Once again, the Israeli lobby enjoys the friendly public opinion and open doors of DC most of the time, because that lobby has characteristics and strategies that enable it to manipulate the surrounding external factors. The lobby keeps reciting an accepted statement and presenting a democratic state that strong and undemocratic enemies surround according to Jewish or Israeli eloquent speech and literature (Uslaner, 2007, p. 307). In addition, the Israel lobby also portrays the Palestinians, particularly Hamas, as agents of evil regimes, Damascus, and Teheran. According to the persistent Israeli claim, Hamas is not a separate group of people, but it is the extension of bad states that want to destroy Israel. This claim parallels the U.S. claim about Damascus and Teheran, with North Korea that compose the axis of evil that works to destroy the United States and the whole liberal world of good states.

These claims may be backed up by the observation of Sheffer (2006) that Muslim diasporas or groups typically hold hybridized identities and overlapping loyalties, which impose difficulties on the relationships between those groups and host governments (pp. 70-71). On the other hand, the sympathetic public opinion and attitude factor was founded upon other factors such as collective ignorance of the public opinion and culture, and precise communication between the lobby and the U.S. media (Smith, 2000, p. 124). This conditional statement appeals to the Israeli lobby and state.

Compared to Israel, those all explained features and elements apply partly to the Egyptian state and diaspora for several reasons that are not our issue in this study. However, the comparison between the American aids given to both states can offer us an indicator of the difference in the official and public attitude and opinion towards both

sides. Although the Egyptian state does not have the favorite prime position, compared to Israel, it is still in a better place than the Arab countries. The question is whether that favored treatment towards the Egyptian state reflects on or connects to the diaspora effort and position by any mean.

The major factor is the strategic interests and relationships between both governments. According to Smith (as cited in DeWind & Segura, 2014), “the United States’ place and role in international affairs affect the potential for convergent interests between the government and individual diasporas” (p. 12). In other words, the governments have the upper hand in determining the relationship between both states and the Egyptian diaspora and the influence of that diaspora. However, I would rephrase the said question; does the real or surface divergence and convergence regarding specific interests between Egypt and the United States reflect on or connect to the diaspora effort and position by any means?

Early in this section, I have referred to Jang’s (2014) notion that implied that the difference in the diaspora’s influence factors comes from and connects with the difference in the respective influence of the groups’ characteristics (p. 633). The same author found that some good characteristics do not necessary lead to any political influence. According to Jang “Despite upward social mobility through education and economic achievement, Koreans’ civic and political engagements have been low...” (p. 633) Likewise, Egyptians have a high rate and level of education and income compared not just to other diasporas or immigrants such as Latinos but also white American citizens (MPI, 2014, pp. 6-9). For example, “38 percent of Egyptian diaspora members age 25

and older held a bachelor's degree as their highest academic credential versus 20 percent of the U.S. national population" (MPI, 2014, p. 7). Despite this fact, these positive characters of those educated members did not produce correspondent, political involvement, and influence of the Egyptian diaspora.

Let us emphasize, at least theoretically, that the external factors and diaspora characteristics are connected variables. Other negative characteristics are strong enough to stifle the interchangeable relation between good characteristics and expected political presence and influence of the Korean and Egyptian diasporas in the host societies such as DC. In other words, correlation between positive traits and external factors is not enough in some cases because of the existence of other negative characteristics that can harm that correlation and diaspora's influence. For example, Mexican Americans are more than 15 million and constitute 60 % of Latinos in America, and Cuban Americans makes 5.5 % only in 2000. However, the bigger group, the Mexicans, is commonly poorer, less educated, less interested in their home country causes, and the leaders did not campaign in the United States on behalf of Mexico, and thus less organized, united, and influential than the Cuban group is (Oswiecinski, 2013, pp. 64, 67; Smith, 2000, p. 147; Uslaner, 2007, p. 311).

The negative characteristics affect the likely response of the diaspora to the external factors differently from other diasporas. My assumption is that each diaspora is unique by itself, and there should be no solid ideal of the relation between positive or negative characteristics and factors to be applied perfectly to all similar diasporas. I would recall the definition of diaspora that I mentioned in Chapter 1; a dispersed group

should be having a unique concern with policy and politics in the homeland, which shapes its behavior in the host land to be considered as a diaspora.

The examples of the educated, wealthy Korean and Egyptian diasporas can show that the positive characteristics can be not always productive. On the other hand, we could also find that negative symptoms are not always negative regarding its connection and effects on the external factors as the example of the small size characteristic of Jewish or Cuban diaspora showed. Therefore, the research questions of the study will address the validity of this hypothesis as an example of the interrelation between characteristics and factors of the diasporas' political influence on the American policy making processes.

Justifying the Relation Between the Available Literature and the Study Concepts

The study of Zohry and Debnath (2010) on the Egyptian diaspora was not based on updated data, and it did not show any clear theoretical framework to back up its way of inquiry. However, the authors mentioned that the study would be just a resource for information for future studies (p. 1). As a matter of the relation between my proposed study and the past studies, Zohry and Debnath's (2010) study remains a unique resource for studying the Egyptian diaspora in the United States since that there is almost no available updated research on that topic. In addition, some other studies considered Zohry and Debnath as a primary resource on this topic. That study should provide my proposed study with much comparative data and information based on the typology base that the authors applied to their study.

Second, as nearly all of the studies conducted on Egyptian diasporas, Zohry and Debnath's (2010), Mehrez and Hamdy (2010), Severo and Zuolo (2012), and Dickinson (2008) were limited to the diaspora's economic linkage and contribution in Egypt development, or Coptic diaspora traumatic memory and religious freedom in the homeland. Those studies had no plan for exploring the political roles of Egyptian diaspora in the host countries or connecting that role to their importance and local political role in Egypt. The studies of Filipovic et al. (2012), and Ceschi, et al. (2005), are other instances of this limitation too. In their article, "Diaspora engagement strategies, and policies," Filipovic et al. (2012) focused on the diaspora-motherland partnership and suggested several policies that the administration should adopt to enhance that partnership and the diaspora contributions concerning the homeland only.

Third, I found that diaspora literature adopted a comparative approach to study the diasporas' characteristics, strategies, and factors of formation or mobilization, having accepted roles, and engaging in the political process. The literature used comparative models of successful diasporas to study or just mention to others who are relatively small or unsuccessful. Cigler and Loomis (2007), Oswiecimski (2013), and DeWind and Segura' (2014) studies are ideals of this method. Most of the researches employed the Jewish diaspora model to compare or measure the other groups especially the Arab. They did not expand their investigation to cover the unsuccessful diasporas per se and why they are not successful.

Regarding the criteria for being active or successful, diasporas have to include a degree of influence over particular U.S. foreign policy according to the most of the

literature and writers such as, DeWind and Segura (2014). The criteria could also refer to the diaspora-host government convergence in policy making, and the extent that Egyptian-Americans attend group meetings, and donate money or time, to group activity. However, all of these criteria should aim and pave the way for the first one that is the ability of influencing over particular U.S. foreign policy for the homeland's interests.

Justifying From the Literature the Rationale for Selection of the Study Concepts

As I found in this analysis of the current literature, several gaps and weaknesses need to be covered, which justify from the literature the rationale for selection of the studied concepts. I also noticed major trends and themes amongst the researchers. One of those major themes was the effect of the external factors on the diasporas' characteristics, presence and, influence. However, that does not mean that the factors should lead to the same results in all diaspora cases. The external factors affect the characteristics of each diaspora and they together affect the diasporas reaction (their engagement strategies) differently. The employed strategies of diasporas for social and political engagement are the natural fruit of the connection between the factors and characteristics; however, not all diasporas were able to see and use this connection. The relations between the factors, characteristics, and engagement strategies are in a loop or cyclic shape. The following diagram illustrates these relationships.




Figure 1. The loop relations between the factors, characteristics, and engagement strategies.

The purpose of Oswiecinski's (2013) study was exploring what could make some ethnic groups effective and what could be their potential influence on the American foreign policy arena. As major factors, the author found three elements including the characteristic of groups and their members, and elements of the political context of the host state (p. 43). The contemporary political environment element implies the political system, global circumstances such as the changes and events that occurred during or post-Cold War, terrorism war, 9/11 attacks, regional conflict such as Iraq war in 2003, globalization, advanced technology applications, and economy (Dickinson, 2008, p. 39). In fact, not all of these factors had been adequately addressed.

Several pioneering scholars such as DeWind and Segura (2014), Ambrosio (2002), and Smith (2005) explained and asserted the positive changes in the political positions and powers of a limited number of diasporas' after some significant events such

as the Cold War (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 251; Smith, 2005, p. 93). While the end of the cold war was a decisive factor for ethnic groups in general (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 51) such as, Armenians and African Blacks (DeWind & Segura, 2014, pp. 252, 254), and negative for East Europeans and Cubans (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 63), it has neutral impact on other groups such Cubans specifically right after the war (Oswiecinski, 2013, p. 58) and Arabs. Having no change can be a kind of success in some cases. The emerged concept here is that the uniqueness of the diaspora's characteristics maximize, minimize, or neutralize the same externally related factors. Hence, there will be a need to explore the differences between external factors effects on some diasporas, especially the new, small, or incipient, because of the differences in their characteristics. For example, as I mentioned before, literature did not indicate how has the post-Cold War affected the Arab, Egyptian, and Muslim incipient diasporas' positions compared to Latinos and Jews.

Hence, if the effect of post-Cold War event on Arab and Egyptian diasporas was not salient in the current literature, so I suggested exploring other events that are strongly connected to those diasporas and more recent. I would employ the same concept, the effect of historic events on diasporas in host countries, but the events would be different in terms of its closeness to the Arab and Egyptian diasporas. Many studies such as "The Arab Spring" of Jones (2012), explored the new revolutions and its impact on Arabs and Egyptians in their home countries but not abroad. However, Severo and Zuolo's (2012) study focused on Egyptian diaspora after the revolution, but the scope was limited to the e-Diaspora only and with no focus on a particular groups or city or state.

The 2011 revolution as a major independent variable induced impacts on diasporas in discouraging and catalytic ways. The MPI (2014, 2015) reports on Egyptian diaspora profile agreed with this finding. New Egyptian organizations work on different issues such as supporting the human rights in Egypt and serving the Coptic community. A significant portion of those organizations was established during the Arab Spring and Egyptian revolutions. Unfortunately, many of those organizations, e-diasporas groups, and unregistered groups had already grown inactive, if not disappeared by 2014 (pp. 8-9). The post-Cold War period can be called the hinge of history, but it is certainly not the last or only one. Other historic-not historical- events such as 9/11, Egyptian revolutions, Arab Spring, and the new information technology revolution might be closer to Arab and Egyptian diasporas emergence in terms of time closeness and effect of those events.

The disorganization, disengagement, self-identity, confusing and complex identity, and other characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora led and connected to another characteristic that is the blatant polarization. This later one is a result and cause of many other characteristics and factors that all affect this diaspora political and civic engagement in its host lands; therefore, the polarization status deserves more attention and needs to be addressed in terms of understanding other factors and engagement status. If we want to know what has kept the Egyptian-American diaspora unorganized and disengaged, then we might need to investigate the literature to find out if it is profound religious differences, e.g., Copt versus Muslim, or ordinary Muslims versus radicals. As stated by Jang (2012), because the available studies on the intersection of ethnic identity,

ethnic community, and religion factor, there is a need for future studies for better understanding of the influence of religious identification on one's ethnic identity (p. 11).

A major claim of this study is that the Egyptian diaspora's political behavior took the wave shape; turning from passive to active and the passive stage again. This behavior is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the country. The short period of the active engagement could indicate that the external motivation or force was just an exception of the common passive behavior of that diaspora. The revolution and its ongoing consequences and other several elements cause that behavior of engagement; nevertheless, no studies have been conducted addressing this phenomenon. Thus, the study questions should address this claim.

Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean diaspora engagement behavior. According to Jang (2014), Koreans received the terrible message of the racial riot that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992 against Korean Americans' businesses. The diaspora understood the need for being active, united, and organized, and became aware for coalition building (p. 629). However, "Although [this factor] brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, despite the need to voice their opinions and empower themselves to address their concerns, Koreans have continued to be inactive." (Jang, 2012, p. 54) Jang did not detail what was precisely the reason of that unresponsive behavior, and that would be one of the needs for my study of explaining the similar behavior of Egyptian diasporas. This concluded observation leads to the need to justify from the literature the rationale for selection of the mentioned concepts.

Comments on Studies Related to Their Chosen Methods and Ways of Approaching the Problem

Here, I summaries several points that I detailed through the chapter. This brief would be focused on describing studies related to the constructs of interest and chosen methodology and methods that are consistent with the scope of the study. Second, this brief would describe ways researchers in the discipline have approached the problem and the strengths and weakness inherent in their approaches. The focus would be on the Egyptian diaspora studies because that is the scope of my study. What are the possible weaknesses of the methods and design of the literature on diaspora in general, and Egyptian diaspora in particular?

Severo and Zuolo (2012) explored the e-diaspora, not the actual diaspora, as a new approach to studying the Egyptian diaspora. This method of sampling can be correct and limited to the associations level. Nevertheless, the representation of selected associations for the actual groups in the real world can be questionable. Hence, I would consider the approach of using e-diaspora besides using surveys and interviews with actual groups and not just the online or virtual groups or one association. Using one approach can give just a part of the truth, and that would not be ideal for my qualitative tradition. Using more than one data resource is a triangulation strategy that is essential for a certain level of validity in qualitative studies. As I mentioned throughout this study, Egyptian organizations and leaders typically have more than one agenda or have personal agendas that are not necessary representing all the diasporas members. In other words,

studying the diaspora based on what the diaspora says online cannot be sufficient, therefore, meeting with people is necessary to synthesize the actual image.

I choose my sample purposely to be one actual- not virtual-association or group in one specific city; Washington, DC prominent Egyptian associations and figures typically concentrate on the important political areas. One of the reasons behind this tendency of the diaspora organizations is that “One of the changes in modern interest groups politics is the centralization of group headquarters in Washington, DC rather than New York City or elsewhere” (Cigler& Loomis, 2007, p. 2). Egyptian organizations and actors are not an exception from that common tendency. There was no study conducted on Egyptian and maybe Arab diasporas in this city specifically. Jang’s (2012, 2014) studies of Korean Americans were my primary theoretical framework; however, it did not focus on Koreans in any particular area.

Another cause related to Egyptian organization placement concentration is the Egyptian history and culture that I have to consider in assigning my sample and place. Egypt is a central-rule state and presidency or monarchy regime through history; therefore, political, civic, and military powers gather around the center that is Cairo in Egypt or Washington, DC in the United States. According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), organizations of DC aim to be influential so that they decided or accepted to settle close to the hub of the policymakers and political kitchen (p. 10). With the same line, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that ethnic groups concentration in metropolitan areas is “more likely to have contacts with, or espouse to, ethnic media and community organizations” (p. 878). Hence, I assume that this choice of the groups could

give some advantage to them on one hand, and should give me easier access to the organizations and involved stakeholders, save some time, and provide my study with updated, direct information on the other hand.

Finally, as I mentioned in the external factors section listed in this chapter, the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have to be considered if we need to explore the effect of external *historic* factors, not just the *historical* factors such as the Cold War. Several studies I explored such as Zohry and Debnath (2010) in this proposal were conducted before the revolution that made a great shift in the Egyptian political scene in Egypt and host countries. This change implies the need to study the same diaspora and that new factor related to what happened after 2011.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I mentioned several characteristics and political influence's factors of different diasporas with connection and major concentration on the Egyptian diasporas based on several functional comparisons with other traditional and incipient ethnic groups. The chapter did not cover all elements or generalize the findings to all Egyptian groups in different regions in America or the world. Based on this review of the current literature, the size, organizational unity, and religious characteristics had had a great focus in literature; thus, they would have the same focus in this study. According to Oswiecinski (2013), there are always circumstances (i.e., external factors) and characteristics (internal factors) that control the implementation of the size (p. 65). This statement shows just one claim of the relation between the independent, dependent, and mediating variables that should explain specific outcomes regarding the diaspora political

engagement and influence. This relation between the size and unity and political effectiveness is still unclear; is it a reverse or direct link? Future studies are in need to grasp this particular hypothesis.

It would not be realistic if the ethnic groups' characteristics and extrinsic factors if they were studied separately. That is because they jointly affect the groups' political proliferation, strategies, position, and power in the host countries. What we can separate is the influence from success of the diaspora. According to Lyons (2014), Ethiopian diaspora became influential, but that did not mean achieving successful change in the American policies towards the Ethiopian government in 2005 (pp. 163, 165, 180). Hence, each category is not enough by itself, and both categories of factors are contributing jointly in enabling or hindering the diaspora establishment, organizational and political strategies employed for active mobilization, engagement, influence, and success.

The Egyptian diaspora has some common as well as unique characteristics that prevent it from taking advantage on the opportune factors and from keeping the active status. The limited existing literature had addressed some of those characteristics by studying other diasporas but other characteristics had not been addressed. I noticed that the Egyptian diasporas has severe political and personal polarization, ideological division among them and between them and the Egyptian state, divergence in interests between some sectors and the Egyptian state, urgent need for a clear organizational purpose and single agenda, and an apparent lack of organizational experience and lobbying history. For these reasons and others, compared to the Ethiopian diaspora, the Egyptian diaspora was not considered influential because it did not employ effective strategies. Thus, it was

unsuccessful because it did not achieve changes in the U.S. foreign politics towards Egypt and the region in general. The research questions should test this assumption.

I could rephrase my concluded statement by saying that the characteristics (independent variables) of each diaspora allowed or did not allow it to manipulate the external factors (dependent variables). In Chapter 3, I explained, among other things, how the research and interviews questions are going to generate valid data regarding the relationship between external, independent factors, i.e. the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions/coups, and the internal factors that define the extent to which Egyptian-Americans are a diaspora, according to my framework.

Based on this contrast, ethnic groups have different and various activities or strategies such as lobbying activities and experiences, which range from two distinct ways of lobbying. Lobbying is about “taking the form of campaign contributions or influence-buying through other means, as an activity that is aimed at changing [and not bending] existing rules or policies [of a government]” (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46). The change and influence can come to reality when the lobbies show the government the likely consequences of its action because lobbies are treasured resources of information showing those consequences for the governments (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 483).

Not all groups can lobby the executive government directly and thus they tend to do indirect lobbying activities as we saw clearly in the Ethiopian case (Lyons, 2014, pp. 163-180). Also, the common perception implies that not all countries are able or prefer to apply the lobbying strategy. This strategy is relatively more common in the rich or developed countries compared to the developing ones. The culture, experience, and

mechanism of lobbying might be not common or easy for groups who came from the developing countries (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46).

The differences in characteristics of diasporas as well as their home countries should explain why the external factors have no similar results for all diasporas and why diasporas could be able or not able to apply similar strategies (Hrebenar & Thomas, 2012, p. 312). Finally, the Korean, Arab, Ethiopian, and Cuban, diasporas were studied here to extract lessons for the Egyptian case. In addition, proliferation, characteristics, political position, and influence of the Egyptian diasporas' have still to be addressed due to the new external factors including the 2011 revolution ongoing implications.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The primary purpose of this applied study was (a) to identify, describe, and understand the problem of the Egyptian diaspora's current political engagement and potential influence in Washington, DC and (b) to explore the key characteristics and related factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement and influence. The research tradition I employed in this study to explore the study phenomenon was the qualitative, instrumental, single case study design. However, the grounded theory approach that was identified in Jang's study (2012, 2014) was integrated with my primary approach of the case study. I applied the case study design expecting to interview participants who have different backgrounds and hold contrasting views about Egypt and diaspora. The goal was to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and the specific bounded case. The source of questions for this case study came from concerns experienced by people (see Patton, 2002, p. 217). Therefore, a thorough understanding of the phenomenon under study came from the prime data sources: case materials collected by exploring the case units and the contrasting perspectives of participants as a prime data source (see American Psychological Association (APA), 2010, p. 11).

To achieve this purpose, I developed the research questions, based on the intellectual goals of this study, to essentially focus on exploring what are the Egyptian diaspora and its political engagement shape. The search and interviews questions were created to provide details about the diaspora's nature or type, proliferation, components, as well as members' backgrounds, immigration status, interrelationships, assimilation,

self-identity, and other characteristics and factors. In Chapter 3, I explain how the questions were developed to generate valid data regarding the relationship between external, independent factors (i.e., the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions) and the internal factors that defined the extent to which Egyptian Americans are a diaspora, according to my framework. In this chapter, I also describe and enumerate the particular steps that I expected to take to address the research questions. Therefore, the chapter is separated into two major sections focusing on (a) the research design and rationale and my role as researcher and (b) issues with participant recruitment, instrumentation, the procedures for collecting data and analysis, and related issues of trustworthiness.

Research Design and Rationale

Research Questions

Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora explain the connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution, organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., the small size, negative perception on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?

Research Question 2: How does the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns such as the presidential election and revolution?

The Research Tradition and Rationale for the Chosen Tradition

In this section, I identified the chosen research tradition that would best answer the research questions, and address the rationale for selecting this tradition. The social phenomenon in this study is the political engagement and influence of the Egyptian diaspora living and acting in Washington, DC during and after the Egyptian revolution. Hence, a qualitative methodology was employed to study the factors of this phenomenon.

The research design derived logically from the problem statement. Based on thorough review of the existing literature on diaspora, I found that it would be appropriate to use the qualitative case study tradition approach because there is no existing theory and very little information about the phenomenon. Hence, the need for exploring and understanding the phenomenon and case might exist. A case study required using multiple data sources that would be useful and essential to cover the limited literature and information about the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, pp. 104-105). Therefore, as Creswell wrote, the researcher should rely on participants' perceptions of the phenomenon studied in the specific context (2009, p. 8; 2013, pp. 24-25). The study participants developed subjective varied meanings about their personal experience that flow from their different historical and cultural backgrounds.

The definition of the case study approach involves studying a case and its boundaries (Creswell, 2013). The case boundaries include the case nature, place, time, and members within a real-life, contemporary context or setting that can be described and identified and are not abstract (Creswell, 2013). The goal is developing an in-depth description and analysis of that case to understand it and the specific related bounded phenomenon (Creswell, 2013,

pp. 97, 104; Yin, 2009, p. 32). I chose the case study as a qualitative research methodology for several reasons. Namely, I met participants in Washington, DC to learn how the things happened in Egypt from their point of view and what makes the diaspora members behave and move due to their perceptions, different backgrounds, and worldviews. I listened to participants about their engagement in what is going on in Washington, DC regarding Egyptian concerns. I began the study with little knowledge about the topic, and using open-ended questions and descriptive analysis based on several kinds of data sources, completed it with more details.

My case study research was qualitative and descriptive, not a cause-effect study that was of the quantitative tradition. As qualitative research, the study aimed to explore and gain new information about the unknown phenomenon studied. My qualitative single case study showed purposefully different perspectives of the participants on the topic by exploring and using multiple units bounded transparently by one place (i.e., Washington, DC) for a specific time (i.e., the term of the 2011 Egyptian revolution through 2018).

In contrast to the quantitative research tradition and because there was not enough realistic information on the topic, I did not conduct the study to develop or test a theory about the phenomenon (as it is in the grounded theory approach). Moreover, the grounded theory approach demands primarily using interviews with a significant number of individuals, which was not very possible due to the study topic and circumstances of the diaspora, such as its minuscule size in Washington, DC. I did not conduct the study to tell a story from marginalized figures or groups or to explore the life of an individual as is demanded in the narrative design. With the narrative approach, the data collection

method included limited sources that are interviews and documents. In sum, other possible choices of research traditions would have been less effective.

As shown in the literature review, I had been seeking to understand the cultural and social settings and experiences of the participants (i.e., the diaspora characteristics). The resulting meanings and themes emerged inductively based on my close interaction with the community members and the subjective assumptions and interpretation of the participants based on their personal view of the world and the situation being studied (see Creswell, 2009, pp. 8-9). The subjective assumptions and interpretation should be obtained through the participants' answers to the interview questions. My goal was making sense of the participants' views on the particular topic, the revolution, transformation period (i.e., 2011–2013), and the effect of those events on the diaspora political engagement.

Role of the Researcher

I needed to define the personal and professional relationships that I may have had with participants, steps to gain entry, personal connection to the site of interviews to collect the data, and my likely biases and sensitiveness to other ethical issues. I also needed to state my plan for addressing these issues. According to Rudestam and Newton (2015), in qualitative research, the instruments are the human researcher and other sorts of traditional instrumentation, such as interviews and observations (p. 127). The relationships between participants and me and between people involved in these activities can influence the potential results. Therefore, I was the key data collection instrument in this single case study by being involved in the case settings as well as conducting the

interviews, browsing documents, and observing what was being studied. My data collection instrument was face-to-face interviews, while sending a questionnaire list to participants was my alternative plan to be used if I could not meet the participants in person.

As a researcher in the qualitative research tradition, it is typical to be involved in intensive experiences and ongoing relations with the prospective participants. Since I was a member in a number of the Egyptian organizations and groups in Washington, DC, Virginia, and Maryland, I had the necessary access and opportunity to access the participants and groups' activities and documents. As such, I knew many of the participants. This position and personal relationship led to building reciprocity and trust between us. However, I did not have any supervisory or instructor relationships involving positions of power with the participants. This situation prevented me from abusing the power I had or coercing the participants into the study, which could have been a serious validity and ethical issue. To address ethical issues in advance, I developed a consent form that functioned as an essential contract between my potential participants and me.

My role included some essential elements, including the potential biases and ethical matters, steps to gain entry, and study values. The ultimate goal was ensuring the validity and accuracy of the findings and respect for and protection of participants, their organizations, and their rights (Creswell, 2009, pp. 87, 89, 177). I might have faced several challenges collecting and analyzing data, such as my presumptions, past experiences, access difficulty to the organizations' sites, abusing power over the participants, interpretation accuracy (see Creswell, 2009, pp. 89-92) and lack of

anonymity. Those challenges could have imposed limitations on my data collection strategy and the quality of collected and analyzed data. To address threats to the quality, I discussed my “past experiences, biases, and orientations that have likely shaped the interpretation and approach to the study” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251). Moreover, I clearly described the methods and procedures I employed for collecting and analyzing the data (see Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 310).

Methodology

This section deals with the issue of from whom and how data are collected and how data will be analyzed. The primary intent of this case study qualitative research is not to generalize the information or findings to another population but to explain the specifics of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, p. 157). This consideration should also be consistent with choosing a small sample size and applying purposeful sampling strategy for collecting the data. Having said that, applying the purposeful sampling strategy should be the right way to help me use the concrete and small sample size and number of units within the major single case for illustrating, exploring, and understanding the target unique phenomenon in depth (Patton, 2009, p. 230).

The case or phenomenon represents an extreme and revelatory case. A revelatory single case means revealing and focusing on a phenomenon that is hitherto unknown or not studied because it has been inaccessible to social scientists’ inquiry in the past (Yin, 2014, p. 52). This revelatory instrumental single case study involves the analysis of multiple units embedded within the larger case that is the diaspora. Mainly, the case is revelatory in nature, and that should give another rationale for selecting an embedded

single case rather than multiple-case design (Yin, p. 52). The primary, larger unit is the diaspora as a whole (the case). One small-embedded unit (the central unit of the study) will be one group of Egyptians, the AEA group in Washington, DC. This small unit includes members and leaders or founders, and it is the major unit of the case. I employ this unit to explore the primary case, the diaspora itself. My primary individual interviewees will come from AEA.

Throughout personal experience and close navigation, I identified a preliminary group of Egyptians that could be considered representative of the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. I focus the AEA and its leaders as a representative sample for the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. In other words, the scope is the Egyptian diaspora in DC, and AEA is the primary unit of analyses I use as an instrumental case to study the Egyptian diaspora as a whole. AEA is a non-profit organization 501-C3 established in 2005 under U.S. Laws. The announced mission is promoting true democracy, and sustainable development and social justice in Egypt and empowers Egyptian Americans in their new communities. The general political orientation of the organization is against the Egyptian government policies as well as the Muslim Brotherhoods, however, it has good relationships with the Egyptian embassy. There is no persistent harmony among the members and between them and the elected president and board of directors. AEA has no particular physical place for its members' meetings and transparent information regarding its financial resources; therefore, the observation instrument would not be applied.

Personal conflicts reflect on the group work and decisions, but AEA performed very well in Washington, DC during the 2011 revolution. Therefore, AEA members were

my primary interviews participants. I also chose this group because its leaders and members have different political backgrounds and political and religious orientations that could enrich the collected data. Finally, the smallest units will be an intermediary unit that includes Egyptian activists from outside the AEA, and the leaders or followers of a mosque. At each level of analysis, it was likely that slightly different data collection techniques and resources were used.

The case was selected to illustrate the study issue or topic, and it must be described in thick detail (Creswell, 2013, p. 102). Defining the phenomenon, case, and embedded units of analysis should include defining the case boundaries that includes the case nature, place, time, and members. It is important to choose a case with some real-life characteristics that can be described and identified and are not very abstract (Yin, 2009, p. 32). For this reason, and as I asserted at the outset of this chapter, I tailored questions addressing particular issues of daily political engagement, such as facilitating the Egyptian immigration and related policy and politics, and Israel-Arab conflict in the light of its relation with Egyptian identity.

Those issues also included the present political development in Egypt in relation to the new regime's manner of governing, as well as the relationships between Egypt and the United States pursuant to the 2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups and their effects. These issues and related questions reflect the forms of political participation and lobbying activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political system. These forms are the focus of the study and its questions in terms of examining how the diaspora lobbies occasionally for Egypt in the United States.

It was necessary to include explanations for why I chose these particular issues (the political participation forms and issues) and the related questions. It was also necessary to explain to the scholarly readers how the interviewee's responses are valid indicators of a more or less strong sense of diasporic ethnic group cohesiveness, proliferation, and the need for political participation among Egyptian Americans. For example, the question of why the diaspora size is small and how the immigration policy is a reason for that status can be an important political issue to the diaspora members. Of course, they like to come to the United States and invite their family easily.

My major principle that dominates designing the study and choosing the proper method and its elements for conducting this qualitative study refers "improved understanding of complex human issues is more important than generalizability of results" (Marshall, 1996, p. 524). That is because my design is a single case study, which aimed to elucidate what is specific of that unique, extreme case (see Creswell, 2013, p. 157). This principal should justify choosing the sampling strategies, sample size, and specific participants who can answer particular simple questions of this very detailed research (Marshall, 1996, p. 523). Therefore, I will detail the criteria on which participants' selection is based; identify data collection instruments and sources; and the procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection

Participant Selection Logic

Considering the qualitative nature of the study, this case study is based on a broad range of data resources. Hence, collecting data ranged from gathering some documents of government and organizations to interviewing some political activists and lobbyists, and

community organizational leaders, mainly, from AEA. Therefore, this process should included and serve to instruct others who could be interested in the study topic, fulfilled the desired saturation and the desired credibility, and gave a full image of the diaspora situation.

Based on my choice of applying qualitative method of inquiry, my purposive sampling strategy focused deliberately on a small number of knowledgeable participants. Those potential participants should have rich information about the case because the intent is to obtain extensive detail about the case and each unit of it and to elucidate the particular of them (Creswell, 2013, p. 157; Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). The participants. They should be able to likely contribute significantly to enriching a deeper understanding of my topic, research questions, and phenomenon posed by this study.

Finding proper participants and make sure that they meet the selection criteria that I have listed for that purpose will depend on several considerations. One of the considerations is the sampling strategy, which is the basis of my logic. That strategy determines and includes what case I should study in the first place and then the criteria on which participant selection is based to study that case. According to Creswell (2013), “In choosing which case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling is available” (p. 100). Therefore, I employed a mix of strategies that combines the snowball or chain sampling and the extreme or deviant case sampling.

The rationale for choosing the later strategy was because it had the same logic and purpose of case study approach. Also, it offers a rationale for choosing the single case study rather than a multiple case study design (Yin, 2014, pp. 51-52). According to

Patton (2002), extreme cases can be information-rich cases. The reason is that by being unusual, the extreme cases can show what is unusual or special and is typical (p. 234). In addition, the Egyptian diaspora case shows notable failures or insufficiency so that it was worth being studied and it can offer useful lessons about the extraordinary conditions of the case.

According to Patton (2002), “Extreme or deviant cases may be so unusual as to distort the manifestation of the phenomenon of interests” (p. 234). My readers could be wondering what are these extreme cases I have in mind and why could be unusual. The meaning here is not “extreme” or “deviant” individuals. I did not intend, in other words, to interview someone who is also completely politically inattentive and uninterested to find out why. I did not also mean by extreme or deviant cases something such as a military coup, militant Islamists, or illegal organization activities. Instead, the general unstable situation of the Egyptian national situation, erratic behavior of the diaspora case and the small but modest growing up size of the diaspora, and the unsuccessful performance of the diaspora compared to other similar diasporas, all imply the deviant of the case according to my estimation and observation.

I had had practical experience with the political movements and organizations, and observation on the media. Based on this fact and my readings, I believe that the extreme trait of the study case also implies the outstanding successes and notable failures of the Egyptian political activists and organizations in the local political sphere of Egypt. Also, this trait implies the Egyptian diaspora’s limited proliferation and swinging political engagement in the host countries before and after the Egyptian revolution.

On the other hand, I asked the initial participants about other likely candidates who could be information-rich key informants or who could know who knows what cases are information rich (Patton, 2002, p. 243). Hence, I want to emphasize highly attentive Egyptian-Americans. Then, I asked them about issues which I predict they may have an inclination to try to influence the U.S. government. The issues are such as mixing religion with politics, U.S. immigration policies, and democracy of the Egyptian governance. Of course, their answers were related and affected by their subjective views regarding the 2011 and 2013 revolutions/coups that are the overarching event of these issues and questions.

As a likely result, the number of participants is not totally known at least in the present. However, the snowball sampling process would stop when it comes to a few key names of useful participants and when good informants or no new information are forthcoming from new sampled units; thus, saturation is the foremost criterion (Patton, 2002, p. 246). Possibly, that how many I interview will depend in part on the identity polarizations, if they exist, among Egyptian Americans. Coptic Christian Egyptian Americans in Washington, DC may have significantly different views about President El Sisi's Egyptian administration than do strongly Muslim Egyptian Americans and secular but Muslim identity Egyptian Americans. Moreover, because of the small size of the diaspora in Washington, DC and the hardship of locating and contacting the members, I expected that the available number of cooperative and informative interviewees would have been limited.

Besides, the criteria on which and how many participants should be selected include also religious affiliations, professional background, social level in Egypt and America, location, social connections, availability for meeting, and access to organizations documents and sites and business meetings. The candidates should be Egyptian who resided in Washington, DC before 2011, and somehow participated in the Egyptian political events such as presidential election campaigns. They could be also members of nonprofits or public agencies.

“In proposing an extreme group sample, as in all purposeful sampling designs, the researcher has an obligation to present the rationale and expected benefits of this strategy” (Patton, 2002, p. 234). Purposeful sampling criteria should consider that the selected participants should have to constitute a purposely diverse and presentational sample (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). So that, the sample included the relatively active members who have had experienced the extreme changes in the diaspora role and nature before and after the Egyptian revolution. Therefore, the interview instrument focused on interviewing those people who were relatively active in the Egyptian diaspora organization(s) at the Egyptian revolution time. I am also interested in interviewing members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian diaspora organization(s) during and after and because of that event.

With describing the relationship between saturation and sample size, saturation is one of the major determinations of the sample size as I have just mentioned before regarding the snowball sampling strategy. The case study approach considers collecting data from interviewing appropriate candidates for participation with other data coming

from observations or other collected data sets. In this recent stage of the study, I did not have a full idea of what all difficulties I could face in the sampling process. According to Marshall (1996), “the number of required [participants] usually becomes evident as the study progresses, like new categories, themes or explanations stop emerging from the data (data saturation)” (p. 523).

However, the sample size and how much it could be small should depend on several essential considerations. Those considerations are such as my decisions regarding the units of analysis, the available time and resources, access issues, availability and cooperation of participants, and the rationale for the study. I also considered my purpose of seeking particular sorts of participants, the amount of information the participants have and can provide, and of course, what I was looking for to understand and the depth of that understanding (Patton, 2002, pp. 228-229, 244-245). I considered my single case itself being the study sample, as well as the number of individuals within my case to interview. As it is a typical qualitative study, the sample size of this case study was small.

Instrumentation

The data collection instruments and evidences that I wanted to use had included field diaries or journals; historical, organizational, or legal documents, and interview protocols and open-ended interviews including several data types such as individuals and organizational founders and members. I have a list of questions that I should send my participants. I explained and justified these questions concerning the data that I hoped to gather using them and concerning generating valid data.

However, the interview was my primary instrument. Creswell (2013) identified the interview method as a “dialogue that is conducted one-way, provides information for the researcher, is based on the researcher's agenda, leads to the researcher's interpretations, and contains “counter control” elements by the interviewee [if the interviewee] withholds information” (p. 173). This popular instrument has high fidelity and little structure (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 130). It included phone calls, face-to-face meetings and, e-mails. For this basic purpose, I collected a few legal documents about the AEA group, and initial exchanged e-mails between the group members including myself. Those e-mails included issues such as what is going on in Egypt, debates on the organizations' leadership legitimacy, bylaws, holidays, or invitations for annual meetings or organizational election. They were also different from the other type of e-mails that I planed to send with attached interview questions that I mentioned previously. As an ethical matter, I have informed these people that I was gathering data for my dissertation, which may change their e-mail behavior.

However, my planned primary instrument of collecting data was the face-to-face open-ended interviews. It was preceded by collecting documents, researching through the organizations' websites, and collecting archival data. Getting responses by e-mail was difficult while conducting Face-to-face interviews were better, even necessary, in order to get the information I need. Hence, sending my questionnaires via e-mails was the last resort when I could not meet any of the participants in person.

I used a protocol for the interviews when I needed to do that (Creswell, 2009, p. 175). Another basic step in conducting the qualitative instruments is to set up a clear

protocol or several different protocols showing important procedural components such as the questions and interviewees-interviewer consent. I designed the interview protocol using a combination of sample interview protocols of Janesick dated in 2011 and Creswell dated in 2013. The protocol included eight central descriptive questions. It was useful for the consistency of the interviews and could vary based on the interviewees' types (see Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24).

Regarding the observation instrument, it could raise an ethical concern. I should not be so involved in the organization or community's activities because I could lose a sense of my required level of objectivity as a professional researcher (Laureate Education, 2013). Pitfalls are also potential that might lead to biased role and outcomes that using the participant-observation instrument might push me gradually to assume a specific position within the observed organization or become such a supporter. Being a participant-observer also could turn me busy involving in the observed setting which that might make me forget about my original mission that is observing and taking notes (Yin, 2014, p. 117). Therefore, applying the interview instrument was my choice to collect the data. The interview instrument should provide a good alternative when I cannot directly observe the internal setting, people, and the environment of the organizations, and when the observation cannot answer a particular research question. The interview provided me with full control over the questioning process and the inputs and outputs (see Creswell, 2009, p. 179).

Nevertheless, the nature of my study leads to apply both ways because I addressed the historical background of the studied group as well as its everyday matters such as the

engagement issues. According to Yin (2003), the observation and interview methods have the chance to address contemporary sources; however, the interview has the advantage of treating past or history in a better way than observation can do (pp. 92, 98). Hence, I did not use the observation option because there would be no actual reason or benefit to my study. During the data collection process, I involved and focused on interviewing people about their experiences and perspectives

The selected source of the instrument for collecting the data is a researcher-produced. The basis for this instrument development is the literature source that is the Jang's questionnaires. Jang's work inspired the style and organization of my study interview questions. In Chapters 1 and 2, I explained the rationales for choosing Jang's study and theory that should justify the validity for this source to be the basis for selecting the specific researcher-developed instrument.

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

According to Rudestam and Newton (2015), a good qualitative case study should include and apply more than one data collection method and obtain different perspectives (p. 56). This rule should give me the flexibility of choosing several methods or instruments depending on their appropriateness and usefulness for the study purpose, research questions, tradition and design, participants' circumstances, and potential field issues. To achieve credibility of the procedures and findings, I sought different types of participants who have average level of political knowledge or interest such as participating in the national elections. They also might hold different if not contrasting, subjective perspectives on the reality.

I attended several meetings of the AEA group that can be in the current organization leader's residence. I also came to some community meetings that were held in the public community centers. Before conducting any instrument, I have tried to make that everything would be clear and easy. Therefore, I used and take advantage on the community center meetings. As Millar & Ahmed, (2013, p. 11) advised the researchers, I should make the topic and the study interview questions known to individuals through using the place' facilities and distributing fliers to ensure that the study participants did not feel coerced to involve in the interviews

I did not expect anyone else to collect data for me. I know that could make potential bias; however, I asked or hire multiple analysts such as experts to assess the quality of my data collection and analysis. Besides my dissertation committee, the outcome of the assessment of the external analysts I would not consider as a formal or final opinion. Those analysts can also be some of my participants and qualified colleagues to review my collected data findings and analysis (Patton, 2002, p. 560).

When I meet in the participants' possible places, the starting point was observing the individuals and settings that give me a better idea of who are the best informative participants for the following anticipated interviews. Those meetings used to occur occasionally, not periodically; therefore, I did not wait until those people gather. Beside attending the community meeting, I contacted them via emails, phone calls, and in person to arrange online or face-to-face meetings. I conducted interviews in either English or Arabic or both ways depending on the participants' preferences and language proficiency

level. The interviews conducted in a language other than English were transcribed and translated into English prior to analysis (Jang, 2014, p. 637).

Some participants asked not to be audiotaped because of personal or political reasons. I considered emails as a way of documenting, recording, and archiving the data that I collected by this method. I also considered using Skype to have online interviews. Potential interviewees might feel insecure about putting in writing in an e-mail response to questions; responses that they fear may end up being read by other people. I had to soothe fears that I would be recording what they are saying or even taking notes. I had to convince them that their identities would be anonymous.

I conducted the interviews including two ways, standardized paper-and-pencil for my own personal notes and observations, and a tape recorder or other advanced technological equipment. I used two modes of recording such as a labeled microphone and iPad recorder making two copies of the interview material. My intention was to avoid any hidden technical problem that can result in losing the recorded text. In a later time, I transcribed the collected comments and answers of participants into written text, and then I ran content analysis and coding for themes of this written text using NVivo software. I detailed this triple process in following section.

The outputs of the participants would be answers and comments. In using the interviews instruments, I was not anonymous to many participants. This is also because of my previous personal relationships with many of them. According to Millar and Ahmed (2013), due to the partial lack of anonymity of the researcher to some participants, a number of them had the chance to contact and provide comments

concerning some areas of confusion and difficulty of understanding the questions. Those likely comments were discussed in the discussion chapter of this study.

There were other similar anticipated barriers. Recruitment process has been resulted in too few participants or no answers at all because of participants' personal reasons, circumstances, inconsistency, or time. This expected behavior itself was important to be analyzed. It explained why some diasporas are not active or engaging enough. I roughly estimated five participants that I needed. As a plan B, I contacted the same participants again, and sought and added other new entrants. Therefore, before I contacted the candidates, I looked for public access to information about the AEA and its members such as press releases and website statements about who they are, what they do, their size and area of operation, etc. Also, applying the snowball strategy for purposeful sampling was another procedure of this contingency plan. I directed the interviews' questions to other several members in AEA and nonmembers instead of those whom I have contacted before. I did not expect responses from all participants or because they could simply have no rich information to provide for my case.

Data Analysis Plan

My approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or aspect of the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single instrumental case or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting (Creswell, 2009, p. 200, 2013, p. 100). The unit of analysis will not be the whole case (the whole diaspora or its entire community) itself because I will not consider studying and analyzing everything of this community such as its history, concerns, or educational

development (Creswell, 2013, pp. 98-100; Stake, 1995, p. 84).

Instead of employing a holistic analysis, no matter how much data I could collect, my analysis focused on a critical incident stage, or aspect that is the political development and involvement of that community. The focused critical incident, stage, or aspect also included, for example, the nature of the foreign policy and relationships of Egypt or the Egyptian regime with the American government. This determination is the basis of my purposeful sampling method (Patton, 2002, p. 447) that I explained previously.

As Creswell (2009, 2013) explained, the analysis process went through three generic procedures. Describing and reducing the codes into themes by categorizing the data into two cycles and condensing the codes followed preparing and organizing my data for the analysis. The last procedure was about interpreting the larger meaning of the emerged coded data and representing them in a narrative discussion or visually in graphic chart (i.e. comparison tables, charts, and figures). Those are the major steps; however, I detailed more specific steps or elements in the following sections.

Several factors stipulated choosing my analysis strategies. The employed strategies included coding categories, theming, concept analysis, or connecting strategy (Maxwell, 2013, p. 105). The factors included my study's nature, my research design choice (qualitative case study tradition), the focus of the questions and alignment between those questions and data analysis strategies, and types of data (Stake, 1995, p. 77). My methods did not produce the data I needed to answer my research questions; therefore, I have not had to change either the questions or methods including the analysis

method (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 116). The alignment between the questions and data analysis strategies was a considerable factor that has let me produce a functional analysis for the study. Therefore, my analysis strategies and the whole method and design were all be compatible with the listed research questions and able to collect data I needed to answer those particular questions.

Having said that, my analysis strategy and process did not fracture the data chunk. I did not apply the option of the “categorical aggregation strategy” only and I used other option, “connecting analysis strategy” option that I took from Maxwell’s (2013) and Maxwell and Miller’s (2008) method of analysis. The purpose of this option was to understand my collected data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns and themes and to be fit for the questions (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002, p. 453). The reason for applying this strategy for coding the collected data is that my research questions focus on “the way events in a specific context are connected” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115) and how one thing such as the diaspora contextual factors work. As I said before, my approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or aspect of the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single instrumental case or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting.

As examples of those events and factors and contexts that I explained in Chapter 2, the factor of the relationship between diaspora and host country environment that can affect the diaspora’s role, and the impact of the U.S. religious institutions; Muslim and Christian, on the Egyptian diaspora’s perceptions and attitudes. These variables should be analyzed by looking at the effective relationship “that connect statements and events

within a context into a coherent whole” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115) I assume that this analysis strategy concurs Yin’s (2003) empirical definition of case study method. This method “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between [them] are not clearly evident [or the] contextual conditions are highly pertinent to [my] phenomenon of study” (p. 13).

Case study approach adds other unique procedures. Therefore, my chosen qualitative approach, the case study, and its purpose should made my analysis different from other types of analysis and general analysis phases. I blended the case study analysis particular procedures and the general analysis steps that include organizing and preparing data for conducting analysis, analyzing for themes, and then reporting them (see Creswell, 2009, p. 184).

Applying the case study approach for inquiry should involve two major components of analysis: describing the settings and individuals in thick details, and then generating and identifying themes (five to eight themes). As I will explain in the third step of the analysis processes, I would extend the coding process scope by building additional layers of more sophisticated analysis meaning that I use those initial themes for more advanced analysis and connect them to the case. Adding more analysis for new themes might add another function to the coding process functions (see Creswell, 2009, p. 189; 2013, p. 200). I will explain in details in the following steps that brief of the analysis process.

The describing phase. This step plays a central role in the case study and means that I should describe what I hear and see (Creswell, 2013, p. 184). An excellent case

study should have detailed descriptions of the case components (Yin, 2003, p. 46). The description should include the case relatively small number of participants and their behavior, specific incidents, and units as well as their context that gives them meaning to illuminate the focus of the inquiry. That essential description should be followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues and using the initially produced themes for more complicated analysis (Creswell, 2009, p. 184, 189; 2013, p. 98-101, 199; Newton, 2015, pp. 132-133; Patton, 2002, p. 450).

Rich concrete and detailed description of the case within the context of a specific setting is the bedrock of qualitative analysis and reporting, and it should be the start of the qualitative study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 184). It should let the readers understand and feel deeply the phenomenon studied and, drive his own interpretation about the meanings, and make the generalization to other settings that are off the interest to the reader (see Newton, p. 133; Patton, pp. 437-438). Detailed descriptions ensure external validity or transferability of the likely coming results and findings of the analyzed collected data beyond the immediate case (Creswell, 2009, p. 200)

This section of the case and analysis addressed questions of the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the topic under study. As a fundamental step of case study approach, this essential description helped explain and answer the research questions that focus on the mode events in a particular context were connected (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115). The questions are such as, what external factors affect the diaspora role and how could they hinder the diaspora organizations. I explained and described the role of the diaspora

and its organization in issues such as lobbying the U.S. federal government, or maintaining the cohesion of the diaspora community.

During this description process, I frequently read and reviewed my collected data that I have gathered from several sources. Also, I collected field notes that I obtained through working in the research location and studying the case parts. Besides ensuring the validity of the study's procedures and results, my other goal is to explore any emergent patterns and themes. Achieving this objective and process has led to the next step of the analysis.

Interpreting data into codes, categories, and themes. This section should include the steps of (a) the emergence of the findings phase (patterns and themes or issues), (b) the open coding phase that leads to the final step, and (c) the potentially learned lessons. The analysis, reporting, and interpretation of the collected data are about making sense and reaching the new meanings of the received data (Patton, 2002, p. 438; Stake, 1995, p. 71). Therefore, I could apply the two major options of strategy, the categories aggregation (coding analysis) or the connecting strategy or holistic approach (i.e. narrative analysis). In the first option, I could aggregate the data into some categories or themes and then collapse them into a specific number of themes by using categorical aggregation. With applying the connection strategy option, I analyze the narrative structure and contextual relationships among the data as a whole (Maxwell & Miller, 2013, pp. 465-467).

In different words, as Creswell (2013) put it, “the case study researcher looks at a single instance and draws meaning from it without looking at the multiple instances. It is

a process of pulling the data apart and putting them back together in more meaningful ways” (p. 199). Creswell calls Maxwell’s connection strategy option of data analysis as a “*direct interpretation form*.” As I mentioned briefly, generating and finding emergent themes was my purpose of the coding process. Those themes should indicate and lead to my study findings, as that was shown in the Results Chapter. Finally, I looked for developing generalizations about the case to obtain general lessons learned from the case (Creswell, 2013, pp. 99, 190, 200; Stake, 1995, p.74).

Coding is an inductive process that has two cycles of open coding where I am open for the potential findings in the form of themes or patterns that might emerge inductively from the data. In the open coding process, the researcher should involve in reading the collected data and developing the codes based on what and which data seem most important (Maxwell. 2013, p. 107). It is important to emphasize that although open coding is the typical way for the categorizing strategy (option 1) in qualitative research analysis (Maxwell. 2013, p. 106), I primarily used the connecting strategy (option 2).

The categorizing strategy is more common and it is focusing on relationships of similarities and differences that can be used to sort the fragments of data into categories regardless of the data context. It is also independent of the time and place hoping that issues relevant important meanings will emerge (Creswell, 2013, p. 199; Maxwell, 2013, pp. 112-113). Instead of that common strategy, the connecting strategy is different considering contiguity relationships that connect events or textual material such as statements of the participants’ interviews or field notes within the actual context into a coherent whole producing new meanings (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 112-113). To connect

those materials to find patterns, it was necessary to begin to categorize the responses, so these two approaches, the categorizing strategy and connecting strategy, were both used.

The connecting strategy was the primer method for analyzing this study data but I did not ignore the categorical coding strategy that focuses on the similarities and differences to define, group, and compare the categories of data, and I might need to mix both strategies (Maxwell & Miller, 2013, pp. 471-472). According to Maxwell (2013), I should flexibly modify the strategy to fit the potential data, to answer specific questions that fit each strategy, and to address potential validity issues. Without integrating and developing the categorization of these situations, it could be not possible to use purely connecting analysis. That is because it can be insufficient to understand some situations and participants' perspectives or to answer some particular questions when I use one strategy only (pp. 105, 113).

Therefore, I looked for similarities and differences as a base of grouping the data (coding). At the same time, I looked for contiguity among data based on their actual context (contextualizing) looking for unexpected meanings and relationships between things, parts of the text, categories, concepts, antecedents, and consequences of the interview transcript and all other data types (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 106, 113). As an example of mixing both strategies, "contiguity relationships may also be identified among abstract concepts and categories, as a subsequent step to a categorizing analysis of the data" (Maxwell, p. 106). Moreover, using connecting strategy cannot be easy because there are not enough resources in the literature addressing this type of analysis.

Conducting more analysis. Coding process should go through another more elaborate and systematic layer of coding. This step involved more thinking, reflecting, and triangulating of the early emergent and coded themes seeking for new, deeper, and better meanings of the themes (Stake, 1995, p. 78). Triangulation is a process that aims to show and secure the validity of the themes and findings via soliciting data from different data sources or converging several sources of perspectives from participants as a way for cross-checking, illustrating, and justifying the themes (Creswell, 2009, p. 191; Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 134). In different words, I allowed the themes and then codes to emerge from gathered information or perspectives of participants interviewed (NVivo coding) and then, analyze and compare them across the produced themes of the case.

I used NVivo software for the open coding process that I am familiar with this software compared to other software and websites. Although this program did not fulfill all jobs for me, it helped organize, retrieve, store, and analyze my different kinds of data such as interviews' responses and my daily field notes (Creswell, 2013, p. 204). However, according to Miles et al., (2014), the user of any software would not automatically get his data analyzed. The user has to stay the dominant instrument in the qualitative research. The software just allows selective monitor display of data and assigned codes in various configurations (p. 50).

Issues of Trustworthiness

This section addresses four criteria and strategies that I applied to validate the accuracy of the study's ultimate findings and discuss their transferability, and illuminate the reliability of the procedures and methods (Creswell, 2009, pp. 200-201). Not all

strategies of trustworthiness or validity will be applied to all the four criteria; however, some strategies such as triangulation were applied to all of them. The validation is a process that includes employing several strategies aim to assess and establish authenticity or trustworthiness and document accuracy for the study (Creswell, 2013, pp. 246, 250).

As generally and typically single case study offers a weak valid basis for generalizability (Yin, 2003, p. 37), no generalization from one case to another is the primary goal of this qualitative study because the context differs from one case to another (Creswell, 2013, p. 99). As I mentioned in the analysis strategies and phases section regarding the required thick description of the case components and units, it was a fundamental condition to allow for generalizability or transferability of the study results to other settings and situations or focus and maybe participants (Newton, 2015, p. 133). That is because this early process gives a robust theoretical framework for comparison that other researchers or readers need it to conduct different cases. Detailed descriptions should help provide generalization; however, generalization is still important but not primary to this case study and it remains “the task of the reader rather than the author of qualitative studies” (Newton, 2015, p. 133).

However, using a systematic methodology and clear set of methods to collect and generate data should assure that my study results would be interpretable and just able to be generalized to another cases and populations. For example, I will consistently use the items in interviews protocol to assure the trustworthiness of the study findings (Walden University, 2014, p. 1). I made sure that there is alignment between designed questions and all other parts of the study especially the analytical strategy as I mentioned in the

section of the nature of the study in Chapter 1 and analysis section in Chapter 2.

Therefore, I was able to substantiate that I could track the conclusions or findings backwards through the chain of evidence that I have collected to my approach, design, protocols, and research questions. The data should be able to be traced back to the primary source (Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24). The trustworthiness “of evaluation resides primarily within the data and is addressed by some questions such as, “Are data able to be traced back to a primary source?” “Are they verifiable?” “Are the conclusions reached logical, sensible, plausible?”

Credibility. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, my anticipated participants should vary concerning many considerations such as participants’ gender, language preference, educational level, political affiliation or perspective, and proficiency. According to Jang (2014), the study's credibility should increase as result of providing different and, vantage point of views (p. 636). Therefore, I worked on constructing the creditability and dependability of the data collection process and conclusions by ensuring that I derived the data from multiple sources such as different individuals, interviews, and document analysis.

This process of applying this tactic that occurs in the data collection phase should allow for developing the in-depth understanding and triangulation of the study data. For an example of credibility issues, my background and personal presumptions could affect data collection phase and my interpretation of the findings. One of my assumptions that I should address and avoid is that organizations such as the State Department or mosques, in general, are not welcoming to the outside inquirers and observers.

There are several strategies such as triangulation. I used this strategy to address my study method and design internal validity. Triangulation in general includes collecting data from different types and sources, comparing multiple methods, checking the consistency of multiple data sources, employing various investigators, or consulting multiple theories to interpret a single data set (Patton, 2002, pp. 247, 555-556; Yin, 2003, pp. 34-35, 97). Besides, other strategies will be about using external auditors and providing a rich and thick description of the setting and perspectives.

The triangulation strategy could include four types that are the triangulation of data, investigator, theory, and methods (Patton, 2002, p. 556; Yin, 1994, p. 92, 2003, pp. 98-99). The first type is triangulation of collecting evidence sources that could include four ways such as bringing together and comparing two or more methods of collecting data in my case study (Creswell, 2009, p. 199; Patton, 2002, p. 559). The goal is to illuminate various aspects of the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora phenomenon. Conducting interviews with multiple resources and comparing them are an important strategy for triangulation to support the validity of the findings (Creswell, 2009).

I was going to find differences in levels and intensity of political engagement and kinds of that engagement. I explained these differences among Egyptian Americans. Is it, for example, one of different levels of education or religious affiliations and views? There are other variables may be important. Hence, I used my questions of multiple interviews to capture these different variables and variations within the variable.

The other types of triangulation strategies are with triangulation with multiple analysts that could include review by inquiry participants, observers, audiences review, peer examination, and expert audit review (Creswell, 2009, p. 200; Patton, 2002, pp. 560-562). By applying the review by inquiry participants, I had my study's participants, whom I described, observed, or interviewed, to review, react, and confirm my descriptions and analysis. I did not ask for this collaborative and participatory review and reactions to my published study. My reason is avoiding any early misunderstanding, ethical concerns or wasting time. In short, this strategy is about having those key informants to review the draft case study report during the composition phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 36)

Triangulation with multiple analysts and observers provided a check on my bias in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is better than having one researcher doing all data collection. This review and feedback were obtained through verbal and written evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This second type of triangulation strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did not notice during the research composition and phases of data collection process (Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate goal of using the both triangulation strategies was to confirm the findings and interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and asked the right research questions (Patton, 2002, p. 560).

Transferability. Transferability, generalizability, or external validity can be defined by the ability of the study results to apply and extend to other people, cases, settings, contexts, theories, or samples (Creswell, 2009, p. 190; Lincoln and Guba as

cited in Patton, 2002, p. 584; Yin, 2003, p. 37). Besides, those terms also refer that the likely findings are transferable between the participants and me (Creswell, 2013, p. 246). The major limitation of transferability for this study is that the study is a *single* case. Single cases method is a poor basis for generalization, and that feature is a major obstacle in doing case studies (Yin, 2003, p. 37). Yin (2003) restricted the possibility of generalization to the multiple case study approach as well as the *analytical* generalization that is about generalizing “a particular set of results to some broader theory” (p. 37).

Having said that, generating a new or modified theory of the Egyptian diaspora that can lead to a case in the first place is the same theory that can also help to identify the other diaspora cases to which the results are generalizable. But, since this study is not a deductive one, therefore, generalization to other cases of diaspora or universe is not one of the study goals, however, it is theoretically, still possible. In his newest version of the same book, Yin (2014), mentioned that a single case study could be a good basis for significant generalizations if it included contrasting lessons or cases and was an explanatory and not just descriptive or exploratory one (p. 7).

According to Yin (2003), the generalization or external validity is not an automatic process or outcome (p. 37). Having said that, and based on my choice of applying the single case study approach, I used specific tests and standards of evaluation to ensure the quality of my study. According to Creswell (2013), when the researcher has identifiable cases with clear boundaries and thick descriptions, a case study can be the right approach for conducting a study (p. 100). Therefore, I described thoroughly what methods and procedures I followed to collect and analyze my data (Miles et al., 2014, p.

310). This procedure would be related and could lead to the possibility of following “the actual sequence of how data were collected and displayed for specific conclusion drawing” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 311).

Besides describing the data collection and analysis process, I defined and described adequately and thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter, and that should establish accuracy for the findings and convince the readers about them and potential lessons and generalizability (Creswell, 2013, pp. 100, 264-265). I collected data from different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that includes sufficient variation should support this typical nature of case study approach and its accuracy. One source of data is, of course, not enough to achieve the in-depth understanding (Creswell, 2013, p. 98; Yin, 1994, p. 92). The goal is assuring the convergence of the findings and ability to convince the readers of the findings. Achieving this level of transferability should, hopefully, enable other researchers in the field to have a solid framework for comparison between the study findings and other future studies (Merriam as cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 200).

Dependability (the qualitative counterpart to reliability). It is the ability of something to reproduce or give rise to another copy or new version of itself. According to Rudestam and Newton (2007), this term refers to the “replicability of the study under similar circumstances” (p. 132). Reliability could answer the question of whether an auditor or another researcher would be able to review, understand directly my produced codes and themes and procedures, and thus find similar results of my original study. This tactic of testing reliability occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp.

34, 38-39). To ensure quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable database as a chain of evidence (see Yin, 2014, p. 105). Therefore, I was able to reach my collected data or raw evidence directly.

Establishing strategies for dependability includes issues such as documenting my case study procedures and most of the study steps, and setting up and using the detailed case study protocol and developing database (Yin, as cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 190; Yin, 2003, p. 34). This strategy of reflexivity means the using of field journals to capture ideas, connections, methodological notes, *etc.* related to the understanding of the phenomenon. Reliability strategies would also include checking transcripts “to make sure that they do not contain obvious mistakes made during transcription” (Creswell, 2013, p. 190). I would also apply “systematically recording and transcribing data” (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 132).

Finally, crosschecking codes by another researchers who could be one of my colleagues is another strategy. Other way of a common procedure of increasing the target reliability of observational evidence is to involve more than one observer (see Yin, 2003, p. 93). I triangulated several data resources and ask participants for their feedback about my collected data and analysis themes to ensure the validity of findings (Creswell, 2009, p. 191).

Confirmability. Confirmability purpose is establishing the value of the collected data (Creswell, 2013, p. 246) through several strategies. I was reflexive or self-disclosing about my position that I should be the maker and product and learner of the study text and findings (Creswell, 2013, pp. 257, 265). Credibility issues, my background, and

personal presumptions could affect the data collection phase and my interpretation of the findings. Therefore, confirmability refers to “the ability to ensure that the data collected was reflective of the attitudes and opinions of the participants rather than the researcher [and] was addressed through the use of multiple data sets” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, as cited in Branchcomb, p. 71). Confirmability also certifies that the data reported in the case can be pursued all the way back to original data sources (e.g., field notes, documents, records, logs, etc.)

The strategy of triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study findings. For example, in the self-reflexivity, I was aware of answering questions such as how did my background and experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and analysis? What should I do with the findings? How do participants know and perceive the topic? How do my readers and audiences make sense of what I produced and gave them? What is the potential feedback they could send me back regarding my study findings?

Moreover, I used the service of an external qualitative auditing to review my methods and all steps and phases of the research process (Creswell, 2009, p. 200; Creswell, 2013, p. 246). In short, based on this reflexivity, self-awareness, and my political and social responsibility for social change, I did not write this study just for myself or build it on my presumptions. I was aware of presenting my study findings in an understandable way for the peer review and researchers.

Ethical Procedures and Considerations

The application for collecting the data was made and approved through the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB; IRB Approval # 03-04-19-

0371164). There was no need for additional protections because I did not expect to have special types of participants such as prisoners, children, or mentally disabled individuals. I continually examined the design of my study so that the risk can be justified by the benefits of the study. I did not expect any possible harm to my participants while I expected and offered several personal, political and organizational benefits for them. Those anticipated benefits did not include any financial benefits. The Egyptian community members in Washington, DC are well educated enough to have a decent financial level.

Regarding the ethical consideration of proficiency, respect and, justice, I did not exclude anyone from participating in the study or collect my data based on my solo personal opinion or presumptions. To ensure the confirmability of the data collection phase and the value of the study findings, I addressed some of my presumptions that could pose some ethical issues. For example, I do not trust the loyalty level of the extreme Islamic groups and individuals. I do not accept or believe in their ideas or appreciate their negative adverse deeds towards both countries. My personal view on those opposite groups is that this sector of diaspora has its own agenda that is not necessary to be a national one.

However, not all scholars and readers believe in these views regarding Islamic political groups and of course, a critical listener can offer an alternative interpretation of the facts and assumptions of my case. The exemplary case study should anticipate and consider those alternatives and challenges because the study should not be a one-sided case. Therefore, I collected all relevant evidence that supports or challenge my single

point of view selectiveness. Empirically, I examined the evidence from different perspectives and try to support the basis on which other anticipated challenging alternative assumptions and rival propositions about those groups and other issues could be rejected based on my study's well collected and examined findings, otherwise my assumptions could remain such biases (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164).

Despite these presumptions and stand of mine, exploring the perspectives and political engagement of those groups in the host countries are paramount to obtain a full image of the studied case. Assumingly, those groups could be more active than others and have stronger and more positive relationships with the U.S. government. Thus, the right question is whether those groups are advancing the U.S. interests such as the war against terrorism or not. This is not to accuse specific groups but it is just to shed light on the controversial and potential role of some religious, political diasporic groups in the United States, and this is not also an attempt to say that the U.S. policy is influenced by those groups to be turned against the Egyptian state. Ambrosio (2002) argued, "The diasporas that connect to something involving international terrorism (either as victim, perpetrator, or even bystander) will have significantly less room to promote an "independent" foreign policy" (p. 211). Nevertheless, I considered the views and participation of all participants regardless of my presumptions to assure the validity of the different types of the study findings.

I managed my potential bias as I have just mentioned in the previous section, apply and comply all IRB requirements, and secure permission for accessing to private, official, or business facilities and individuals' residencies. Besides, I tried to maintain the

integrity and confidentiality of the obtained documents such as archival and official data and artifacts. During the interviews, I tried not to ask any leading question that could affect the authenticity of the participation and its subjective outcomes and conformability of the findings or results.

In some occasions, other ethical concerns related to data collection or intervention activities could arise. These concerns could include participants' refusing participation or early withdrawal from the study, and any unpredictable adverse events. Also, I expected that some participants would not be on time just because they can be busy, careless, or culturally have no respect for their and others time and obligations. Addressing this kind of concerns, I sought to "extend the discussion by incorporating new elements, or replicate [the] study in new situations or with new participants" (Creswell, 2009, p. 25).

To avoid any ethical concerns in early time, I composed and submitted an informed consent. In general, voluntarism, competence, comprehension, and full information, are basic components of any informed consent (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 85). Ethical concerns and risks could occur at any time before, during, and, after the study. Hence, I was aware that my interviewees and all other participants would not be at maximum risk at any level or stage of the interviews and the whole study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 264).

Because I interviewed participants in person, then the contact information for them would need to be known to me. My participants' participation would be confidential, but not anonymous. Therefore, I composed and sent the consent form to my participants before starting the interviews and any other method of collecting the data.

This form simply allowed me to begin the interview and also stop the process or prevent it. The content of my consent include the study's topic, purpose, interviews questions, zero-potential cost and potential risks and benefits, time and place of the interviews, privacy right and anonymously, and my personal contact and affiliation (Creswell, 2009, p. 89). I also tolled my participants about their right of joining and withdrawing from the process at any time they feel that, and whether I would be publishing the interviews and study. Finally, I made sure to provide them a copy of the signed consent form in advance

Summary

My ideal choice for the research tradition was qualitative that directed my study and its parts in a specific way and shape. Particularly, it influenced the methods I would use to collect and analyze data. My chosen tradition is based on the social constructivism worldview that typically hold true for qualitative more than quantitative and rely on the participants' rich views and open questions (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). I chose to apply this tradition and case study approach because they also fit my study problem, research questions, and purpose. They are fit because I have clearly identifiable case with specific boundaries and I seek to provide an in-depth understanding of my case.

I purposefully devoted my exploratory study to a single case and limited size of units in a particular geographic area and time. The purpose of this approach is not to test a theory or influential relationship between variables. Hence, generalizability of results and theory is not the primary goal, but it is just possible. Instead, the focus is on a specific, single organization or unique bounded system

Focusing on a single specific, bounded system is not also the purpose or nature of the other four qualitative approaches such as the narrative approach, and that is why I did not apply them to my study. My major purpose and criteria of deciding on choosing the samples (or units), sample size, and purposeful sampling strategy is reaching to the desired in-depth understanding and findings that were based on the research questions and the nature of those questions (Marshall, 1996, p. 523). Hence, this criterion should concern selecting and finding information-rich case and units or samples for study (Patton, 2002, pp. 229-230). I did “study a more open range of experiences for a smaller number of people (seeking depth)” (Patton, 2002, p. 244). To collect my data from this number of people, I applied specific methods. My primary method is interview-based (i.e., face-to-face and telephone).

The quality or trustworthiness issues point to ensuring that the data and evidence are valid and free from biases on the part of the researcher, and thus the findings and the data are an accurate portrayal of the situation. Validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research and it includes a group of strategies to be followed to ensure that the study findings are vibrant and realistic, and the study interpretations are presented neutrally (Creswell, 2009, p. 191). Neutrality means collecting all relevant evidence that support or challenge my point of views avoiding any orientation of selectiveness that could harm the validity of evidence (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164).

Since I applied single case study, my potential findings could be criticized as not trustworthy enough, hence triangulating several collection data types or evidence sources could recover this limitation of the single instrumental case study (Creswell, 2009, p.

191). As I will show in the Results Chapter, the ultimate goal is not generalizing the findings, but it is exploring, developing, describing, and interpreting a particular instrumental single case to address a particular issue or phenomenon within given time and place.

Chapter 4: Findings

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013 revolution or coup d'état. Therefore, I recruited first-generation, Egyptian American immigrants living in Washington DC, most of whom are scholars and community leaders, to provide their perspectives on their political participation inclinations and activities and the factors that affect them. The participants also provided their perceptions of how their opinions have been reshaped by their acculturation experiences in the United States. The following two research questions guided my study, focusing on the key, joined internal and external factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular, contemporary political Egyptian issues:

Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution on organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S. environmental elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of political engagement and the characteristics (i.e., small size, negative perception on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?

Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such as the Egyptian presidential election and revolution?

In this chapter, I present the settings and demographics of the recruited participants, including a thick description of the group. Then, I discuss components of the data collection process, such as the settings for the interviews and the interview participants. I detail the analysis process with developed codes and themes. The chapter also includes a description of evidence of the trustworthiness of the data. I then provide the findings by research question, detailing the answers provided by the participants for the interview questions asked during the interviews to provide rich, thick data taking a narrative form. Finally, I present the findings of the study based on themes and summarize the chapter taking into account any consistencies or inconsistencies I have discovered before transitioning to Chapter 5.

Settings

At the time of the study, the participants and their experience had not been influenced by personal or organizational situations. I conducted all the interviews as planned; therefore, I believe that my interpretation of the results has not been influenced by any unexpected conditions. My data collection design was planned to target Egyptian diaspora members residing in Washington, DC. The primary unit of the study analysis was the case of the members and leaders of the AEA group who did not systematically meet in a specific professional place. Therefore, I interviewed participants in private or public settings away from any workplace or professional authority. Regarding the time

setting, I scheduled the interviews based on who was recruited and immediately available for an interview. Therefore, the setting times were related to the participants' work and personal schedule. The political circumstances and interests of Egypt also made the participants change and delay the interviews several times.

Demographics

Because I employed a case study design, I need to provide a thicker description for the case major and subunits, AEA group and its members, and other active individuals and mosque followers who are not affiliated with AEA. Most of 16 participants in this study were current or former members of AEA. The participants comprised 14 well-educated, professional, Muslim men; one orthodox Christian woman; and one Muslim woman. One participant was an active member in the Muslim Brotherhood. The age range of the recruited and interviewed members was 50–75 years old. Most of the participants lived in the Washington, DC metropolitan area and some others lived in the surrounding suburbs.

Consistent with my filed notes and close observation, all of the participants were politically active directly before, during, and shortly after the 2011 revolution. Many of them came to Washington, DC more than 25 years ago and became U.S. citizens. They were retired or still worked as freelancers, such as doctors or taxi drivers, or worked in official or private U.S. or international foundations, such as the White House, Voice of America broadcast, universities, news media, and hospitals. Some of them came on an immigration visa for political issues during President Sadat's era, and others came for working or education purposes during Mubarak's time. None of them mentioned a clergy

figure whom they could love, follow, or admire. I noticed that all of the participants except two might not go to Friday prayers or Ramadan events in mosques.

For different reasons, all participants agreed on not going back to Egypt or at least splitting their residency between both countries. They explained emotionally that this general trend is related to the home state political culture and circumstances. However, many of the participants asserted that they might go back home for a while but not to stay. The diaspora members widely believe political conditions are inadequate in Egypt because they are afraid. Some of them also consider living or working responsibilities in Washington, DC and their children's schools as a rationale for staying in the United States without any intention of returning to Egypt. A few of them expressed no reason for that trend at all.

In 2005, the AEA was founded in Virginia as a group of Egyptian American scholars to work on bridging gaps in understanding between Egyptians and Americans. Similarly, to the rest of diaspora active members, AEA acts as a watchdog on the Egyptian governments' activities and agenda in and out of Egypt in the Washington, DC political realm. AEA cares about different hot topics at different times. For example, in 2016, AEA issued statements regarding the dispute with the Saudi government on the border islands between Egypt and Saudia. In 2019, AEA considered the top Egyptian political topic, which was the presidential election and the related controversial constitution amendment.

The political orientation of this diaspora, and exclusively the AEA group, focuses on working for freedom of speech, better living conditions, and better governance style in

Egypt. Additionally, they work, at least theoretically, to support the middle and poor social classes that have been oppressed because of the unorganized political and economic policies and the spreading corruption in all government offices after the military coup in 1952. According to personal talks with several former leaders of AEA, this situation became severe in Elsis time, and this is the current motivation of the active members of the diaspora.

According to the collected e-mail exchanges of the group and my notes, several members and leaders of AEA asserted that their group used to have internal conflicts regarding several issues, such as the leadership style, elections, and the political stance the group should take as a whole. The former leader of AEA is a secular professional. He was a founding member (2005–2009), spokesman (2009–2012), and president (2012–2017). According to that leader, in 2017, AEA had low amount of activity because of the current Islamist director who was elected by default. AEA cares about giving a chance to all political orientations to be presented; however, most of the members claimed that he was not qualified. Another AEA member believed that the youth Islamists are an obstacle and that their membership reflects on the group activists as well as its typical political orientation that used to be secular and open-minded.

A majority of my study participants did not believe that Egyptians, consisting of the diaspora, have Arab identification. They expressed their notion that Egyptians are Egyptian only, but they also desired to have desirable relationships with Arab human beings in the United States. Some participants also mentioned that the most of Egyptian Christians hate the description of being Arabs. AEA individuals are an ideal of this

patriotic notion. Despite being proud to be Egyptian and nothing else, they are willing to assimilate into the U.S. network and way of life. Residing in the United States and being away from Egypt for a long time caused modifications in their original Egyptian values.

Several participants stated that they, similarly to many of the diaspora members, have been in a box culturally and politically. They also agreed that the most sizeable exchange that happened to them, given that they came to the United States, was that they are out of that home box. They became capable of seeing matters from a one of a kind angle; for instance, giving overall freedom to children to choose their life companions regardless of their religions. I also noticed that some of the participants have become grandfathers to grandchildren who maintain U.S. names. Another instance is that Egyptian Americans pay attention to their credit history, which is an extraordinary norm that could be essential for residing in the United States.

Data Collection

I conducted one-time, in-depth interviews that took place from March 2019 through May 26, 2019 in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. I designed one group of 27 open-ended questions that each of the 16 participants answered. Each interviewee's answers provided me with new information and enabled me to do periodic reviews to enhance my questions before I sent them to the next interviewee. Data included my handwritten, filed notices and confidential audio recordings of the interviews using my iPad. None of the participants refused to be audiotaped. My field note captured the environment of the interviews, the participant's personality, explanatory notes, and my overall impressions of the experience with the participant. These two joint methods of

data collection ensured that my findings were precise and captured the associated meanings of both verbal statements and nonverbal communication presented by the participants.

Sixteen out of 20 possible participants residing in Washington, DC were successfully recruited for this study. I was looking for seven-nine members from the AEA group and another four to five nonmember participants. I contacted more than this total number to be able to avoid any last-minute surprises. Two potential participants declined the interview after they had initially agreed to participate. They said they would not have time. In general, all recruits were slow with their positive or negative reactions. Despite this slowness in response, I completed my data collection and obtained enough informative participants to meet saturation. I did not encounter any variations in data collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3.

When I recruited the members for the interview, I drove from New York City to Virginia to attend an Egyptian community event on March 2019. More than 33 Egyptian members attended this event. Most of the members came from Maryland, and Washington, DC. I distributed invitational letters to potential individuals whom I thought that they might be fit to my recruitment criteria and able to volunteer for the study. I interviewed participants individually in a place of their choice inside the center; however, three other interviewees preferred to meet in their private residences.

Each interview lasted an average of 90 minutes. This time included time to establish rapport, review the purpose of my study and the consent form, and to answer possible questions before and after the actual interview. I recorded each interview

entirely by two recording devices after asking and receiving the permission of the interviewees. I stored the recordings to my home computer with two backup copies. I transcribed each saved interview one by one without asking for following up questions or having any outside help.

Data Analysis

My approach I used to generate the codes and themes for identifying the meaning of the data included two joint strategies. The first strategy is the categorizing strategy that is about coding. The raw data segments should be labeled, sorted, and then grouped by categories to create a similarity-based ordering of data (Maxwell & Miller, 2008, pp. 465, 469). This process is seeking similarities and differences between data segments within the interview questions and their respective responses.

I also applied the connecting analysis strategy that is, in contrast to the first one, does not fracture the data chunk. The purpose of this strategy was to understand my categorized data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns and themes and to have them fit for the questions chosen type (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002, p. 453). My research questions focused on the way events in a specific context are connected and how one thing, such as the diaspora external factors work with other things in the phenomenon studied.

Because I chose to apply case study approach and connecting strategy for the analysis, I provided a thick description of the case, the Egyptian diaspora, the case major unit, AEA group, and subunits such as the active individuals and other groups, a mosque and its followers, and all other available aspects, concepts, or facts about the case. These

components of the findings chapter should give the coded data meanings to illuminating the focus of the inquiry, add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, and enhance the insight into the target single case and its representing larger, holistic aspects (Yin, 2003, p. 46). Therefore, analyzing the examined codes by reducing them for eight themes or issues, two of which had additional subthemes, will follow this description phase. I confirmed the themes and subthemes against each other and the data and then began defining the final themes. In the following section, I report the process used to move inductively from small coded units to larger representations, including categories, themes, and subthemes.

Coded Units to Larger Representations

Therefore, I described the specific codes, categories, and then the themes that emerged from the data using quotations of participants interview as needed to emphasize their importance and relevancy. Moreover, I describe discrepant and infrequent issues, and disconfirming data if they exist and how they were factored into the analysis. For easier reference, examples of the preliminary codes are presented in Table 3. I also used those codes to produce possible pattern codes to summarize the interview data by putting the information into categories. I was able to see more codes and a set of themes emerged as I left it open so that new ones would appear. As a result, more codes were discovered and examined.

For data analysis, I used Saldana's (2014) coding manual for this qualitative study as was explained in Chapter 3. I performed two cycles of coding that included 6 coding methods such as descriptive, NVivo and emotions, values, hypothesis, causation,

attribute...coding and pattern codes to determine emerging themes after I conducted interviews. Also, I used simultaneous coding when the data's content suggested multiple meanings (e.g., descriptive and attribution codes; Saldana, 2014, p. 81).

I coded after I conducted each interview and rechecked interpretations of the meaning with participants by using their e-mail addresses and meeting some of them to ensure the validity of the coding process as well as its possible results. I identified and organized related codes produced by participants on each open-ended interview question. Table 1 provides an example of coding process and some specific codes.

Table 1

Example of Coding Process and Specific Codes

Raw data	Simultaneous code [Descriptive and attribution]
“They are politically passive, ...by and largely preoccupied with making a living and improving their living conditions and achieving their personal immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities have priority over political responsibilities.”	Other factors involved with living issues
“...our solo culture, you know, made us have no intention for collective work...,” “...it is in our blood...we are Pharaoh,” “Egyptian success stories in the U.S. are individual,” “It is one man-show culture, everyone wants to be the boss”	Cultural aspects affect political engagement
“Most successful diaspora institution in political mobilization is mosques and churches. Therefore, they care about the relationship between Egypt and USA governments more than other activists,” “There should be no role for mosques and churches in promoting political interest,” “...their roles in mobilizing Egyptians politically is poisonous”	Mosques' political role might be harmful

Then, by employing the connecting analysis strategy, the participants that stated the same words or opinion or related statements were grouped and reduced into related themes. Finally, I summarized all of the theses gathered information in narrative nature seeking to preserve the context and story of the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora. Table 2 shows all themes and their applicable subthemes.

Table 2

Final Themes and Subthemes

Theme 1	Subtheme 1	Subtheme 2	Subtheme 3	Subtheme 4	Subtheme 5
Cultural attributions for diaspora political engagement	Typical passive of the diaspora is attributed to its national solo culture	Temporary factors that illuminated the passive culture effect for some time	Pharaonic culture leads to unorganized and uncooperative diaspora	The effect of small size on diaspora's political engagement	Mistrust culture between diaspora and Egyptian officials
Theme 2	No adequate help for new immigrants	Insufficient organizational unity and problematic leadership			
Low level of loyalty:					
Theme 3					
The effect of domestic Egyptian concerns on diaspora in DC.					
Theme 4	Contrastive relation between the home-hose states relationships and diaspora's	The low effect of the relationship between diaspora and Washington, DC decision maker on the			
Diaspora's relationships					

	influence	diaspora' role
Theme 5		
Individuals and Groups Involve in politically and organizationally		
Theme 6		
Egyptian causes the individuals involve in trying to persuade the U.S. government		
Theme 7		
Different lobbying types to promote Egypt's interests		
Theme 8	The revolutions reveal the inconsistency of the diaspora political behavior	Political role of Mosques and churches in Washington, DC.
Evaluating the political performance.		

Finally, while offering the results, I discuss the discrepant troubles or nonconforming data as applicable in which members' opinions differed from the majority sentiments. By means of inclusive of specific perspectives, I ensured an actual reporting of individuals' sentiments. That was without capacity bias influencing the presentation of the outcomes.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Credibility

I used several ways to establish the credibility of my research results of the study—in other words, by making sure that my research findings are consistent with reality. With applying qualitative case study, achieving the reality means that the results reflected what the participants intended to convey. I used persistent efforts to build essential trust with interviewees to obtain informative, detailed responses as I took enough time to establish rapport by making myself friendly, but empathetic. I applied triangulation of sources and triangulation with multiple analysts and observers that all should provide a check on my bias in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is better than having one researcher doing all data collection. This review and feedback was through verbal and written evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This second type of triangulation strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did not notice during the research composition and phases of data collection process (see Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate goal of using these two types of both triangulation strategies is to confirm the findings and interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and asked the right research questions.

Transferability

The second tenet of trustworthiness is transferability, wherein a qualitative researcher seeks to determine if the findings are generalizable across other individuals or settings. By attaining saturation, I gathered a comprehensive view of the perceptions within the case of interest, subsequently generating a deeper understanding of the case of

interest. Because developing a descriptive study could lead to the finding transferability, I defined and described thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter. In addition, I described the data collection and analysis process. Therefore, I collected data from different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that included sufficient variation and comprehensive view of the perceptions should subsequently generate a deeper understanding of the case of interest. While I cannot ensure generalizability of findings to other populations in social settings or cultural contexts, I utilized a thick description to ensure raw data excerpts supported the thematic findings. This strategy provides outside researchers with additional information about the phenomenon and context of the findings allowing them to decide if the findings would transfer to other populations.

Dependability

Dependability should answer the question of whether an auditor or researcher would be able to review, understand my produced codes and themes and procedures directly, and thus find similar results of the original study. This tactic of testing reliability occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 38-39). To ensure quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable database as a chain of evidence (Yin, 2014, p. 105). I utilized other strategies, such as feedback acquisition, debriefing, and peer-review, to test the quality of the results. I triangulated several data resources and asked participants for their feedback about my collected data and themes to ensure the validity of findings (Creswell, 2009, p. 191).

Confirmability

The fourth tenet of trustworthiness, confirmability ensures I realize I was not subjective totally, so biases were bracketed in my field notes and journal and were carefully considered during data analysis and reporting of the results. The strategy of triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study findings. For example, in the self-reflexivity, I should be aware of issues, such as how did my background and experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and analysis, and what will I do with the findings. I should consider the way the participants know and perceive the topic. I should be able to retain the voices of participants in the analysis process by included direct quotes and excerpts to inform each theme. The potential feedback they could send me back regarding my study findings also should be my concern.

Results


Eight resulting themes emerged from the data analysis—(a) Cultural attributions for diaspora political engagement, (b) low level of loyalty, (c) effect of Egyptian domestic concerns on diaspora's engagement, (d) diaspora relationships, (f) individuals and groups involve politically and organizationally, (g) Egyptian causes the diaspora individuals involve in, (h) different lobbying types, and, (i) evaluating the political performance. Themes Number 1, 2, 4, and 8 have subthemes as that was shown in Table 2. Participants' responses and noticed natural reactions informed the emergence and development of the themes, which I supported them with the most important quotations from the data to illustrate the possible results and assure their validity. I organized the results by themes, not by the interview questions. The themes numbered from 1- 4 are

related to the Research Question 1, and they are classified under the category factorial background of the political engagement. I sorted the rest of the themes under category style and evaluation based on the Research Question 2. I provided the answers to the research and interviews questions in the summary.

Theme 1: Cultural Attributions for Diaspora Political Engagement

This theme and its five subthemes presented the obvious effect of the diaspora's cultural characteristics on the Egyptian diaspora's development and political engagement. All participants expressed their belief that the original Egyptian dominant culture is the most persuasive rationale behind the typical passive characteristic of institutionalization, and organizational development thus resulting in low degree of political engagement of their diaspora. That authentic national culture is the collective attribution category that includes other cultural characteristics such as the lack of organizational purpose and unity, affecting Egyptians inside and outside Egypt.

That overarching theme is associated with the current problem of the lack of political activity of Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. However, the difference between the participants' general beliefs appears regarding the reasons for that typical cultural characteristic of being passive and where these reasons take place. The following statements, themes, subthemes detailed this attribution and the related noticed differences. The relationships between this theme and its five subthemes are shown in Figure 2.



Theme 1: Cultural attributions for diaspora low political engagement

Figure 2. Links between Theme 1 and its five subthemes.

Subtheme 1: Typical passive engagement of the diaspora is attributed to its national solo culture. This subtheme indicates that Egyptian political culture of the diaspora individuals could be classified into two major sections; internal that is related to their growing, dwelling, and coming from a home country, Egypt, and external that is related to their living in a host state, the United States. Two participants denied this feature. DD thought, “We are not relay passive. We are learning.” In contrast, MM concluded this opinion by saying, “We are not active at home, therefore we are passive abroad, and no matter how can be the atmosphere helpful in this capital city.” In details, MK described how Egyptians abroad are culturally passive based on national Egyptian attributions. He stated, “Yes, because of our Egyptian prevailing patriotic culture led to a

long history of disappointment and despair as related to the possibility of real political change.” AW opined, “We did not use to participate in united organized efforts.” He further summarized his opinion saying, “When it comes to politics, it is a individualistic home culture.” AH expressed a similar sentiment when he explained, “Yes, we are passive most of the time in Washington, DC, but you can not blame us. Egyptians worry about getting back Egypt because that could make safety problem not just for us but also for families who live there. So, we keep shut up here!”

Several participants overwhelmingly reported that also there is no fast interact with Egyptian events because of the conventional traditional political education and the priority of living safely. AG detailed this type of education and culture. He said, “Yes, because we came from authoritarian or dictatorship countries where people used to have no voice to share. Egyptian generations after the military coup and socialism wave were educated to consider the president as the nation father whom they should obey because he knows better and protects his kids.”

Talking about living and assimilating with host country culture, participants agreed on several attributions. DD thought that Egyptians could better upwardly assimilate into the American society. They try to take the best of the dominant American culture but also remain attached to their own unique cultural practices. DD did not go forward to detail that practices and how they could affect the diaspora integration into the new political climate.

AG believed that the problem of the low level of political engagement was not the Washington, DC system. He said, “I see that recent immigrants who still do not

understand intricacies of the new society of their immigration and settlement are the real problem. I wonder why other diasporas were able to take advantage of Washington, DC prevalent mood and raise their voice to be heard!” SG explained, “Perhaps we have not enough experience.” AG revealed, “They are politically passive, I mean Egyptians here, also by and largely preoccupied with making a living and improving their living conditions and achieving their personal immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities have priority over political responsibilities.” SH believed, “Egyptians dwelling in Washington, DC longer than others are assimilated with the system however, they do not use it very well for their causes.”

Subtheme 2: The diaspora acts typically as temporary reacting waves. In

Interview Question 22, I requested participants to explain for; based totally on their belief on their passive political lifestyle, why and how long did the 2011 revolution feature as a factor for advantageous modifications of their role? Did they return to be passive again after the revolution? Why that occurred?

When I asked DD does the diaspora act and react politically as a wave's shape and not as a straight line, he said, “Yes, to some extent.” MH illustrated an essential factor while he said, “We do no longer participate in politics in the United States due to the fact, absolutely, we do not participate in Egypt, and vice versa.” Therefore, participant SH attested that the surprising 2011 revolution was like a wake-up call for that diaspora in particular. The community in Washington, DC became aware of the need for being active, united, and organized.

AG asserted, “Yes yes... the so-called revolution of 2011 was a dream cut short. It did inspire some serious members of the community and provided hope for positive change.” Along the same lines of revolution short positive effect, XY said, “Short-lived hope soon crashed on. Maybe because it was not prepared or organized well.” SH gave a different explanation by saying that disappointment was because of the reality that since 1952, Egypt became a military-security state that was able, unfortunately, to absorbing the revolution impact.” MK and other participants emotionally agreed that the 2011 revolution did not last long because of the feeling of defeat by Muslim Brotherhood and military throw many of Egyptians back.

SH concluded that at that time, Egyptians created a new term that is the *deep state* referring to all old powers that seemed to have vanished, but they came back again to the scene to revenge on the revolutionary parties and resumed the former security state of Mubarak. As a result, Egyptians, including the diaspora members, returned to their old passive culture. XY articulated that the diaspora was not far from all of those events and what happened to revolutionaries; it happened precisely to us here. He said, “We became careless, busy, or divided again as the day before January 25, 2011.” These sentiments and emerged themes revealed that passive characteristic, and they showed that there were external factors that might functionally join that national culture leading to the diaspora failing inside and outside.

Subtheme 3: Pharaonic culture leads to unorganized and uncooperative diaspora. Along with the cultural attribution of being politically passive, several participants added more reasons that should clarify that the diaspora is not

organizationally united and cooperative. Participants also explained why the diaspora did not stay active after the revolution. Ten participants believed that establishing active organizations and having internal cooperation is not a high priority for some of the diaspora members.

Participant AW said, “As I told you, our solo culture, you know, made us have no intention for collective work, no respect to roles. So, everyone wants to be the boss who has his own agenda.” SH added, “The leaders usually have personal business that has nothing to do with the group or organization mission-no trust in our leadership so that there is no single leader we should work under him only. So, there is no unification for now.” MM rephrased that saying and said, “We do not adopt and push for maintaining a primary or clear, single, known agenda for the organization.” AW provided an emotional example. He said, “The last leader of AEA went to Aljazeera channel talking about Elsisi. We might share his opposition opinion on Elsisi but he was speaking there for personal purpose, maybe money. We did not permit him to represent AEA.” AW mentioned other reasons for the insufficient organizational unity.” He said, “We are all busy with daily life; we do not hate each other. We do not love each other too.”

Subtheme 4: The effect of small size on diaspora’s political engagement. This theme explored the impact of the Egyptian immigrants’ immigration decision, and the United States immigration policy on the diaspora size, and whether the diaspora invests in it to improve its influence. All participants agreed on the impact of those two elements on the size; however, three participants came up with an unexpected observation that might present discrepancy in the results. They explained: we are not really a small size!

We should take advantage of our size and maximize it. Simply, our official number is unknown. SH said, “No adequate information about the percentage of Egyptians in Washington, DC and the United States in general because we do not register our names in the embassy because we do not trust the official agencies.”

The small size of the community could be attributed to other cultural reasons. AG mentioned, “Traditionally, Egyptians throughout their history have been more bound to Egypt soil and roots because they are an agricultural country. They do not immigrate largely in contrast to other nations. SH added to this explanation and said, “The problem of knowing the exact size of the community is not just about the residents in DC because that size is not stable.” According to TF, “For those Egyptians living in America or the DC area in particular, the frequency of their travel back to Egypt is an indication of their reluctance to be away from the motherland for any extended period. Therefore, the size is unknown, unstable, and small.”

AG added, “Do not forget geography. Washington is far away, and they would prefer to travel to Europe or the Arabian Gulf countries for closeness.” Similarly, TF conveyed “Larger numbers of Egyptians head to other Arab countries to work where the culture and language are more familiar. These places are closer to home and family.” When I asked about that trend, participant MK explained, “Egyptian immigration is a relatively recent trend in Egypt, started in the late sixties with accelerating pace until now, unlike Lebanese, for instance, which launched their immigration in the late 19th century.” TF admitted: Most Egyptians in America would rather have it both ways. They

want to get the green and citizenship but they also want to be able to split their residence between the United States and Egypt.

There is another causation explains the diaspora small size phenomena and belief system that might affect its human actions or not. U.S. Embassy's immigration policy, including visa restrictions, is a factor. MK revealed, "Also Americans make it very difficult for Egyptians to obtain the status. Cairo embassy always has a negative and aggressive attitude towards youths." AW added a different side of the situation. He said, "Let us say that some of us were able to have any kind of visa, the problem is still us! Not everyone can afford expensive living in America while, as I told you before, those lucky newcomers get no help from residencies. Participant XY claimed that "Ethiopian community has more people, and they support each other."

MK explained further, "Unlike the Lebanese and Syrians who ventured out to other countries, the Egyptian people have historically been less inclined to immigrate." DD explained, "Egyptians are immobile due to the Nile culture that promotes settlement and stability." A former leader of AEA, participant MK said, "The level of the Egyptian diaspora organization is below average in contrast with the successful Jewish diaspora despite that both are relatively small." SH concluded, "The small size was not the only factor because diasporas are not equal in investing in their size, and thus, it does not matter if they are small or big." XY asserted the same idea and added, "This is what the Egyptian community is in Washington, DC and it should use that relatively small size."

Subtheme 5: Mistrust between diaspora and Egyptian officials. The previous theme mentioned that the mistrust between the Egyptian embassy and diaspora members

had pushed both of them away from building mutual organizational efforts between each other. This situation can be an example of the theme of negative perception and mistrust in Egyptian politicians and government in large. When I asked MK about this hypothesis, he responded firmly, “Yes, to a considerable extent.”

According to multiple participants and my field notes, low level of political participation of Egyptian diaspora could be attributed to that typical characteristic of Egyptians. Egyptian politics and government as well as Egyptian organizations and leaders and their performance in Washington, DC refrain the Egyptian diaspora from political engagement such as establishing or joining the diaspora. SH implied a cultural attribution; he said, “Our community leaders, if any, mix personal issues with organizations’ agenda and activities-It is the culture of people who came in the near past. I think that distrust should harm our efforts of organizing ourselves.” AW indicated other several reasons. He said, “Blame Egyptians in general; we don’t respect roles because we have the usual dough or maybe many of us are such ignorant.” XY explained, “Before the revolution, we used to avoid the embassy or consulate because we have a deep mistrust in the Egyptian government agencies.” An embassy official told me, “That attitude hinders the embassy’s role and cooperation with the community. You can see that during the visiting army recruiting committee.”

AW deeply explained this observation: “Regardless of our actual number or what you call it a size, they [diaspora members] simply do not want to talk with each other and the embassy.” XY explained, “They consider family is more important and have mistrust in their government; we do not want to provide the embassy with our real addresses

because that should harm families who still live in Egypt.” SH added, “I think the embassy spies us here. All dictatorship states are like that, not just Egypt.” In contrast to that general stream of participants, One Muslim female participant was such as an exception. She proudly said, “Yes. But Elsisi is an honest example that we trust.”

Theme 2: Low Level of Loyalty

Subtheme 1: No adequate help for new immigrants. Those professional individuals who have connections in the political and social realm of Washington DC should be able to support their new peers; however, MK determined this capability as “Great level of loyalty but weak practice.” MM had the same observation: “No fast or continues help for newcomers. However, we send money and try to help with the local problems in Egypt for just good reason.” AW said, “Because they are busy with personal life concerns, they might have no time or even interest in frequent meetings and cooperating with others.” This finding might give an example of the lack of cooperation and a minimum level of loyalty to the home country that all should produce weak development and influence of the diaspora.

That is in general, however, as some participants reminded me that there was a little exception on that negative image. AW asserted, “Christian Egyptians still; Church helps only Copts sometimes.” SH explained that particular good picture could be such a reaction. I mean Copts want to be different, or maybe they react as a weak minority that wants to gather to be reliable. XY gave the same opinion but added another dimension, “This minority invest positively in their small size similarly to Jewish and Ethiopian diasporas reacting to what they think is discrimination or isolation against them inside

Egypt.” However, FF told me, “Mr. XYZ, who is Christian man ordered his children to avoid talking in Arabic with their new Muslim-Egyptian next door and any Egyptian! We do not know his rationale. Bizarre!” Two diaspora members provided some detailed and unique answers when they mentioned the comparison between the Egyptian and Chinese diasporas. They believed that China invests in the diaspora as a political tool, and the Chinese diaspora supports the new immigrants in systematic and planned ways. Some answers merit exploration in the interpretation and implications sections of Chapter 5.

Subtheme 2: Insufficient organizational unity and problematic leadership. As I mentioned before, insufficient support for new immigrants is an example of the lack of cooperation and organization but that is just one aspect of insufficient organizational unity. When it comes to comparing Jewish, Ethiopian, and Egyptian diasporas regarding their cooperation and organization style, AG said, “The comparison is not valid. The Jews came here as a persecuted minority from Europe. They were more motivated to invest in their small group and excel.” SH added, “Jewish people had no other choice other than success. They had had a teamwork spirit. In contrast, that is not the case of the Egyptian minority. Egyptian success stories in America are such individual.”

TF conveyed, “In tribal and family settings, Egyptians followed directions got from the patriarchal leaders. Rarely did they follow organized initiatives.” MK provided a more profound explanation when said, “First generations came carrying their baggage. They do not have the teamwork spirit, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts, and they are trapped within the box they grew up in. All is about culture, here and there.” Participant SH mentioned the need for national professional and credible leadership

inside and outside Egypt working with the members for one national cause under the united organization.

Several participants assured this meaning repeatedly: It is a one-man-show culture; everyone wants to be the boss and working for his or her agenda. They reminded me of the several clashes that occurred in front of the White House during the revolution. A group of demonstrators pushed other people away from the spot just because the latter wanted to demonstrate showing a different claim regarding the revolution. MM said, “Sir, it is in our blood precisely as the typical role of any leader inside Egypt itself; we are Pharaoh.” Meanwhile, participant MK attributed the competition and lack of gathering organization of the diaspora members to “they are severely divided into political “tribes” covering a wide range no sense of and against Egyptian nationality, so people resort to their political tribes instead; thus, they lose the national framework and goal.”

For another example, one of the participants, AW assured, “We need an outside leader who can cooperate with inside-people. I asked our community to announce me as a presidential candidate against MB, the military ruling council-SCAF- in 2011, and Elsis in 2014 during both revolutions. No one listened to me!” Many participants said something similar to participant GH, who was a member of AEA. He said, “All organizations are fragile and fake. Our organizations are such empty frames and full of internal personal conflict.” Therefore, SH gave an example saying, “A congressman of a district in Virginia told me if you guys tell us what u all want, we will come to be with you.” When I asked DD whether the small size of the community could be a positive characteristic that the Egyptian diaspora might invest in it, he said, “Yes if they get

organized.” SH assured that potential bad feature could turn to be good if the diaspora understand our other positive elements.

Theme 3: The Effect of Egyptian Domestic Concerns on Diaspora in DC.

I asked my participants to explain how could the tension of political concerns in Egypt cause sharp divisions among the diaspora. The participants’ responses and reactions were unexpected and very different from each other. Their responses focused on the political and religious fragmentation in the country and among the diaspora members. Regarding this concern, one or two participants denied any division among Egyptians inside Egypt. A female participant who used to have positive reactions and show support to the current rule in Egypt, stated, “Its a temporary man-made crisis.”

Another group of the participants thought that there was political powers polarization inside the country before the revolution and became severer during and after it; however, that situation had no reflection on the diaspora members. That is because Egyptians do not know each other in host countries! I noticed that they brought their culture aspects to the host country, but they did not say whether they brought their home's conflicts to the host state or not.

Third groups of participants thought that Egyptians came to Washington, DC carrying their original beliefs. TF said, “They have the same thoughts anywhere.” AG articulated: Most Egyptians retain a mindset even after an extended stay in their new society. Therefore, diaspora members are rare to be affected by U.S. culture except for persons who born here.” MK provided two illustrating examples. He said, “This mindset is clear in the Egyptians religious orthodoxy as opposed to reform, and it is also clear in

their views of the Jews and the Israeli-Arab conflict. The outcome of this input is that all such factors plus people preoccupation with socioeconomic conditions affect their willingness to immerse in the American melting pot.” SH mentioned “the Arab-Israeli conflict is still in our heart and mind; however, we are not in the 1960s now. I mean it is not the priority on our agenda, and it does not reflect negatively on our diaspora.”

Theme 4: Diaspora’s Relationships

Subtheme 1: Contrastive relation between the home-hose states relationships and diaspora’s of influence. This theme describes the relation between the better relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments and the diaspora role and its chance of performing. Participant SH believed that relation is a contrastive relation. He said, “The working relationship between both governments should lead to the unfortunate situation of some diasporas, especially the Egyptian one.” Another participant specified that connection. MH said, “The current relationship hurts some active groups.” MK reminded me when said, “generally, most acting and successful diaspora institution in political mobilization are mosques and churches. Therefore, I think they are the most active component of that diaspora who should be worried.”

AG explained further, “Very few Egyptians care about the nature of the Trump-Sisi relationship and how it affects them. They care and afraid because that Elsisi and Trump have chemistry. That should give more protection to Elsisi and Israel.” I was surprised by this claimed similarity between Israel and Elsisi or Egypt and did not hear the same from other participants. TF reiterated participant AG’s sentiment and clarified, “That new official relationship between both governments affects the active portion of

our diaspora...you know! Like the Muslim Brotherhood are weaker now. They cannot talk with Trump's administration as before 2017." He added a separate statement: Those fear Trump may succeed in designating their group as a terrorist organization. I predict that Trump will be reelected.

On the side of Copts, the effect was not harmful as it is for some Muslim groups. MN advised me to not to worry about Copts; they are happy, but still, there are negative results in the future on Egyptians in Egypt and the United States in general. AW summarized this theme: Egyptians, including many of the diaspora members, are not happy for that chemistry; all depends on who you are. I mean...whom you belong to at a particular time and place. The participant who has affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood stated, "Of course, because it [the present governments relationship] justifies oppression and violation of our human rights."

Subtheme 2: The low effect of the relationship between diaspora and Washington, DC decision maker on the diaspora role. Unexpectedly, seven participants only who believed that lack of the relationship between the diaspora and the United States decision makers had a role to play when it comes to improving the establishment and activities of the diaspora. Participant SH elaborated this unexpected finding. He stated, "This communication between us and Washington, DC people does not affect diaspora engagement, not because America does not welcome or consider diaspora, it does, but because of the diaspora itself does not establish relationships with Washington people on a systematic base; thus no effect of that relationship and diaspora. One of those seven individuals was the Muslim Brotherhood representative in this study;

DD stated, “Some do [have relationships] in different degrees, and it can help the diaspora promote the American values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law inside Egypt.”

In contrast, AH said, “No effect because they [diaspora members] do not really interact except few educated individuals, but unfortunately, we don’t take advantage of the chance to work.” Moreover, DT denied the relationships themselves. He said, “no relationship or somewhat. Because they [diaspora members] have no specific stand or clear collective agenda, so Washington, DC does not know whom to talk to or support.” Participant SH agreed to TD’s inclusion and said “we left the playground to Islamists and maybe Copts since Obama’s time. President Donald Trump’s time is our chance.”

As GS explicated this situation by saying, “Egyptians live in Washington, DC are few, and who wanted to approach Washington, DC decision makers are fewer.” MM uncovered, “that is because they choose to live in the suburbs to be close to larger common shopping areas. How they could build any relationship with the Washington, DC center?” When I exposed this example to the next participant, participant SH assured that it could not be an excuse! How about who lives in Washington, DC itself? He thought that could be not enough attribution. The reasons should be more profound than the living choice and more general. He referred that their social and economic life responsibilities keep active and none active members away from immersing in American political life of Washington, DC AW added, “no specific political activity. No lobby or weight to be considered by the decision makers.”

The following themes 5-8 are based on the answers to the second and last research question regarding the engagement style and aspects.”

Theme 5: Individuals and Groups Involve Politically and Organizationally

Several participants believed that engaging in political activities and working for Egypt’s interests in Washington, DC would depend on the individuals. DT said, “Religious individuals and institutes are most active if called by their clergy. I am not sure whether first or new generations are more productive; however, newer generations are much involving in American life, of course, including political aspects. In details, AW said, “as I told you before, Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized and active component; therefore, they demonstrate in different events. However, they are not like before two or four years ago. Immigrants are also active.”

Other participants focused on the difference between generations instead of groups or individuals. AG said, “First generation Egyptians come carrying their baggage. Culturally, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts.” So that, as MM added, “the potential impact on U.S. policy comes from the second and third generations, but they are too recent and small to political activism” Participant GS warned me saying, “new generations, if they participated in political realm, they are about American policies more than Egyptian, no wonder my friend!” SM is a school founder and principal and very active. She emotionally complained, “Unfortunately, there are very few of us, and that makes it a hefty load. I am so tired of being the only woman in gathering or demonstrations or political meetings!”

Theme 6: Egyptian Causes the Individuals Involve in Trying to Persuade the U.S. Government.

The participants did not say much in this matter, and their comments were about three issues: -(a) facilitating the emigration process, (b) the presidential elections, and (c) Egypt-America political relationships. None of the participants mentioned any foreign policy issue, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AG and DD believed that U.S.-Egyptian relations and good Egyptian governance are two top issues of interest. MM reiterated participant AG's sentiment. He said, "Both of these issues are important to the country stability, and we should support it." But he also assured that human rights for all Egyptians including Copts are the priority. Another one mentioned to the Muslim brotherhood situation with this matter; TF said, "The good governance and establishing democracy in Egypt, in particular, is of interest to supporters of that group living in Washington, DC." In contrast to TF's view, DD talked differently about his group, Muslim Brotherhood. He said, "Christians lobby work hard for their sectarian agenda but many Muslims lobby struggle to see the American values practiced in Egypt."

Theme 7: Different Lobbying Types to Promote Egypt's Interests

Related to the previous one, this theme shows examples of issues and activities of the Egyptian activists. A very active participant conceded that there is a small lobbying effort by the Egyptian community; however, lobbying is not only on maintaining democracy and wise governance or against the Egyptian regime. GH said, "Our lobbying agenda includes such as an economic and business promotion group." AG told me not to forget that there was an Egyptian government-supporting lobby during the era of

Mubarak. He added that “Most of the lobbying effort is government inspired or funded and it aims at supporting the regime in power at any moment.” MM added, “most of those lobbying efforts is laughable such as the case during a visit to Washington by the Egyptian president. The embassy rented a mobile screen advertising his achievements. Muslim Brotherhood has their lobby too.” Participant SH reminded me: in 2014 when Elsisi came for the first time, the president supporters and opposers had demonstrated and begun as only two groups in streets, and American local police separated them. We were monitoring who had the biggest number of demonstrators.

Regarding the Islamic groups’ lobbying activities, DD said, “The lobby of the Brotherhood was very active during Obama’s time and cooperating with other Islamic organizations. DT agreed with this opinion and illustrated further, “Muslim Brotherhood runs the headquarter of CAIR [a Muslim charity organization] in Washington, DC. They cooperate with democrat politicians in DC. The politicians in DC know that CAIR members are active in DC.” MH believed that this Islamic organization for charity have been sending donations to the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist Islamic groups in the Middle East regularly. SH added: Now, Trump announced them a terrorist organization. I do not know what they do now; however, they still act individually. MH said, “Hopefully we will have an Egyptian AIPAC. There are UAE and Saudi lobbies, but they are official.” SW, a female participant with a positive attitude along the whole interview, said, “Some does [lobbying]. We need more to assure that Egypt stays in peace and strength.”

Theme 8: Evaluating the Political Performance

This theme evaluated the actions of Egyptian diaspora in general based on the participants' answers and previous themes that were about assessing specific activities of the diaspora. There were two subthemes to this general theme providing concrete examples on the diaspora political engagement. Several participants assessed the current performance of the Egyptian diaspora as low or nothing. Participant SH articulated, "It is far below average...its bad...period." However, SH believed, "Maybe we underestimate our political power and participation."

Some participants attributed this status to several negative reasons. AW said, "They do not want to be active, and if they do, everyone wants to be the boss with no objection." SH though, "Leadership issues should harm the organization unity from the top and that should hinder the collective community work. UV added, "As for lobbying, Egyptian Americans are not active at all because they are used to be politically irrelevant." When I asked FF how about the future, she specified, "Changes may emerge in third and fourth generations."

Subtheme 1: The revolutions reveal the inconsistency of the diaspora political behavior. During the 2011 revolution, obtaining new democratic nonmilitary governance was the principal motive for Egyptians inside Egypt. Diaspora in DC had been backing up the revolutionaries' demand. SH proudly said, "Muslims, Christians, men and women, and even kids had the same motivation and demand; we all were Egyptian only." Another participant, KS, revealed, "Right after the success of the revolution, many Egyptians who lived in DC for long years, had decided to go back home." HA said, "Why not? Mubarak

and his spies had gone. It is safe now.” None of the participants provided me with the actual reason for acting during the revolution in the first place. The participants did not mention to their conflict with the previous regime or any disturbance or challenge to their common interest. All of them spoke about general issues. For example, DD said, “They love to see Egypt as free and just as America. The Arab Spring unified and made us more conscious.” I found that could be a discrepancy between this finding and the conflict theory. However, participants explained why they became politically passive again after the revolution

What happened afterward was very different according to all participants. XY regretfully said, “We all came back to the first square, same same!” That is because, as AG said, “Most of Egyptians react and rarely take a significant initiative.” I asked a different participant whether she agreed on that observation, she said, “Our backing up for the revolution was such reaction.” Thirteen participants out of 16 expressed the same collective belief that was expected, but SG, optimistically said, “Egyptians in Washington, DC generally, are successful in many fields and slowly participating in politics.” However, KF added, “In contrast to the 2011 revolution, the 2013 revolution (or coup) retrieved polarization between Egyptians in Egypt. I think that had reflected on us in Washington, DC.” KF assured that “the diaspora members’ reactive political behavior was between passive and active but not very cooperative as before.”

Subtheme 2: Political role of mosques and churches in Washington, DC. It was mentioned, conservative Muslim groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and many Christian groups, are active more than other diaspora members. Most of the

participants believed that the most successful diaspora institution in political mobilization is the religious institutes and groups. So, they care about the relationship between Egypt and the U.S. governments more than other activists.

There was no agreement among participants, including the secular participants, on the nature of religious institutions' political role. Most of them said that this role is harmful to both countries; however, participants did not equate the mosques' role to the church's role. AW believed, "The effect of the sectors role depends on what is the interests' sort! And who you are. When the active church urges its Christian believers to gather to welcome Elsis in DC that gives him some necessary support; however, DC knows that is fake." SH added, "This role does not harm the state's interests but might be not what our diaspora wants."

However, there is a paradox in the Coptic groups situation as TF implied. He said, "They support the agenda of the Egyptian governments in Washington, DC, but they also lobby claiming unfair governmental treatment. They used to have fair hearings in the Capitol." Therefore, as AE added, "The U.S. government widely suspects any role by the church. Some in Congress; however, echo the Egyptian Church in expressing those claimed grievances." AE asserted that Trump's administration has been raising those grievances with the Egyptian government; but the church role in promoting Egyptian interest remains limited for those grievances. AW saw this matter differently assuring that the U.S. government watches the church, but it does not bother it as it does for mosques. FF said, "They have a better situation here than their situation in Egypt."

No agreement between participants, including the secular participants, on the religious institutions' political role. Their opinions range from "no role" to "it is a bad role." Thus, the clergies should be stopped and limited to their original religious role. MK's opinion was extreme and did not make any difference between the mosque and the Egyptian church. He said, "Mosques and churches are extraordinarily orthodox and anti-modernity, therefore I find their roles in mobilizing Egyptians politically poisonous." The observations of AG supported my hypothesis that Mosques are suspect of hosting radicals. He said, "They are infiltrated by FBI agents and informers. Both the Egyptian and U.S. governments suspect them. Therefore their role remains minimal."

In contrast, one or two participants only thought that mosques in Washington, DC have no political role, but the church had an active part all the time supporting Elsisi's agenda. One participant only who called for the role of the mosques and churches; DD added, "there is no dialogue between Christians and Muslims of Egyptian origin, and there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good for all of us. I tried many times but did not achieve positive results."

As a result, several participants agreed that there should be an affirmative separation between religion and the state. The former leader of AEA, MK asserted, "There should be no role for mosques and churches in promoting political interest. Such separation doesn't exist, however, but the role played by these religious institutions is limited anyway in America." Therefore, as SH reminded me: President Sadat said during the Muslim-Christian clash in 1981, that no religion in politics...no politics in religion." Consequently, he asserted to me that America-Trump should know and apply this golden

role, which Obama and Carter did not consider, and we pay the price now. Listen, Imams and Moncks should lead prayers only.”

Summary

The principal conclusion from the findings of this study is that the theme of home culture explained the Egyptian diaspora typical passive political engagement. There are several positive characteristics of the diaspora as well as positive elements in the host country culture and system, such as living in the tolerant political climate of Washington, DC close to the decision-makers. However, the diaspora members did not take enough advantage on those elements because of the negative effect of the political home culture characteristics. All participants agreed that the diaspora should continually and actively contribute to the Egyptian interests in Washington, DC through socioeconomic and political discourse, family relations, and networks; however, the practice is different. Participants underlined several cultural characteristics in conjunction with external factors that are hindering their political efforts.

The members, especially the older generation, preserved that domain culture and its several aspects, despite their claim of long-living and total assimilation in the open climate of Washington, DC. It seems that climate factor and high level of education and carrier did not result in a high level of political engagement because of the opposite effect of other factors. The cultural aspects are such as the busy personal life schedules, insufficient help to new immigrants, lack of adequate organizational unity or cooperation, competitive internal relationships, fear of Egyptian political and security authorities, and lack of political ties with Washington, DC.

All participants agreed that the external factor of the revolution was the greatest motivation for acting for all Egyptians, including the diaspora in recent time. This finding might confirm my hypothesis that the Egyptian diaspora acts when it has a compelling and exceptional motivation such as the revolution. However, it remained unclear why and how, if they are culturally passive, such a factor (i.e., revolution) changed their behavior temporarily, or whether it was the change in the culture itself.

All participants provided enough information regarding their political concerns and reasons for acting politically such as establishing a new democratic rule in Egypt or economic support for Egyptians. However, none of them talked about their mechanism of building and utilizing the desired lobby working on those concerns. For example, participants did not mention reaching out to think tanks, or knocking on the door of Washington, DC agencies.

The diaspora does not act as a whole. Engaging in political activities would depend on individuals and specific groups. All participants agreed that Christians lobby for their sectarian agenda and many Muslims lobby actively more than others. Participants used the term *individuals* and similar terms frequently. For example, participants stated, “Initiatives normally take the form of small demonstration...it depends on the individual.” and “Egyptian diaspora members’ success stories are individual.” There were fewer female participants than male participants. The female participants spoke and participated less in my interviews. This note can be a small indicator of the low level of their participation and interest in large.

The Egyptian diaspora has difficulty maintaining and investing in political relationships as well as obtaining their noncompetitive internal relationships. Participants' answers could imply that establishing active organizations and having internal cooperative relationships serving one national agenda was not a high priority for some of the diaspora members. Some participants admitted that there is national political polarization that they had brought to their host country. However, none of their responses were clear enough about the influence of that polarization, if any, on the diaspora interrelationships and political activities in Washington, DC.

In Chapter 5, I will analyze and interpret the findings in the context of the theoretical framework. I then will present the implications of the research study's findings for positive social change at the appropriate level and provided my study recommendations for future researchers in the field. Finally, I will outline the limitations of this research, followed by a conclusion that captures the essence of the study.

Chapter 5 Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore, describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013 revolution or coup. In this chapter, I present my interpretation of the findings of this study focusing on some key themes of the results, such as the effect of home culture on the diaspora organizational development and political engagement and the style of its involvement.

In this study, I discovered that the overall perception of the Egyptian diaspora community on its contemporary engagement was negative. All participants asserted the political engagement of the diaspora is affected negatively by the home culture side-by-side with a few other factors related to the homeland and host country. Therefore, I worked from the premise that exploring the present situation of Egyptian diaspora's political engagement is essential to establish a sustainable diaspora with healthy future participation towards building an organized influential lobby in Washington, DC

The key findings also implied that Egyptian Americans participate in politics in Washington, DC not because they are interested in politics in general or American politics in particular but because they react to home politics. They do not engage in Washington, DC political activity regarding U.S. or Egyptian political affairs because they did not learn or use to participate in the Egyptian political realm inside Egypt.

In the discussion of the results in this chapter, I further incorporate viewpoints from the literature as presented in Chapter 2 that are related to the findings of this study. Likewise, the theories of the passive political and social engagement of the Korean diaspora, conflict theory of Truman, and the climate theory of Cigler and Loomis (2007) were applied to the findings as appropriate. In the following sections, I discuss the limitations, recommendations, and implications of the study. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

Interpretation of the Findings

The findings of this research revealed a generally negative image of the Egyptian diaspora and its contemporary political engagement. The diaspora engagement inclines to be passive most of the time and to be active from time to time. Such perception was particularly confirmed in the literature review of this study. The majority of Egyptian expats abroad have been more focused on gaining an education and career to build their economic fortunes (Ashour, 2010).

I used a theoretical framework that was based on Jang's (2012, 2014) Korean diaspora negative model to explore the adverse factors of the failing enterprise of Egyptian Americans' lack of political engagement. Some participants suggested that the comparison with the successful Jewish diaspora might be not valid. Jang's model included factors that mainly addressed how and why the Korean-Americans were not very engaging or influential except during intensive times. I applied some of those factors from Jang' (2012, 2014) theory, such as underestimation of the self's political engagement, lack of organization, and negative perception toward politics and

organizational leadership. Besides Jang's theory, my theoretical framework also included other theories and diaspora models to address issues that Jang's theory neglected.

The findings of this study approved several of my hypotheses from Chapter 1. Positive characteristics and external factors are not always enough or capable of imposing a positive change or keeping it in the diaspora reality; for instance, the excellent education, employment and supportive political and social climate of the host country. Cigler and Loomis's (2007) climate theory indicated that a national, tolerant environment should shape the expected proliferation of interest groups and organizations. The general norm of many participants in this study was in line with this theory. However, they also believed that the current generation did not understand the climate, so they use the system of the host city. AG said, "The problem of the low level of political engagement was not the Washington system." One of the diaspora members' significant problems was the home culture of disorganization and lack of unity among the members and groups. That culture has been hindering them from politically investing in the open climate of Washington, DC.

The effect of host climate was not enough to help the diaspora members; therefore, they became passive again when they lost the homeland motive to be active politically. Several participants asserted that they were assimilated in U.S. society a long time ago. However, the diaspora does not remain consistently engaged in the supportive U.S. atmosphere despite that claim of assimilation, according to the participants. This finding was further vindicated in the literature review of this study, as described by Talani (2005) who stated that despite the members of many Egyptian diasporas deciding

to become new citizens and assimilate into the Western host countries, they still have difficulty being accepted and integrated into the political realm.

I sought to determine what factors made the diaspora members typically passive and not influential most of the time, and I found that those factors are primarily cultural. Ashour (2010) stated that the Egyptian diaspora is divided along political, ideological, religious, and social class lines. Participant MK described the diaspora members resorting to their political “tribes” and covering a wide range of small goals against Egyptian nationality and losing the national framework.

The study findings also showed that the participants’ loyalty to Egypt is high but is highest to the culture. All study participants reported that the lack of organizational unification is a cultural characteristic. That culture includes several elements, such as adopting sectorial agendas instead of recognized national purpose and organizational leadership. Previous researchers, such as Cigler and Loomis (2007) and Oswiecimski (2014), linked passive engagement to the lack of unified political organizations. Müller-Funk (2016) found that sharing common situations and believing and working for the same causes among the members are essential elements for the diaspora’s proliferation and development.

In general, a diaspora needs to found organizations or lobbies holding a clear agenda and reasonable goals to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). However, the results of this study revealed that the situation of the contemporary Egyptian diaspora in general and AEA in particular is static and has clear polarization. Fourteen participants out of the 16 admitted that the members have ongoing

disputes on essential matters, such as leadership, the organization's agenda, and political orientation.

Many researchers also asserted the effect of losing an announced, clear organizational purpose and goals among the Egyptian diaspora members and groups, in particular, and Arab Americans in general. Smith (2000) and Ambrosio (2002) contended that organizational unity might enable the diaspora to convince decision-makers to support its political agenda. Therefore, the diaspora might have a chance to shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014). These sentiments are backed up by a participant's report. A congressman advised this participant to encourage the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC to announce a single agenda if the diaspora needs consideration from Congress. When divisions occur within the diaspora and it loses its united voice, it will be harder to gain or keep support outside it for its political cause (Uslaner, 2007).

All participants asserted that building mutual relationships within the political structure of Washington, DC in terms of enhancing the diaspora role in both countries should be beneficial to the diaspora, Egypt, and the United States. Regarding the effect of the different types and levels of diaspora relationships, the response of participants ranged from "I do not know," "no relationship at all," or "minimal relationship; therefore, low effect should be expected." All participants admitted the lack of trust between diaspora members and Egyptian governments, including official agencies, as well as the insufficient relationship between diaspora and Washington, DC decision makers. They also acknowledged that both levels of relationships are deteriorating at an alarming rate.

Some participants specified results of those effective relationships, such as imposing human rights statutes in Egypt. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the host land-diaspora relationship should help resolve some conflicts in the motherland. Participant DD indicated that unfortunately, there is no dialogue between Christians and Muslims of Egyptian origin, and there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good for all.

The study findings determined that it is not true that the Egyptian diaspora never has a political agenda that is based on organizational unity. It is also not true that all sectors of the diaspora do not foster announced or unannounced agendas. The literature explained and asserted the positive changes in the political positions and powers of some diasporas after certain significant events, such as revolutions and Arab Spring. As all participants asserted, their diaspora exceptionally, had a specific national motive based on promising unification between all individuals and different groups during the revolution.

Participants did not mention any home conflict caused by their diaspora involvement. As indicated in Chapter 1, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean diaspora regarding the sudden engagement behavior but not similar regarding the reason of that engagement. According to Jang (2014), Koreans faced a domestic racial conflict that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992. That diaspora understood the need for being active, united, and organized and, therefore, became aware of coalition building. The study participants determined that the Arab Spring revolutions unified and made them more conscious politically. Nevertheless, they gave different reasons for their

enthusiastic reaction to the revolution; for example, DD mentioned that they love to see Egypt as free and just as the United States. The conflict theory of Truman did not align with the findings regarding the real reasons for the diaspora involvement in the revolution activities.

Because of the diaspora's passive home culture, such as typical insufficient organizational unity and waves shape of engagement, it had not been able to keep the revolution factor. All participants, including AEA members, also criticized and blamed the political powers and circumstances in Egypt for the lack of sufficient organization and political engagement. Jang (2014) mentioned the same observation regarding the Korean diaspora but did not explain the reason for that waving shape of the diaspora political and civic engagement.

The theoretical framework for this study held that the political engagement of some diasporas, such as Korean diaspora, might take the waves shape. Some diaspora turn from typically being passive to being active then passive again. The study findings approved this major claim of this study regarding the Egyptian diaspora. This phenomenon is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the homeland. All participants in this study agreed on that phenomenon, but they attributed it to different reasons. MPI (2014, 2015) reports agreed with this finding. A significant portion of new Egyptian organizations was established during the Arab Spring and Egyptian revolutions. Many of those organizations had already grown inactive or disappeared after the revolution. Jang's (2012, 2014) theory clarified that although the domestic racial conflict brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, Koreans have

continued to be inactive. UV explained this phenomenon by attributing the constant passive political engagement of Egyptian lobbying efforts to the fact the Egyptian people used to be politically irrelevant.

Another aspect of the passive engagement and the absence of the culture of organizational unity is the difference between the diaspora members, generations, and groups regarding who could be active and the level of commitment. The difference between involving people should lead to differences between their levels and types of their organizational purposes. Diaspora members can also be different regarding their lobbying efforts and national goals.

In details, all participants agreed that the first generation is politically passive. They also decided on the future political role of the second and third generations in the political realm of Washington, DC. This finding was in line with the theoretical study framework that was based on Jang's (2012, 2014) theory. The first generation of both diasporas has this stand that is more intensive than the position of the later generations. Therefore, the study participants believed that the second generation who understands the politics and culture of both countries could hopefully function as a bridge to represent their citizens and diaspora communities. They have hope in the political involvement of the younger generations.

All participants agreed on the role of mistrust and negative perceptions factor that exists, in particular, among the members of the first generation. That impact of that role is not limited to the diaspora members' intra-relationship, but it extends to the relationship between the diaspora and Egyptian political system and agencies. This

finding is consistent with previous concepts revealed in the literature. It is not just negative perceptions but also mistrust between Egyptian citizens and their governments that affect the citizens as well as diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010).

In line with those statements, Jang (2014) found that cynical perceptions and distrust toward Korean associations and leadership, who belong to the first generation in America is a common trend among Koreans in Washington, DC. It is a common thought that those leaders and politicians only work for their won agenda and family businesses. As the findings of my study indicated, the first generation of the Egyptian diaspora and its leaders have the same situation; therefore, the members refrained from engaging similarly to the Korean case.

The opinion of all participants confirms the prevailing view in the literature review regarding the Coptic lobby in the United States. Rowe (2001), and Severo and Zuolo (2012) emphasized that the lobby members are very active and more organized compared to their Egyptian peers. However, the dispersed Islamic organizations and mosques should also be considered in the same category according to the findings. Mosques have been found to directly and purposefully influence political engagement and perceptions of Arab Muslims (Jang, 2014).

The opinion of most of the participants that the political role of religious institutions and groups is harmful to both countries matches Sheffer's (2006) assertion. This role and nature of some diasporas and groups can be detrimental on the political level causing conflicts and terrorism in the home and host lands. This sentiment seems as opposite to DeWind and Segura's (2014) recommendation; the host land-diaspora

relationship should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland. However, I believe that both statements are compatible.

The general implications of participants' responses indicated that the national purpose of a diaspora would be for the benefit of the diaspora and the home country. In contrast, one sector of the diaspora with a sectorial agenda is usually working against the whole or at least working for selfish demands. As stated by many participants who all are Muslims, the Christian community promotes support for their claim of civic and religious discrimination and the Egyptian military regime. Most of my study participants do not like or at least they do not agree with the Coptic claim and political orientation. Same participants except one who belongs to Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly asserted that the organization is the most organized and active component of the diaspora in Washington, DC. This group works for their won agenda that could be beyond the Egyptian national purpose.

Limitations of the Study

Even though I applied several procedures to enhance trustworthiness, such as members checking and executing multiple data sources, some limitations emerged. One limitation of my research occurred during the data collection process was that the level of participants' cooperation and interaction with the study was average. Even though all participants were asked to be not in a rush for returning their responses, all except one did not respond promptly at all, and some did not respond and ignored my frequent contacts. Three candidates were hesitated to answer my questions during the interview. Their concern was whether I conduct my research for the Egyptian government and

Elsisi, or a U.S. or Egyptian university. They were afraid that I could transfer their information and responses to the security agencies. I assume that some others had the same thought, although they did not say. To overcome their suspicious of my motive, I referred them to the consent form.

Moreover, two candidates from my study had withdrawn after they have agreed on participation. This behavior may imply to their passive political participation concurrent with a lack of cooperation with other Egyptians like me. Another potential recruit who was an Islamist leader advised me to join in a demonstration was conducted by an Islamic group against the Egyptian president and government in front the Capitol Hill. He said that I would meet several people who can accept answering my questions instead of interviewing him! The last potential recruit did not respond to my several e-mails or phone calls.

Despite knowing about the member-checking process and the study duration, most participants took a long time to respond to my request of member checking and did not offer any valuable feedback or corrections to the transcripts. Perhaps, participants answered the questions to the fullest, or they merely browsed their responses. To overcome the threat to quality due to my own potential personal bias as an Egyptian American political activist, I tried to remain objective throughout the entire study while establishing trustworthiness.

Recommendations

While reviewing the available literature on diasporas, I did not find any study on the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. Also, while collecting my study data, I found

there are no Egyptian or U.S. academic surveys, and interviews focusing on the Egyptian diaspora viewpoints. Researchers performing similar studies could use this diaspora model to explore the barriers and opportunities of other new or small-size diasporas situations. According to literature as well as Chapter 4 findings, I found that the political performance of the Egyptian diaspora connects functionally to culture and social background interpretation of the diaspora members. So, to gain a deeper understanding of the political engagement of the diaspora, future scholars could focus on the same diaspora and city in areas other than political area such as social and economic. Therefore, future researchers will be able to build a new inductive composing for a comprehensive model theory on the Egyptian diaspora.

The strength of this study is that it is the first; therefore, all the candidates who accepted to participate were interested in the topic; therefore, they willingly answered the research questions. This involvement indicated that my research was meaningful to participants. Their interest might encourage any follow up study to focus on the same diaspora and city or other areas in the United States. Hence, the knowledge obtained by my study participants would expand. Future research would also provide additional information and recommendations for the Egyptian diaspora as well as decision-makers of the home and host countries to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of that diaspora. Washington, DC should be a good starting point for policy-makers and future researchers if they consider the political engagement of the diaspora.

Implications

In this case study, I based the study implications on the analysis of the subjective perceptions and daily real-life experiences of research participants. Though this study has limitations, implications for positive social change on different levels emerged for policymakers, immigration agencies, and the diaspora itself. Because this study is not a practical one, the study purpose was not about providing information from or to leaders, members, and beneficiaries about strategies for better work. Instead, the study only brought attention to the present status of the Egyptian diaspora and its weaknesses. In this way, the members can design better programs and strategies to empower their community and promote its agenda. Particularly, this section should bring attention to the need for improving better internal relationship the Egyptian diaspora as well as cooperation between it and other diasporas, and the home and host lands.

An organized, active diaspora operating in Washington, DC can be an agent of positive social change in both countries. I asked participants how could their groups or the whole diaspora obtain any benefit from my study and questions. One of them stated, “Highlighting the challenges and the opportunities is always an eye-opener. I hope it leads to a serious dialogue among all Egyptians in America to create a democratic Egypt where all human rights are protected.” However, the Egyptian diaspora sustainability, development, and influence are hindered by many challenges beyond and under its control as Chapter 4 findings presented.

Regarding the potential positive social change on the individual and social levels, the knowledge gained from this study could guide changes in the practices of the

diaspora, including the leaders of AEA. The foremost step towards a competent diaspora and its strong lobby is building personal trust and organizational unity among the group members and leaders (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Those leaders must find ways to remain sustainable by resolving their conflicts and avoiding their personal agendas to reach the desired unity. This is not an easy task, but the diaspora should take advantage of the supportive climate of Washington, DC to work on its individualistic cultures where individuals strive for self-achievement only. I assume that the diaspora needs to build trust with Egyptian citizen and new immigrants via economic contribution and legal aids. Formalizing and intertwining that social role with political action might lead and speed up social and political change in the homeland and the diaspora reality. The Chinese diaspora can be an ideal that the Egyptian diaspora might follow.

The most active organizations and groups such as Muslim and Coptic organizations should be directed towards one national purpose under a single leadership of one diaspora. However, that is a tremendous goal needs a lot of personal, organizational, and political work. Concerning the religious institutions' political role, I would adopt the recommendation of Jang (2012) who considered the religious factor as a critical element of organizational type and unity. Therefore, there is a need for studying the effect of the civic and political role of religious-background institutions factor on the diaspora communities in the host countries, including the United States, particularly, in Washington, DC.

Jang (2014) and my participants emphasized the likelihood of political involvement of the following generations. The second generation who understands the

politics and culture of both countries could function as a bridge to represent their citizens and diaspora communities. On the other hand, new generations might not have the negative traits of the home culture such as negative perceptions mistrust in the homeland politicians and diaspora organizations. Hence, there might be a hope in the political involvement of the younger generations. Future studies might also focus on the empirical implications of that role and why it could have a better chance than the chance of the first generation of the diaspora.

On the organizational and political levels, the whole diaspora, not as groups or individuals, needs to create a collaboration with other incipit diasporas. The diaspora also needs to seek partnerships with the home and host governments regardless of the nature of the existing relationships between the governments. Knowledge of the diaspora efforts and challenges could establish opportunities for partnerships between the governments and diaspora, thus promoting positive social change. Knowledge of goals and plans rendered by the diaspora could add to existing data and assist in the decision-making processes of organizations and governments.

Also, the diaspora should be active, involving in the host country' affairs in the first place; therefore, it would be accepted and heard in its host environment regarding home concerns. Smith (2000) recommended that interests groups, in general, should implement deep understanding and deal with the U.S. political system. Groups should work to foster political relationships with the decision-makers, no matter whether the system could be good or bad according to the groups view. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, diasporas should not try to change the political system of America because it would be

an unrealistic attempt. On the other hand, the favorable climate and policies of the host state should consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a symbol of weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states.

The Egyptian diaspora should investigate, on all possible levels, the factors that kept it passive again after being active during the revolution. The cultural attribution might be not the only factors. The theory of Jang (2012, 2014) and conflict, and climate theories did not offer enough updated explanation regarding the study target diaspora. Hence, future studies need to seek theories and methods to explore other factors explaining that shape of unstable political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and other similar diasporas. The diaspora leaders might need to share the results of this study with their members. That could be as a mean of exploring ways to build their stability of engagement and effective lobby with specific strategies that should enhance and truly empower the diaspora. AEA would be ideal for the whole diaspora in this regard.

Conclusion

The problem of this study was that there is no existing studies or interests in studying the Egyptian diaspora. Given this fact, the contribution of this qualitative study is important to the discipline, diaspora, and related parties. The study is not an applied or comprehensive study, but it forms a foundation for future studies on the same topic. The impact of this qualitative case study is to help the diaspora members in Washington, DC understand their current situation issues. The different views of the study participants may help frame an initiative for some positive social changes in the reality of the whole diaspora.

Some facts in the present diaspora predicament would not be changed in the short term because they are beyond the diaspora control. Perhaps, political culture and small size of the diaspora could take generational time to be enhanced. On the other hand, the diaspora can improve other factors. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone of the diaspora organizational unity. Chapter 4 findings showed that this factor could lead to improving other factors and facts. Besides, the host land-diaspora close relationships should provide opportunities for all, thus resulting in positive social change on all levels and areas (DeWind & Segura, 2014). Residency in Washington, DC is a privilege that is not available for other Egyptian communities and it should facilitate the diaspora access to the decision-makers door. However, to reach positive change, any diaspora should not involve in relationships as individuals or groups. Individual and sectorial relationships and interests could lead to negative changes, especially related to the homeland's interests (Sheffer, 2006) and that is like the present situation.

Given all of these facts, some individuals of the younger generation might be interested in sharing and addressing the findings of this study. There is a need to encourage the younger generation to become more engaged, not only in the host country but also homeland (See Jang, 2012). The Passive culture of the current generation should not affect the coming generations whom born and live in the United States. The ultimate goal is to maintain the organizational unity by avoiding any potential emergence of new religious or sectorial groups and agendas among the new generations. AEA needs to accumulate more efforts in this regard to strengthen the collective political weight and presence of the Egyptian diaspora at the broader community for the future.

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Appendix: Interview Questions

The diaspora term in this questioner is defined as a socio-political entity that maintains connections with Egypt and other Egyptian groups beyond the border and mobilizes for causes. For the purpose of this interview, be aware that the term *diaspora*, would mean *community*

A. Describe your Background (Nationality, education, religion, age, profession) **[Optional]**

1. Why and when did you come to the United States, and DC in particular?
2. Do you think about going back to or staying in Egypt? Why or why not?

B. Identify your political identity

3. What community or political group do you belong to [If applicable]?
- 4 What did lead you to change or not change your original identity since you came to America?
- 5 Who do you admire among the greatest Egyptians of the past and present?
- 6 Do you attend any church service or go to any mosque? If so, how often?

Research Quistion1. How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution, organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, American environment elements, relationship between that diaspora and host country) of political engagement, and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative perception on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization and development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?

C. The level of assimilation and self-identity of the Egyptian community within the American society?

7. Do children learn Arabic because the parents push it, send them to Egypt, and so on?
8. Does second generation become Americans and soon forget how to speak Arabic?
9. What is the level and type of the loyalty the diaspora keeps and shows to Egypt (e.g. financial contribution, showing self-identity, lobbying, and helping newly arrivals in solving their legal concerns)?
10. Do Egyptians, including you, believe that they are Arab? What can be a rationale?
11. How that belief could reflect on the Egyptian Americans identity, and Egyptian political interests?

D. The Egyptian community characteristics and elements

12. Why could you think that the Egyptian and Arab diasporas are typically passive in terms of political activities?
13. What has kept the Egyptian diaspora unorganized and not cooperative politically?
14. Despite the huge population in Egypt, why Egyptian diaspora's size is smaller than others? Can be individuals' immigration personal decision and pattern, or U.S. immigration policy [e.g. green card] a reason?

15 Could the small size be a positive characteristic and thus; the Egyptian diaspora should invest in it similarly to the small Jewish Diaspora? Why and how? (Explanation: Jewish diaspora as an example; the more it is small, the more it is more focusing and stronger)

16 How could mistrust and negative perception of Egyptian politics and government in Egypt and organizations leaders in DC refrain the diaspora from political engagement?

17 Based on those characteristics, how could you evaluate the performance of diaspora?

E. External factors you think discourage or motivate the diaspora political engagement

18 How could the Egyptian diaspora possible concerns [e.g. personal, political and religious fractions among the diaspora members; and Israelis-Palestinians conflict] affect its political activities and engagement?

19 Does the better relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments affect the diaspora negatively? How?

20 How could political American environment elements, i.e. local politics and politicians, foreign policies, and official or public attitude do or do not effect diaspora establishment, engagement, and activities?

21 What do you think about the factor of the relationship between your diaspora and decision maker in the host country or city, Washington, DC that can affect the diaspora position or role?

Research Question 2. How does the Egyptian community in Washington, D.C., act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns such as the presidential revolution and elections?

F. The political engagement style of the Egyptian Diaspora in Washington, DC.

23 Who involves in the Egyptian concerns more than others [first or new generation, men or women, religious or secular persons, or immigrants or citizens...]??

24 What Egyptian issues [i.e. 1-facilitating the emigration process, the presidential elections and constitution, and Egypt-America relationships] make the diaspora (AEA in particular, if applicable) attempting to influence the U.S. government?

G. The Egyptian diaspora's perspective on its political roles and engagement activities in Washington, DC society concerning Egypt issues?

25 How do you, as a member of AEA or not, perceive the way Egyptians have been active in the American political sphere and activities [e.g. voting, financing the political campaigns, contacting American official entities, becoming politicians themselves, or demonstrating]?

26 How much the community members lobby to promote Egypt's interests?

27. Should Washington, DC area mosques, and Coptic institutions play any political role? Is it harmful to the Egyptian state? How could the American government and host environment see that role?